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C HAP T E R 15 
Zoning and Land Use 
RICHARD G. HUBER' 
A. THE NEW ZONING ACT 
§15.1. Effective Date. Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Chapter 808 of the 
Acts and Resolves of 1975 contain the effective date provisions of the 
new Zoning Act (the Act).! Section 7 provides that the Act takes effect 
on January 1, 1976, "as to zoning ordinances and by-laws and 
amendments, other than zoning map amendments, adopted after said 
date."2 The second paragraph of Section 53 provides that zoning or-
dinances and by-laws in effect on January 1, 1976 continue to be gov-
erned by the provisions of the Zoning Enabling Act,4 the former 
Chapter 40A, until either of two events occur. First, the new Act may 
be accepted by cities and towns.5 Second, even if the Act has not been 
*Dean and Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The author acknowledges 
with gratitude and respect the research and writing assistance of Ms. Debra Lay in the 
preparation of the material on the new Zoning Act and the work of Ms. Lay and Ms. 
Mary Holland in the preparation of the sections covering decisions of the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court and the Appeals Court. 
§15.1. 1 Acts of 1975, c. BOB, § 3, G.L. c. 40A, § 7. 
2 Section 4 of the Zoning Act requires that a zoning map be included in any zoning 
ordinance or by-law that divides a city or town into districts. G. L. c. 40A, § 4 (New 
Act). In this light, the exception of zoning map amendments from the effective date of 
the Act seems incongruous. However, the legislature may have intended to allow com-
munities which had previously not mapped or had mapped incorrectly to make appro-
priate changes without going through a cumbersome procedural process. Since the 
mapping would not change the applicable land regulation, no problem of lack of notice 
to property owners would be presented. 
3 This portion of the statute should logically be preceded by G.L. c. 40A, § 7 (New 
Act). There is no apparent reason why the legislature organized this part of the statute 
in this manner. This is one area which should be corrected by the technical revisions 
amendment to the new Zoning Act being considered by the legislature. Mass. H.R. 
4358,1976Sess. §§ 17,IB. 
4 Because of the overlap between the implementation of the new Zoning Act and the 
phase-out of the old Zoning Enabling Act, there are presently two chapters 40A in the 
General Laws. In order to distinguish herein between the two chapters, the designation 
(New Act) will appear following citations to the new Zoning Act. 
o The acceptance procedure is governed by G.L. c. 4, § 4. See also G.L. c. 4, § 6, for 
further provisions applicable only to action taken by a city council. 
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accepted, all provisions of the Zoning Enabling Act cease to be effec-
tive as of June 30, 1978.6 This two and one-half year period will allow 
communities to review their zoning regulations and make the changes 
necessary to bring them into conformity with the new Zoning Act. 7 
Finally, Section 6 provides for the only use specifically exempted from 
the operation of the new Act prior to June 30, 1978. The provisions 
of the Act "shall not be deemed to affect any church or other facilities 
used for religious purposes in existence or under construction prior to 
June 30, 1978."8 The grounds for this limited exemption lie in the 
new policy toward religious facilities expressed in Chapter 808. Under 
Chapter 40A, section 2 of the Zoning Enabling Act, regulations pro-
hibiting or limiting the use of land for religious purposes were invalid. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted this prohibition to en-
compass dimensional regulations, at least in certain situations,9 but not 
parking requirements. to Section 3 of the Zoning Act permits localities 
to impose "reasonable regulations concerning the bulk and height of 
structures, . .. open space, [and] parking" among other re-
quirements.ll The two and one-half year delay in the implementation 
of this section affords churches and other religious associations an 
opportunity to discuss possible regulations with local authorities and, 
if necessary, to make plans for compliance with new regulations.12 
§15.2. Adoption and Amendment of Zoning Ordinances or By-
Laws. One of the legislature's principal purposes in enacting Chap-
ter 808 was to "provide standardized procedures for the administra-
6 G.L. c. 40A, § 5 (New Act). The proposed technical amendments to the new Zoning 
Act make substantive changes in the effective date provisions. Section 17 of the pro-
posed amendment, Mass. H.R. 4358, 1976 Se~., would strike out the last paragraph of 
Section 5 of the new Zoning Act. Section 18 would strike out and replace Section 7 of 
the new Zoning Act. Section 18 proposes that "particular provision of zoning ordi-
nances and by-laws in effect on Uanuary I, 1976] that are inconsistent with [the new 
Zoning Act] shall, until the Act is accepted by a city or town, continue to be governed 
by" the former Chapter 40A. The language of Section 7 currently in force is broader 
than the proposed amendment. Unlike the proposed version, it is susceptible of the in-
terpretation that all ordinances and by-laws in effect on January I, 1976, whether or 
not consistent with the new Chapter 40A, continue to be governed by the former chap-
ter. However, a conflict would probably arise only in a situation in which an ordinance 
or by-law were inconsistent with provisions of the new Act. Therefore the current Sec-
tion 7 could be interpreted in the narrower sense proposed by Section 18 of the 
amendment. In addition, the proposed amendment would delete the exemption of zon-
ing map amendments from the effective date provisions of the new Zoning Act .. See 
note 1 supra. 
7 See Bok and White, The New Zoning Act, 20 BOSTON BAR JOURNAL 11, 16 (February 
1976). 
8 G.L. c. 40A, § 6 (New Act). 
9 Sisters of the Holy Crossv. Town of Brookline, 347 Mass. 486,492-94,198 N.E.2d 624, 
629-31 (1964), noted in 1964 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 14.5. 
10 Radcliffe College v. City of Cambridge, 350 Mass. 613, 618, 215 N.E.2d 892, 896 
(1966), noted in 1966 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §15.1. 
11 G.L. c. 40A, §3. • 
12 This issue is discussed in greater detail at §15.8 note 43 infra. 
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§15.2 ZONING AND LAND USE 451 
tion and promulgation of municipal zoning laws."l Although Section 6 
of the old Zoning Enabling Act mandated procedures for amendment 
and adoption of ordinances and by-laws,2 these provisions would 
not apply to municipalities that derived their zoning powers in-
dependently of the enabling statute.3 Section 5 of the new Zoning Act 
incorporates sections 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the former Chapter 40A.4 The 
new law retains most provisions of the old. It does, however, present 
some significant changes. 
First, the new law designates those persons and groups who may ini-
tiate the adoption or amendment of zoning ordinances or by-laws.s 
The previous act contained no comparable provision. Other sections 
of the General Laws and existing case law authorized a city council, a 
board of selectmen,6 a certain number of registered voters of a town,7 
owners of land affected by the proposed change,S or any person hold-
ing an option to purchase the locus of the change9 to submit proposed 
ordinances or amendments. All except the last of these are enumer-
ated in Section 5. 10 The significant difference is that a board of ap-
peals, planning board or regional planning agency may now also ini-
tiate zoning proposals. 11 A measure of flexibility was retained, since 
the section also states that other methods provided by municipal char-
§15.2. 'Acts of 1975, c. 808, § 2A. 
2 G.L. c. 40A, §2. 
3 There are two theories as to the source of municipal zoning powers. One is that 
municipalities have no power to zone except that expressly granted by the legislature. 
The other is that municipalities possess all zoning powers of the state except as ex-
pressly or implicitly prohibited by the legislature. The Zoning Enabling Act was illustra-
tive of the former theory. The Home Rule Amendment, Article 89 of the Amendments 
to the Constitution (passed in 1966), taken in conjunction with the new Zoning Act illus-
trates the latter theory. Where a municipality did not derive its zoning powers from 
state authorization but from an independent source, the provisions of an "enabling" act 
are, theoretically, inapplicable. 
• See G.L. c. 40A, §5 (New Act). 
5/d. Proposed ordinances or by-laws may be submitted to the municipal legislative 
body "by a city council, a board of selectmen, a board of appeals, by an individual own-
ing land to be affected by change or adoption, by request of registered voters of a town 
pursuant to section ten of chapter thirty-nine, by ten registered voters in a city, by a 
planning board, by a regional planning agency or by other methods provided by munic-
ipal charter." Id. 
8 G.L. c. 39, §§ 1, 10. See Crowell v. Attorney General, 1975 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 141, 
141,322 N.E.2d 87, 88 (rescript). 
7 G.L. c. 39, § 10. 
8 Caires v. Building Comm'r of Hingham, 323 Mass. 589, 595-97, 83 N.E.2d 550, 555 
(1949). 
• Pitman v. City of Medford, 312 Mass. 618, 623-24, 45 N.E.2d 973, 977 (1942). 
'0 G.L. c. 40A, § 5 (New Act). 
"Id. The inclusion of the planning agencies was specifically recommended by the re-
port of the Department of Community Affairs. Mass. H.R. Rep. No. 5009, 1972 Sess., 
at 50-51. This reflects the general policy of the report that the role of planning agencies 
should be expanded in order to effect innovative land use regulation geared to regional 
rather than merely community needs. 
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ter are permissible. 12 The section should, therefore, be interpreted as 
a mandatory, but not exclusive, list of those persons and groups who 
must be allowed to initiate zoning changes. 
After receiving a zoning proposal, a city councilor board of 
selectmen must, within fourteen days, submit the proposed ordinance 
or by-law to the planning board for review.13 The only new aspect of 
this requirement of the Zoning Act is the specification of the 
fourteen-day time limit for the submission of the proposal to the 
planning board. 14 
Section 5 also makes several minor changes in the hearing and 
notice procedure previously contained in Section 6 of the former 
Chapter 40A. Thus, for example, a public hearing must now be held 
within sixty-five, rather than sixty, days after submission of the pro-
posed ordinance or by-law to the planning board.1s Further, the new 
Section 5 provides that a proposal may be adopted after a joint hear-
ing before the planning board and the city council. 16 One question 
raised by the old act was whether or not such a joint hearing was 
permissible. 17 The plain language of the old act indicated that sepa-
rate hearings were required. 18 The hearing before the planning board 
was to be scheduled. prior to that before the city council. The purpose 
of this requirement was to insure that the planning board report on 
the proposed ordinance or by-law would be before the city council 
during its hearing. 19 However the Supreme Judicial Court, in Woods v. 
City of Newton,20 held that a joint hearing was permissible.21 The new 
Zoning Act, in requiring only a joint hearing, indicates that the Legis-
lature has adopted the viewpoint of the Supreme Judicial Court. 22 
Section 5 does provide that no vote on the adoption of the ordinance, 
by-law or amendment can be taken prior to the filing of the planning 
board's report or the passing of twenty-one days after the hearing 
without such filing. Section 6 of the former Chapter 40A had pro-
vided for a twenty-day period in which to file .the report. As under 
the Zoning Enabling Act, a city council's failure to vote within ninety 
12 G.L. c. 40A, § 5 (New Act). See note 5 supra. 
13 G.L. c.40A, § 5 (New Act). 
14 [d. In a town with no planning board, the board of selectmen is required to per-
form this function. [d. 
15 [d. The Department of Community Affairs report suggested a similar change with 
respect to board of appeals procedures. H.R. Rep. No. 5009, 1972 Sess., at 71. 
18 G.L. c. 40A, § 5 (New Act). 
17 The language indicated that the dual hearing requirement applied only to cities. 
G.L. c. 40A, § 2. Since the vote on adoption of town by-laws occurs at town meetings, 
the equivalent of two public hearings is held in this situation also. 
18 1941 Rep. Mass. Att'y Gen. at 43. 
19 H.R. No. 5009, 1972 Sess., at 49-51. 
20 351 Mass. 98, 217 N.E.2d 728 (1966), noted in 1966 ANN.SURV. MAss. LAW § 15.8. 
U [d. at 101-02, 217 N.E.2d at 731-32. 
22 G.L. c. 40A, § 5 (New Act). 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/19
§15.2 ZONINC AND LAND USE 453 
days makes it necessary to repeat the notice and hearing procedure.23 
Similarly, the new Act requires a town meeting vote on a proposed 
regulation within six months. 24 
The technical notice requirements for the public hearing contain 
several changes. Under Section 6 of the Zoning Enabling Act, notice 
could be published in a newspaper of general circulation according to 
a specified timetable. 25 Alternatively, if such a newspaper did not 
exist, notice could be posted conspicuously in the city or town hall. 
This alternative is now a mandatory addition to the newspaper publi-
cation.26 Moreover, the content of the notice must not only describe 
the subject matter of the hearing in a manner "sufficient for identifi-
cation," but must also state the place where texts and maps can be in-
spected.27 The addition of the latter component clarifies the Legisla-
ture's intent as to the interpretation of the phrase "sufficient for iden-
tification". In Crall v. City of Leominster28 the Supreme Judicial Court 
held that a reference in the notice to a plan on file at the board's of-
fice met the requirement that the subject matter be described in a 
manner "sufficient for identification."29 The inclusion in the new Act 
of a requirement that reference be made to the location of maps and 
texts30 appears to conflict with this interpretation.31 
It is mandatory under the new Act that notice by mail, postage pre-
paid, be sent to the Department of Community Affairs, the regional 
planning agency, and the planning boards of all abutting cities or 
towns.32 Legislative history indicates that the purpose of this require-
ment is to facilitate input from agencies outside the community.33 Sec-
tion 5 also provides an optional plan by which notice of pending zon-
ing matters may be given to nonresident property owners pursuant to 
annual request and payment of reasonable fees. 34 Finally, the new Act 
23 C.L. c. 40A, § 5 (New Act). 
24 [d. 
25 C.L. c. 40A, § 2. 
26 [d. 
27 [d. 
28 362 Mass. 95, 284 N.E.2d 610 (1972). 
29 [d. at 99-100,284 N.E.2d at 613. 
30 C.L. c. 40A, § 5 (New Act). 
31 It should be noted that in Crall v. City of Leominster the subject matter had been 
fully described in the notice for the public hearing. 362 Mass. at 99,284 N.E.2d at 613. 
The court characterized the planning board hearing as being only of an advisory na-
ture. [d. at 99-100, 284 N.E.2d at 613. Since it also concluded that interested parties 
had been afforded adequate notice of the proposed zoning change, id., the notice re-
quirements for the planning board hearing were more leniently interpreted. 
32 C.L. c. 40A, § 5 (New Act). 
33 H.R. Rep. No. 5009, 1972 Sess. at 51-52. The department's report had advocated 
that individual planning boards, at their discretion, notify communities as to what they 
thought would be affected by the proposed change. 
34 C.L. C. 40A, § 5 (New Act). As currently set out, this provision applies only to 
boundary or use changes. [d. The technical revisions amendment pending before the 
legislature would add density changes. Mass. H.R. 4358, 1976 Sess., § 4. 
5
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codifies existing case law on the issue of whether defects in the notice 
procedure are jurisdictionaJ.35 Section 5 provides that "[n]o defect in 
the form of any notice under this chapter shall invalidate any zoning 
by-laws or ordinances unless such defect is found to be misleading."36 
Section 7 of the Zoning Enabling Act contained extraordinary 
majority voting provisions for the enactment of zoning amendments.37 
The Department of Community Affairs report noted that this re-
quirement gave a minority a veto power.38 Thus, zoning became in-
flexible as a tool for innovative land use planning and regulation. This 
forced the boards of appeals to engage "in ad hoc rezonin~ through 
an improper use of the variance granting power."39 In additIon, there 
exists no logical reason for distinguishing between initial enactments 
and amendments of ordinances and by-laws. The legislature has re-
sponded by making the two-thirds majority requirement applicable to 
both the initial adoption and the amendment of ordinances and by-
laws.40 The so-called "twenty per cent" clause, however, still applies 
only to amendments.41 It has been modified so as to limit its applica-
tion to city or town councils of fewer than twenty-five members. More 
importantly, the unanimity requirement for councils of fewer than 
nine members has been dropped. The written protest of landowners 
must be submitted prior to final action by the council rather than 
prior to the close of the council's first hearing as was mandated by the 
Enabling Act. Those eligible to protest are limited to owners of land 
either included within the change or immediately adjacent thereto.42 
The changes brought on by the new Act will undoubtedly facilitate 
passage of protested zoning regulations in small cities in which the 
council consists of fewer than nine members. However, the retention 
of the two-thirds majority voting requirement for amendments and 
the addition of the requirement for initial adoption will continue to 
permit a minority to prevent progressive zoning change. It is probable 
that the legislature intended that its new policy with regard to special 
35 See e.g., Shaughnessy v. Board of Appeals of Lexington, 357 Mass .. 9, 13, 255 
N.E.2d 367, 369 (1970), noted in 1970 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 17.12; Bearce v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals of Brockton, 351 Mass. 316, 320-21, 219 N.E.2d 15, 18 (1966), noted in 
1966 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 15.16. 
38 G.L. c. 40A, § 5 (New Act). 
37 G.L. c. 40A, § 2. This provision, which did not apply to initial adoption of ordi-
nances or by-laws, provided that "[n]o change of any zoning ordinance or by-law shall 
be adopted except by a two-thirds vote of all the members of the city council ... or ... 
a town meeting .... " ld. Where, however, a written protest was signed and filed by 
owners of twenty percent or more of the area proposed to be included in the change or 
closely adjacent thereto, the number required for approval rose to three-fourths or 
more depending upon the size of the city council. ld. 
38 MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess. at 52. 
391d. at 52. 
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permits, particularly for cluster zoning and planned unit develop-
ment, would supply the flexibility needed to foster innovative land 
use.43 
An important characteristic of Section 5 of the new Zoning Act is 
that it generally applies to both initial adoption of ordinances and by-
laws and to amendments. Thus, the portion of the section dealing 
with the limitation on the reconsideration of proposed regulations fol-
lowing unfavorable action applies to both categories.44 Its predecessor, 
Section 8 of the former Chapter 40A, applied only to proposed 
amendments.45 Apart from this modification, the provision remains 
substantially the same as Section 8. Similarly, the substance of the 
provisions of Section 5 relating to submission of by-laws and amend-
ments to the attorney general, previously addressed by Section 9 of 
the former Chapter 40A,46 remains unchanged. 
Prior to the passage of the new Zoning Act, newly adopted ordi-
nances, by-laws and amendments were effective in cities upon their 
publication and in towns when published and approved by the attor-
ney general,41 The seventh paragraph of Section 5 of the new Zoning 
Act changes prior law and provides that the effective date of adoption 
or amendment of zoning regulations is the date on which the adop-
tion or amendment was voted on by the municipality's legislative 
body.48 In towns there is the added requirement that "publication in a 
town bulletin or pamphlet and posting has been made or publication 
in a newspaper pursuant to section thirty-two of chapter forty"49 have 
taken place. On the surface, this provision appears to indicate that the 
legislature intended that publication of a town by-law occur prior to 
the taking of the vote in order for that date to be the effective date of 
adoption or amendment. However, this portion of Section 5 must be 
read in conjunction with Section 32 of Chapter 40 of the General 
Laws. Thus, it could be concluded that if the publication did not 
occur prior to the date of the vote then the effective date of the 
by-law would be the date of the attorney general's express or implied 
approval, providing that publication pursuant to Section 32 has oc-
curred. In the event that publication occurred after the attorney gen-
eral's approval, the by-law would become effective after publication. 
This interpretation, although warranted by the language of the Act, 
appears to be self-defeating. It is probable that by-laws could be 
amended in the process of voting at the town meeting. Any substantial 
change in the subject matter would render the prior publication in-
'3 This subject is fully discussed at § 15.9 infra . 
•• G.L. c. 40A, § 5 (New Act). 
45 G.L. c. 40A, § 2. 
4sld. at § 9 . 
• 7 See G.L. c. 40, §§ 32, 32A and G.L. c. 43, §§ 20-23. 
'8 G.L. c. 40A, § 5 (New Act). 
'·Id. 
7
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valid. The new language in Section 5 would, in effect, become mean-
ingless. At least one factor militates against this interpretation. The 
technical revisions amendment,50 which is intended to clarify am-
biguities in Chapter 808, proposes to substitute the words "is sub-
sequently" for the words "has been" in Section 5.51 This change would 
make it clear that the effective date of ordinances and by-laws, as well 
as amendments, adopted by both cities and towns, is the date upon 
which a vote was taken by their respective legislative bodies. In the 
event of subsequent disapproval of a new by-law by the attorney gen-
eral the zoning by-law previously in effect would relate back to the 
date of the vote. Finally, after the adoption of by-laws and ordinances, 
the city or town clerk is required to mail a copy of the new regulation 
to the Department of Community Affairs.52 
Another ambiguity is present in Section 5. The last paragraph of 
the section creates a one-hundred-and-twenty day statute of limita-
tions on any claim of invalidity based upon procedural defects in the 
adoption or amendment process.53 Sections 32 and 32A of Chapter 
40, as most recently amended,54 contain the publication requirements 
for towns and cities. They require that the published or posted notice 
shall contain a statement that claims of invalidity based upon pro-
cedural defects must be made within ninety days of the posting or 
second publication. 55 When these sections are read in conjunction with 
Section 5 of the new Zoning Act, it is apparent that their respective 
periods of limitation may expire on different dates. 56 This contradic-
tion obviously creates great confusion for anyone seeking to institute 
legal action based upon a procedural irregularity in the adoption or 
amendment process. Once again the proposed technical revisions 
amendment seeks to clarify this problem. Sections 1 and 2 of the 
amendment would amend Sections 32 and 32A of Chapter 40, re-
spectively, to mandate that the publication and posting contain the 
50 MASS. H.R. REP. No. 4358, 1976 Sess. 
51Id. at § 7. 
52 G.L. C. 40A, § 5 (New Act). This requirement is another illustration of the empha-
sis on coordinated statewide planning and land use regulation. 
53Id. 5. Acts of 1975, c. 808, §§ I, 2. 
55 G.L. C. 40, §§ 32, 32A. 
58 For instance, a town might publish the by-law prior to the town meeting vote. The 
ninety-day period of G.L. c. 40, § 32, would run from the second publication and ex-
pire during the ninety days allowed for the attorney general's approval. The one 
hundred-and-twenty day period would run from the date of the vote and would prob-
ably extend beyond the attorney general's ninety days. In this hypothetical situation, the 
period of challenge afforded by G.L. c. 40, § 32, would expire prior to the time at 
which it could be known whether the attorney general intended to approve or dis-
approve the by-law. Alternatively, a town might publish the by-law after the vote was 
taken, at the same time the by-law was submitted to the attorney general for his ap-
proval. Once again, the one-hundred-and-twenty day period could extend beyond the 
ninety-day period allowed by G.L. c. 40, § 32. 
8
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same one-hundred-and-twenty day limitation period required by Sec-
tion 5 of the new Zoning Act.57 
§15.3. Variance and Special Permit Granting Procedure. An in-
novative change in the variance and special permit granting proce-
dure concerns those persons or groups authorized to grant variances 
and special permits. Section 13 of the new Zoning Act creates the po-
sition of zoning administrator. 1 The administrator may be delegated 
the authority to hear petitions for variances, applications for special 
permits, and other matters. 2 Prior to this change only the board of 
appeals, with certain exceptions, was empowered to hear these ac-
tions.3 In the formal terminology of the Act, those persons or groups 
authorized to grant variances are referred to as "permit granting au-
thorities" and those authorized to grant special permits as "special 
permit granting authorities." The former category includes the board 
of appeals and zoning administrator.4 The latter is comprised of "the 
board of selectmen, city council, board of appeals, planning board, or 
zoning administrator as designated by zoning ordinance, charter or 
by-law for the issuance of special permits."5 
The hearing, notice and other requirements are located in various 
sections of the Act. Sections 11, 15 and 16 contain requirements gen-
erally applicable to both variances and special permits. These sections 
incorporate some portions of Sections 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the 
former Chapter 40A. They also make significant modifications and 
additions to the procedural requirements of the former act. Sections 9 
and 10 contain both substantive and procedural requirements applica-
ble only to special permits and variances, respectively.6 
One of the first questions which arises under the new procedure is 
57 Mass. H.R. 4358, 1976 Sess., §§ 1, 2. 
§15.3. 1 C.L. c. 40A, § 13 (New Act). 
2 A complete enumeration of the administrator's duties and limitations thereon is 
found in Section 13. 
3 C.L. c. 40A, § 15. In certain circumstances the legislative body of a municipality or 
its delegated committee may function as a board of appeals. See C.L. c. 40A, § 14, and 
C.L. c. 40A, § 12 (New Act). In addition, C.L. c. 40A, § 4, had authorized a board of 
selectmen or city council to grant special permits. 
4 C.L. c. 40A, § 1 (New Act). The proposed technical revisions amendment, Mass. 
H.R. 4358, 1976 Sess., § 3, would amend C.L. c. 40A, § 1 (New Act), by adding the fol-
lowing phrase to the definition of permit granting authorities: the word "administrator" 
would be followed by the words "unless otherwise provided by ordinance, by-law or 
charter." Section I, as currendy in force, could be interpreted as a mandatory, but not 
exclusive provision. It could also be interpreted as a conclusive list of permit granting 
authorities. The amendment would clarify the legislature's intent as to this matter. 
• C.L. c. 40A, § 1 (New Act). The technical revisions amendment would also alter this 
definition by adding the conjunction "or" after the word "administrator" and before "as 
designated." Thus it would be clear that municipalities were free to authorize other per-
sons or groups as special permit granting authorities. 
6 Sections 4 and 15(3) of the Zoning Enabling Act were the predecessors of these sec-
tions. 
9
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with whom an application or petition is filed. The answer to this ques-
tion and similar ones arising under the new Zoning Act may vary with 
the particular person or administrative body that has jurisdiction over 
the particular action. Section 9 of the new Act requires an application 
for a special permit to be filed with the special permit granting au-
thority, and a copy of the application to be given by the applicant to 
the city or town clerk. However, Section 15 now requires that all ap-
plications for special permits or petitions for variances over which the 
board of appeals or zoning administrator exercises original jurisdic-
tion be filed by the petitioner with the city or town clerk. The clerk 
must then transmit a copy of the application or petition to the board 
of appeals or the zoning administrator. In the case of variances, only 
the board of appeals or zoning administrator are considered to be 
permit granting authorities. 7 Therefore, a petition for variance must 
originally be filed with the city or town clerk. In the case of special 
permits, an application must be filed with the city or town clerk if the 
board of appeals or zoning administrator is the special permit grant-
ing authority. If any other group designated in Section 2 of the new 
Zoning Act is the special permit-granting authority, the application 
must originally be filed with the authority and a copy must be given to 
the city or town clerk. 
The new Act also contains significant changes with regard to the 
time within which a hearing must be held on a petition for variance or 
an application for a special permit. Section 17 of the former Chapter 
40A had required that a hearing before the board of appeals be held 
within a reasonable time of filing. The length of this time period was 
limited by the provisions of Section 18 which mandated that the 
board's decision be made within sixty days of the filing of an appeal 
application or petition with the board.8 Under the new Chapter 40A, 
the computation of the time period within which a hearing must be 
held is far more complex. This is particularly so with respect to situa-
tions in which the zoning administrator or board of appeals is the 
permit or special permit granting authority. Section 9 requires that a 
public hearing on an application for a special permit be held within 
sixty-five days after the filing of the application with the special per-
mit granting authority. In the situation in which the board of appeals 
is the special permit granting authority, Section 15 contains a separate 
provision that a public hearing must be held within sixty-five days 
from the date of the transmittal of the application to the board by the 
city or town clerk. This requirement also applies to the hearing on pe-
titions for variances. 
If the zoning administrator is the granting authority, however, prob-
lems arise irrespective of whether the application is for a variance or 
7 G.L. c. 40A, § I (New Act). See n. 4 supra. 
8 According to the former Chapter 40A, § 4, these requirements were applicable to a 
city councilor board of selectmen authorized to hear special permits. 
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for a special permit. In the former case, since there are no distinct 
provisions concerning the hearing procedure for variances, Section 13 
would seem to apply.9 Section 13 mandates that a zoning adminis-
trator render a decision within thirty-five days after the date of filing 
of the application.10 On the other hand, if a special permit is at issue, 
the thirty-five day limitation mandated by Section 13 is in direct con-
flict with the sixty-five day period allowed to special permit granting 
authorities by Section 9. In view of the publication and notice re-
quirementsll for hearings on both variances and special permits, it 
would appear to be difficult to provide acceptable notice and hold a 
hearing within the thirty-five day period. However, since as a general 
rule of statutory construction the specific controls the general,12 the 
thrity-five day period would appear to take priority. Alternatively, the 
sixty-five day period in Section 15 could be interpreted as applying to 
the zoning administrator. The proposition would be that the adminis-
trator, as the delegate of the board's authority, should be subject to 
the same requirements concerning the hearing process as the board of 
appeals. However, given the specific provisions of Section 13, it is un-
likely that this argument would prevail. 
Section II of the new Zoning Act contains the basic notice require-
ment concerning variance and special permit granting procedure. The 
timetable for newspaper publication of notice prior to the public hear-
ing remains unchanged.13 It is now mandatory, however, that notice 
of the hearing also be posted in a conspicuous place in the city or 
town hall. The newly adopted Sections 9 and 10 require that notice of 
hearings on special permits and variances be sent by mail to all parties 
in interest. The term "parties in interest," as defined in Section II 
and applicable to all of Chapter 40A, means "the petitioner, abutters, 
owners of land directly opposite on any public or private street or way 
and owners of land within three hundred feet of the property line, 
the planning board of the city or town, ... and the planning board of 
every abutting" city and town.14 The parties must be determined by 
their appearance on the most recent applicable tax list, a requirement 
carried over from Section 17 of the former act. A new component re-
quires that the assessors maintaining the tax lists certify the names 
9 G.L. c. 40A, § 13 (New Act). 
10 The same question arises as to which filing is referred to here, the date of filing 
with the city or town clerk or the date of transmittal to the administrator. 
11 See text at notes 13-14 infra. 
U Pereira v. New England LNG Co., Inc., 364 Mass. 109, 118-19, 301 N.E.2d 441, 
447 (1973). 
13 The former Act provided for newspaper publication in each of two successive 
weeks, the first such publication to be not less than fourteen days before a hearing of 
any petition for a variance, appeal or other matter. G.L. c. 40A, § 17. 
14 G.L. c. 40A, § 11 (New Act). There is an obvious omission following the word 
"abutting." Id. Mass. H.R. 4358, 1976 Sess., § 15, would amend that section by adding 
"city and town" after "abutting" in the definition of parties in interest. 
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and addresses of parties in interest to the permit or special permit 
granting authority. This certification is conclusive for all purposes. 
Section 11 also contains a new procedure by which notice may be 
waived. 
The statutory requirements for the content of the notice have been 
altered. Section 17 of the former Chapter 40A had required that the 
notice contain the petitioner's name, the location of the premises sub-
ject to the petition and the date and place of the public hearing. In 
addition, it provided that the hearing could not be held on the day of 
a state or municipal election, caucus, or primary. The new Zoning Act 
retains these four provisions. As compared to the earlier statute, how-
ever, the new Act indicates more specifically what are considered the 
adequate methods of identifying the subject property. A street ad-
dress, for instance, is sufficient. Finally, Section 11 adds the require-
ment that the subject matter of the hearing and the nature of the re-
lief requested, if any, must be specified. 
The time within which a granting authority must take action on an 
application or petition has been altered by Sections 9 and 15 of the 
new Zoning Act. As noted previously, the former Section 18 had re-
quired a decision on either a petition for a variance or an application 
for a special permit within sixty days after the date on which the ac-
tion was filed. The new Section 9 requires that a special permit grant-
ing authority must act within ninety days following the public hear-
ing. 1s Failure to take final action16 within this time period is deemed 
to be a grant of the relief sought.17 The voting requirements for this 
action, formerly addressed by Section 19, have been somewhat mod-
ified. A unanimous vote of a board of three members and a vote of 
four out of five members of a five-member authority are still re-
quired. However, the new Act reduces to two-thirds extraordinary 
majority requirements for authorities of more than five members, 
which called for the concurrence of all but one vote. This change will 
undoubtedly make the granting of special permits by large authorities 
more feasible. 
According to Section 15 of the new Act, action on variances must be 
taken by the board of appeals within seventy-five days of the filing of 
th~ petition with the city or town clerk. Similarly to the provisions for 
special permits, Section 15 provides that failure of the board to act on 
15 C.L. c. 40A, § 9 (New Act). If the special permit authority is a city council, it may 
appoint a committee of its members to hold the public hearing. Id . 
• 6Id. Mass. H.R. 4358, 1976 Sess., § 14, would amend C.L. c. 40A, § 9 (New Act) by 
substituting the word "act" for the words "take final action." This indicates that the 
legislature anticipates problems of interpretation as to the meaning of "final action", 
and that its intent was not to require final action within 90 days. Also indicative of the 
legislature's intent is the fact that the analogous requirement of variance procedure 
mandates that the board of appeals "act" within a specified time limit. See C.L. c. 40A, § 
15, (New Act). 
17 C.L. c. 40A, § 15 (New Act). 
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the petition within this time period is deemed to be a grant of the re-
lief sought. Confusion will updoubtedly arise as to the time within 
which a zoning administrator, the other. designated permit granting 
authority, is required to act. The previous discussion of the provisions 
pertaining to the period within which a hearing on a special permit or 
variance must be held noted that Section 13 of the new Act requires 
the zoning administrator to render a decision within thirty-five days of 
an applicant's or petitioner's filing and action. This is the only provi-
sion which specifically pertains to this aspect of the zoning adminis-
trator's function as a permit granting authority. The same argument 
which was considered in the previous discussion could be raised here 
as well. As the delegate authority of the board of appeals, the ad-
ministrator arguably should be subject to the same time requirements 
as the board. This position is further bolstered by the argument that 
the procedural requirements for the granting of a variance should not 
vary with the identity of the granting authority. However, the chances 
of this interpretation's prevailing are probably slight. There is one 
compelling argument in favor of placing different time limitations on 
the zoning administrator. That position, unlike the board of appeals, 
would be full-time. The administrator would not be bound by the 
convention of weekly, bi-weekly or monthly meetings and, therefore, 
might be expected to deal with actions more expeditiously. The voting 
requirements for the board of appeals remain unchanged.18 Section 
15 requires a unanimous vote of a board of three members and a vote 
of four out of five members of a five-member board. t9 
There were particular requirements in the former Zoning Enabling 
Act pertaining to the board of appeals' keeping and filing of a de-
tailed record of its proceedings. These have been carried over into 
Section 15 of the new Act, with only one significant modification: it is 
no longer necessary for a copy of the detailed record to be filed with 
the office of the local planning board. However, Section 11, which is 
applicable to both special permit and permit granting authorities, does 
require that the decision be filed with the planning board. The new 
Act has, in general, been modified to reflect the creation of alternative 
authorities empowered to hear petitions for variances and applications 
for special permits. Section 15, however, refers to requirements such 
as those concerning the detailed record, which apply only to the board 
of appeals regardless of whether it is functioning as a permit or spe-
cial permit granting authority. Thus, according to the new Act, only if 
an ordinance or by-law has designated the board of appeals as the 
18 These requirements were formerly addressed by G.L. c. 40A, § 19, and are noted 
in the disrussion of special permit requirements. 
19 The voting requirements for the board of appeals have been tailored to the new 
size requirements for the board contained in G.L. c. 40A, § 12 (New Act). This may 
well cause difficulties in any situation in which the city councilor board of selectmen 
acts as a board of appeals pending its appointment. 
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permit or special permit granting authority is it necessary for a de-
tailed record of the proceedings to be kept. In the case of both vari-
ance and special permit hearings before a zoning administrator, it 
could beargued that this requirement should apply. Again, however, 
it is unlikely that this interpretation would be accepted. 
An even more serious problem arises under the new Act concerning 
the application of the "detailed record" requirement to special permit 
proceedings before a city council, a board of selectmen, or any other 
designated authority. Section 4 of the former Chapter 40A had man-
dated that the procedural requirements of Section 18, as well as those 
of Sections 17, 19, 20 and 21, be followed by the city councilor board 
of selectmen if those bodies were empowered to entertain special 
permit proceedings. This provision is conspicuously absent from the 
new Zoning Act. Therefore, a facial examination of the Act would in-
dicate that different procedures must be followed depending not 
upon the type of action involved, but upon the authority empowered 
to hear the action. Although this interpretation appears warranted by 
the omission of the above mentioned provision, it is more reasonable 
to assume that procedures should be uniform for a particular type of 
action. Resolution of this specific problem as well as the others dis-
cussed previously must await the attention of the judiciary, or pref-
erably, that of the legislature by way of amendment. 
Another area in which the new Zoning Act creates requirements 
generally applicable to permit and special permit granting authorities, 
and others specifically applicable only to the board of appeals, con-
cerns notice following decisions on variances and special permits. The 
former Section 18 had required that notice of decisions of the board 
of appeals, the usual variance and special permit granting authority 
under the former act, be sent to the parties in interest20 and to each 
person present at the hearing who requested notice and supplied his 
address. An analogous notice provision which applies only to the 
board of appeals is now found in Section 15 of the new Act. There 
are some slight modifications, however. Section 15 specifies the "peti-
tioner, applicant or appellant" as parties to whom notice must be sent . 
.There are changes in the composition of parties in interest as they 
appear in Section 11 of the Act. The most significant, and potentially 
troublesome, requirement is that the notice contain a statement that 
judicial appeals must be brought pursuant to Section 17, and must be 
filed within twenty days of the fihng of the notice of the decision with 
the city or town clerk. 21 
The notice provisions of Section 18 of the Zoning Enabling Act, 
which took effect only upon the granting of a limited or conditional 
10 "Parties in interest" was defined in G.L. c. 40A, § 11 (New Act). See text at note 14 
supra. 
II See G.L. c. 40A, § 17 (New Act). Problems created by this provision are discussed in 
§ 15.4 infra, which deals with judicial appeals. 
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variance or special permit, appear to be the source of the more gen-
erally applicable notice provisions of the new Section 11.22 Further, 
not only does the provision now apply to the decisions of any permit 
granting or special permit granting authority, but it also adds sub-
stantive requirements concerning the content of the decision. Accord-
ing to Section 11, the decision must not only contain the name and 
address of the owner and identify the land affected, as required 
under the prior act; it must also set forth compliance with the appro-
priate statutory requirements for issuance, and must certify that 
copies of the decision and all plans referred to therein have been filed 
with the planning board and the city or town clerk.23 Section 15, as 
was noted earlier, requires only that decisions of the board of appeals 
be filed with the town or city clerk. It could be assumed that since the 
filing requirements of Sections 11 and 15 do not actually conflict, the 
generally applicable filing requirements of Section 11 would be effec-
tive as to the board of appeals. Thus, it would be necessary to file the 
decision in both offices. 
Section 11 also specifies the date upon which the variance or special 
permit shall take effect; such variance or permit becomes effective 
upon certification by the city or town clerk with the appropriate reg-
istry of deeds. 24 The portion of the effective date provision which will 
be problematical concerns the city or town clerk's certification of the 
passage of the appeal period. A problem arises because the legislature 
omitted to specify the time from which the clerk must certify that the 
appeal period has run. The provision merely requires that the clerk 
certify that "twenty days have elapsed and no appeal has been filed or 
if [it] has been filed, that it has been dismissed or denied." The pro-
posed technical amendments revision to Chapter 808 of the Acts of 
1975 would clarify this requirement by adding the phrase "after the 
decision has been filed in the office of the city or town clerk" after the 
word "elapsed."25 In addition, Section 17 of the new Act, which per-
tains to judicial appeals, mandates that appeals must be taken within 
twenty days of the filing of the decision with the city or town clerk. It 
would, therefore, appear that the period requiring certification should 
be calculated from this date. 
However, this conclusion is placed somewhat in doubt when Section 
11 is read in conjunction with the specialized notice requirements re-
22 The portion carried over from the former Section 18 mandates that the appropri-
ate authority issue to the owner of the land a certified copy of its decision containing 
the name and address of the owner and identifying the land affected. 
'3 There is also a slight alteration made in the new Section 11 requiring that the au-
thority also issue a certified copy to the applicant if he is not the owner. 
'4 This particular provision was strongly recommended by the report of the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs, MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess. at 72. Under the 
prior G.L. c. 40A, § 18, the recording requirement was applicable only upon the grant-
ing of limited or conditional variances or special permits . 
•• Mass. H.R. 4358, 1976 Sess., § 16. 
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lating to the board of appeals contained in Section 15 of the new Act. 
That section requires that the notice of the board's decision contain a 
statement that judicial appeals must be taken within twenty days after 
the filing of the notice of the decision in the clerk's office, not within 
twenty days after the filing of the decision itself. If these two docu-
ments were filed simultaneously then no uncertainty would arise as to 
the commencement and expiration dates of the appeal period. Con-
sequently, there would be no confusion as to the effective date of the 
variance or special permit. If they were not filed on the same date, 
however, and the board of appeals is the permit or special permit 
granting authority, then the notice of appeal sent to the parties would 
specify one appeal period according to Section 15, and the city or 
town clerk would certify another period pursuant to Section 11. Thus, 
assuming proper recording, in this situation the variance or special 
permit might be technically effective under Section 11 prior to the 
expiration of the appeal period under Section 15. If the specialized 
requirements for notice by the board of appeals are to govern the 
general requirements, then it would seem that the clerk should be re-
quired to calculate the period within which board of appeals decisions 
must be appealed from the date on which notice of its decision, rather 
than the decision itself, was filed. 
There has been a major rewriting of the provisions concerning re-
consideration of any petition for variance or application for special 
permit which has been acted upon unfavorably. Section 16, which 
contains these provisions,26 is generally applicable to permit and spe-
cial permit granting authorities. The section presents several major 
changes in the reconsideration procedure. Formerly, a matter which 
had been unfavorably acted upon could not be reconsidered by the 
board of appeals within two years from the date of the unfavorable 
action. The exception to this rule occurred when all but one of the 
members of the planning board, or board of selectmen if there was no 
planning board, consented to the reconsideration. The requirements 
of the new Act are far more demanding. Not only must all but one 
member of the planning board consent, but there must be a finding 
by the special permit or permit granting authority that there have 
been "specific and material changes in the conditions upon which the 
previous unfavorable action was based."27 Moreover, the authority 
must describe the changes in the record of its proceedings. Notice of 
the time and place of the planning board's meeting concerning its 
consent must now be given to all parties in interest.28 
28 G.L. c. 40A, § 20 was the parallel section of the Zoning Enabling Act. 
2. G.L. c. 40A, § 16 (New Act). The voting requiremerits for this finding are: (1) a 
unanimous vote of three-member board; (2) a vote of four out of five members of a 
five-member board; and (3) a two-thirds majority of a board of more than five mem-
bers. This third provision would only apply to special permit granting authorities which 
may be composed of more than five members. See G.L. c. 40A, §§ 1,9 (New Act) . 
•• G.L. c. 40A, § 16 (New Act). . 
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Section 16, in addition, contains a new procedure by which petitions 
or applications which have been transmitted to the proper authority 
may be withdrawn without prejudice. If the withdrawal occurs sub-
sequent to the publication of notice of the public hearing, it requires 
approval of the authority in order to be deemed without prejudice. 
No approval is required if the withdrawal occurs prior to the publica-
tion of notice.29 A problem of interpretation may arise concerning the 
meaning of "publication" in this context. The word could refer to 
either the first publication or the completed process of publication. If 
the purpose of the provision is to prevent misinformation and in-
convenience to potential parties in interest, then the former in-
terpretation would appear more plausible. Moreover, attempted with-
drawal of an action subsequent to the first publication would require a 
factual determination of the inconvenience caused and the effects of 
the withdrawal. The fact that the section provides the mechanism by 
which this factual determination can be made further supports the in-
terpretation of "publication" as meaning first instance of publication. 
§l5.4. Appeals Procedure: Administrative Appeals: Judicial Ap-
peals. The procedure for administrative appeals pursuant to the new 
Zoning Act is contained in Sections 8, 13, 14, 15, and 16.1 The new 
Zoning Act retains several of the appeals provisions of Section 13 of 
the former act. Thus, any person aggrieved by his inability to obtain a 
permit, or by any order or decision of the building or other adminis-
trative official, is still entitled to take an administrative appeal. Any of-
ficer of the city or town may also appeal to the board of appeals. Sec-
tion 8 of the new Act, in addition, specifies several categories of po-
tential "aggrieved persons." These include any person aggrieved by 
his inability to obtain enforcement action from administrative of-
ficers,2 the regional planning agency in whose area the city or town is 
situated, or an officer or board of an abutting city or town. 
Under the new Act, an administrative appeal may be taken either to 
the zoning administrator or to the board of appeals. Under the 
291d. 
§15.4. 1 This procedure was previously addressed by Sections 13-20 of the former 
Chapter 40A. 
2 Controversy had previously arisen concerning the interpretation of language of the 
former G.L. c. 40A, § 13 concerning the "order or decision." The question was whether 
the statutory language included the denial of enforcement by a building inspector. The 
Supreme Judicial Court has held that a denial of a request for enforcement is an order 
or decision only if the denial is evidenced by a "writing." Williams v. Inspector of 
Bldgs., 341 Mass. 188, 190, 168 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1960) weed in 1960 ANN. SURV. MASS. 
LAW §§ 13.5, 13.6. The inclusion of the inability to obtain enforcement as a potential 
grievance obviates the necessity of construing. "order or decision" so as to encompass 
this situation. In addition, the section of the new Act concerning enforcement, Section 
7, requires that if a request to a building inspector is made, he must act or respond in 
writing within fourteen days after receipt of the request. 
17
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former zoning statute, only the board of appeals was empowered to 
hear appeals.3 A common situation in which appeals arise is that fol-
lowing the denial of a permit by the building inspector. In localities 
following the suggestion of the new Act, this type of appeal would be 
taken to the zoning administrator.4 The decision of the administrator 
may, in turn, be appealed to the board of appeals.s 
There has been significant reorganization and some modification of 
the appeals provisions of the former zoning statute.6 Sections 15 and 
16 of the new Act, address the basic requirements. Pertinent pro-
visions, however, are also found in Sections 13 and 14. Under Section 
15 the time within which an appeal may be taken continues to be 
thirty days from the date of the order of decision in question. 7 Both 
Sections 13 and 15 contain specific provisions concerning appeals 
from the zoning administrator to the board of appeals. An aggrieved 
person may appeal within thirty days after the administrator's decision 
is filed with the city or town clerk. If the administrator makes no deci-
sion within thirty-five days from the date of the original filing of the 
petition, application or appeal,S the matter is deemed denied. It is 
thereafter subject to appeal to the board of appeals. 9 The re-
quirements contained in the second paragraph of Section 15 are iden-
tical to those of the first paragraph with one exception. In a case in 
which the appeal arises under Section 8, the city or town clerk must 
transmit copies of the notice of appeal "to the officer whose decision 
was the subject of the initial appeal" to the zoning administrator.1o 
The n~w Section 15 also incorporates provisions of the former act 
concerning the scheduling of meetings and hearings, voting re-
quirements, and the keeping of records.u Generally, these provisions 
apply not only to appeals, but also to variances and special permits.12 
The board of appeals is now required to hold a hearing within sixty-
five days of the transmittal of the appeal from the city or town clerk 
to the board. The former Section 17 had required the board to 
schedule a hearing within a "reasonable time."13 Notice of the hearing 
3 G.L. c. 40A, § 13 (New Act) creates the position of zoning administrator. See § 15.3 
supra for a discussion of this position. 
4 G.L. c. 40A, § 13 (New Act). 
5Id. 
6 The procedural requirements of appeals were found in Sections 16 through 20 of 
the former Chapter 40A. 
7 The only alteration is the use of the appropriate terminology, "permit granting au-
thority," and "zoning administrator," introduced by Chapter 808 of the Acts of 1975. 
8 G.L. c. 40A, § 13 (New Act). The statute does not clearly indicate to which filing 
date is referred. This interpretation seems to be the most sensible one. 
9 G.L. c. 40A, §§ 13, 15 (New Act). 
10 G.L. c. 40A, § 15 (New Act). 
11 These provisions were found in Sections 18 and 19 of the former Chapter 40A. 
12 See § 15.3 supra. 
13 The board was limited by the sixty-day period in which it was required to render 
its decision. G.L. c. 40A, § 18. 
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must be provided in accordance with Section 11 of the new Act. 14 In 
conjunction with the requirement of holding a hearing within sixty-
five days, the board has seventy-five days from the date of the filing 
of the appeal in which to make a decision rather than the sixty days 
previously provided by Section 18. A substantive change worked by 
the new Act is that the board's failure to act within the seventy-five 
days is deemed to be a grant of whatever relief was being sought.1s 
This is, of course, subject to judicial appeal. 
The voting requirements of former Section 19 are substantively un-
changed. They have been modified, however, to conform to the size 
requirements of the board of appeals, either three or five members, 
contained in the new Section 12. Thus, in a board of three members, 
all must concur, and in a board of five members, four must concur, in 
order to reverse an administrative official's decision under Chapter 
40A. The language of the former act making the requirements 
applicable to decisions in favor of the applicant in any zoning matter 
has been deleted from the new Act. In exercising any of the powers 
granted to it by the new Section 14, the board of appeals has all the 
same powers formerly designated in Section 19 of the Zoning En-
abling Act. The only new component is that the board may specifically 
"make orders of decisions."16 The board is required to keep a record 
of its proceedings in the same manner provided for in the former 
Section 18. According to that section, a copy of the record had to be 
filed with the city or town clerk and become a matter of public record. 
It is no longer necessary, under Section 15 of the new Zoning Act, for 
a copy of the record to be filed with the planning board. 
There is a slight modification in the provisions for mailing notice of 
the board's decision. Section 18 had specified that notice be sent to all 
parties in interest, as well as to those present at the hearing who re-
quested notice and stated their addresses. The latter is unchanged. 
The definition of parties in interest, however, has been modified. The 
former definition included the petitioner, abutters, those owning land 
adjoining the land of abutters, the municipality's planning board and 
possibly the board of the adjoining municipality. The new Act deletes 
abutters of abutters as parties in interest. It adds owners of land di-
rectly opposite the property in question on any public or private street 
or way, and owners of land within three hundred feet. It also appears 
to require that the planning board of every abutting city and town be 
notified. 17 Section 15 of the new Zoning Act also explicitly provides 
that the petitioner, applicant, or appellant be notified. The former 
Sections 17 and 18, read in conjunction, required notice only to a "pe-
14 See § 15.3 supra for a discussion of the provisions of Section 11. 
15 C.L. c. 40A, § 15 (New Act). 
16 [d. at § 14. This may indicate legislative recognition of the board's expanded pow-
ers under the Anti-Snob Zoning Law. C.L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23. 
17 See § 15.3 note 14 supra. 
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titioner". This explicit provision shows a legislative intent not to re-
strict the notice provision only to petitions for variances. There is also 
a new requirement concerning the content of the notice. Judicial ap-
peals must now be made according to Section 1 7 and must be filed 
within twenty days after the notice is filed with the office of the city or 
town clerk. IS 
Section 16 of the new Zoning Act contains the limitations on the re-
consideration of appeals, petitions for variances, and special permits. 19 
The significant changes in the procedure have been fully discussed in 
the preceding section concerning variance and special permit granting 
procedure. 
A questi~n exists under the new Act as to the propriety of the 
mandamus remedy. Under the prior act, it was generally agreed that 
a mandamus action would lie to require the local official to enforce an 
ordinance or by-law. This would short-circuit the more arduous route 
of the administrative appeal. However, Section 7 of the new Act, 
which addresses the subject of enforcement of ordinances and by-laws, 
mandates, among other things, that no action, suit or proceeding be 
maintained in any court except in accordance with that section, Sec-
tion 8 and Section 17. Thus, Section 7 can be read as eliminating the 
mandamus/ remedy. The last paragraph of Section 7, however, con-
tains a statement of the jurisdiction of the superior court to enforce 
the provisions of the chapter, and is a brief version of the mandate 
contained previously in Section 22 of the former act. This may well 
indicate that, despite S~ction 7's broad language, the legislature did 
not intend to alter the availability of the mandamus remedy. 
The basic framework of the judicial appeal process contained in the 
former Section 21 has been carried over into Section 17 of the new 
Zoning Act. There are, however, several new requirements relative to 
the content of the complaint and notice. The most significant change 
is the omission of appeals to the district court. As under the former 
act, appeals may be taken from decisions of the board of appeals to 
the appropriate superior court, the Land Court pursuant to Chapter 
240, Section 14A of the General Laws, and in Hamden County, to the 
Housing or superior court of that county.20 In accordance with other 
changes in the new Act, appeals are also authorized from any other 
special permit granting authority. Any person aggrieved by the deci-
sion of the board of appeals or other authority, or by any municipal 
18 This provision is potentially troublesome. It appears to create two differently calcu-
lated appeal periods. One would run from the date of filing the decision in question ac-
cording to Sections 11 and 17. The other would be calculated from the date of filing 
notice according to Section 15. This problem is discussed in relation to the effective 
date of variances and special permits in § 15.3 supra. 
19 This matter was previously addressed by Section 20 of the former Chapter 40A. 
20 A provision for the transfer upon motion of a bill in equity from the Supreme 
Court to the Housing Court has been deleted from Section 17. 
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officer or board, has standing to appeal the decision. Under Section 
17 of the new Act, the city council no longer automatically has stand-
ing to appeal. 
The requirement that actions be brought within twenty days after 
the decision is filed with the city or town clerk has been retained. 21 
Notice to the city or town clerk of the appeal must be given so as to 
be received within twenty days from the date of the filing of the deci-
sion.22 
There are important new provisions concerning the contents of the 
complaint. It is now mandatory that the complaint contain an allega-
tion that the decision exceeds the authority of the board of appeals or 
other permit or special permit granting authority. The complaint 
must, in addition, state any facts pertinent to the issue. It should be 
carefully noted that this is an exception to the notice-pleading re-
quirements of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, it 
must contain a prayer that the decision be annulled. As under the 
former Section 21, there must be annexed to the complaint a certified 
copy of the decision from which the appeal is taken. When the com-
plaint is filed by a person other than the original applicant, appellant 
or petitioner, that person and all members of the board or other au-
thority must be named as parties defendant. The new additional re-
quirement is that their addresses be included in the complaint. This 
provision had recently been deleted from Section 21 of the former act 
by Chapter 1114, Section 4 of the Acts of 1973. In place of the service 
of process required by the former act, the plaintiff is now required to 
send written notice to all defendants, including board members, 
within fourteen days of filing the complaint. This can be accomplished 
by certified mail or by delivery. An affidavit of notice must be filed 
with the court within twenty-one days after the entry of the complaint. 
The only alteration of this requirement is the change in the time from 
which the twenty-one days runs. Section 21 had required filing of the 
affidavit within twenty-one days aiter the commencement of the ac-
tion. The commencement of the action and the entry of the complaint 
may denote the same time. However, it would also be possible to con-
strue the time of commencement as the date of the service of the 
complaint on the defendant. The language of the new Act more pre-
cisely indicates which time is meant. The provisions as to dismissal of 
the complaint for failure to file the affidavit on time have been re-
tained. The requirement has been construed as directory rather than 
21 See § 13.3 supra. 
22 This represents a change from the wording of the former Section 21 which re-
quired notice to be given within a twenty-one day period. Substantively, however, the 
new language works no change. It merely reflects the longstanding perception that the 
notice must be received within the twenty-one day period; see Bjornlund v. Zoning Bd. 
of Appeals, 353 Mass. 757, 231 N.E.2d 365 (1967), the "new" language had also ap-
peared in a previous version of the statute, G.L. c. 40A, § 21. 
21
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mandatory. There is no reason to expect that interpretation to be 
changed. 
Finally, when it is necessary to give notice in the manner specified 
above, the applicant or board members who receive notice are not re-
quired to file an answer.23 However, Section 17 also provides that if 
an answer is filed, notice of the filing together with a copy of the an-
swer and affidavit of notice must be sent within seven days after the 
filing of the answer, to all parties by certified mail or by delivery. The 
section also requires that notice of the hearing be given to all parties 
by the clerk of the court whether or not they have appeared in the ac-
tion.24 
There is no change in the type of hearing to which the appellant is 
entitled except that the court can now make any"decree" rather than 
any 'judgment" as was specified by the former Section 21. The parties 
retain the rights of appeal and exception as in other equity cases. The 
provisions pertaining to appointment of counsel to an officer or board 
for the purposes of appeal contain slight modifications. Counsel must 
be "independent." The provision of counsel for subsequent action is 
limited to action that the parties are authorized to take. The former 
Act had limited this to action that the parties were permitted to take. 
The significance of this alteration may be that the new term connotes 
positive action while the former term may have required only acquies-
cence of a municipality. The portions of Section 17 concerning 
allowance of costs against parties, and the precedence of appeals over 
other civil actions, are virtually identical to their predecessors in Sec-
tion 21. 
There is an important new provision in Section 17 as to which de-
fects in procedure or notice are jurisdictional. This change reflects the 
Supreme Judicial Court's decisions in this matter.25 Even the specified 
defects must be challenged by a proceeding commenced within ninety 
days after the decision in question has been filed in the office of the 
city or town clerk. 
§15.5. Enforcement of Zoning Ordinances and By-Laws. There 
are two types of procedures by which zoning ordinances and by-laws 
may be enforced, administrative and judicial. In the former Chapter 
40A, the provisions pertaining to these procedures were located in 
separate sections. Section 12 had addressed the administrative, and 
Section 22 the judicial. In the new Zoning Act they are located to-
gether in Section 7. 
Administrative Enforcement. The most effective method of enforce-
ment is the withholding of building permits in situations in which a 
23 This provision has been carried over from the former Section 21. 
24 This requirement makes apparent the reason for mandating that the addresses of 
board members and the petitioner be included in the complaint. 
2S See, e.g., Garfield v. Board of Appeals, 356 Mass. 37, 247 N.E.2d 720 (1969). 
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zoning violation would occur. A mandatory building permit system is 
a prerequisite to this mode of enforcement. Such a system was not re-
quired by the General Laws prior to January 1, 1975. In order to un-
derstand the changes that have been made in the former Section 12, a 
portion of which has been incorporated into the new Section 7, it is 
first necessary to comprehend the changes that have been worked in 
the law relating to building codes. Prior to January 1, 1975, Section 3 
of Chapter 143 of the General Laws had provided that municipalities 
were permitted, but not required, to establish their own building 
codes and a permit system designed to enforce them. Section 2 of 
Chapter 143 of the General Laws had authorized the regulation of 
uses. The former Section 12 had to be read in conjunction with those 
sections. If a municipality had promulgated a building code and re-
quired permits, then Section 12 mandated that permits be withheld if 
the proposed construction or alteration of a building or structure 
would have been in violation of the zoning laws. Similarly, Section 12 
required denial of a permit if the new use of a building, structure or 
land would have violated zoning ordinances or by-laws. On the other 
hand, if a municipality had no building code, then the establishment 
of a system of permitS to prevent zoning violations was merely permis-
sive.1 
Chapter 143 of the General Laws was thoroughly revised by Chap-
ter 802 of the Acts of 1972, which became effective on January 1, 
1975. The effect of this revision and that of a companion statute relat-
ing to the state building commission2 was to mandate the promulga-
tion of a compulsory state building code. The Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts State Building Code is applicable to virtually all buildings in 
Massachusetts.3 The Code promulgates a mandatory system of permits 
for construction and alteration,4 as well as changes in existing uses.5 
The provisions of the State Building Code relating to specified aspects 
of construction and use of materials take precedence over any zoning 
regulations which purport to regulate these areas. 6 
The language of Section 7 of the new Zoning Act reflects these 
changes in the building code law.The first sentence of the former Sec-
tion 12, which mandated withholding of building permits for con-
struction, alteration, or change in use that would violate zoning re-
gulations, has been retained with two significant alterations. The ter-
minology used to describe building permit issuing authorities now 
correlates to the language of Chapter 143 of the General Laws. It is 
explicitly required that a permit for the moving of a structure which 
§15.5. 1 MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess., 54-55. 
I G.L. c. 23B, §§16-21. 
3 Commonwealth of Massachusetts State Building Code §l00.1. 
4Id. at §lOS.ll. See also itt. at §§1l3.I, 114.0. 
5 Id. at § I 05.0. 
8Id. at 6101.3. See G.L. c. 40A, §3 (New Act), which contains similar provisions. 
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would violate zoning ordinances or by-laws be withheld. The second 
sentence of the former Section 12, which provided for the situation in 
which a municipality had no building code, has been deleted from the 
new Section 7 since this situation could no longer exist. Therefore, the 
final result of the amendments discussed above is to provide 
municipalities with a mandatory building permit system, and, con-
sequently, a mandatory system of withholding permits in order to en-
force zoning ordinances and by-laws. 
Section 7 also provides a new procedure by which any person may 
request enforcement of zoning ordinances and by-laws. The provision 
is designed to bring such requests within the administrative appeals 
process. 7 First, a person must make a written request for enforcement. 
I n the event that the official or board charged with enforcement de-
clines to act, he or it is required to notify the party who made the re-
quest in writing. This response must occur within fourteen days of the 
receipt of the request. The denial of the request is then subject to 
administrative appeal pursuant to Section 8 of the new Act. The pro-
cedure incorporates elements of both judicial decisions8 and the exist-
ing practices of some municipalities.9 
The final aspect of administrative enforcement procedure contained 
in Section 7 is the authorization of criminal penalties for violations of 
zoning ordinances and by-laws. A municipality may provide a penalty 
of up to one hundred dollars per violation, each day that the violation 
continues constituting a separate offense. Although this provision is a 
new component of the Zoning Act, it has its basis in a decision of the 
Supreme Judicial Court. The Court held, in Commonwealth v. Sostilio, 1O 
that the power to impose fines for violations of zoning ordinances and 
by-laws was contained in Section 21 of Chapter 40 of the General 
Laws.u Legislative history indicates that the new Act's explicit provi-
sion for this power was intended to make communities aware of this 
option. 12 
Judicial Enforcement. Section 7 contains a new provision that explicitly 
limits all actions resulting from alleged violations of zoning laws to 
7 MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess., 57. 
8 Williams v. Inspector of Bldgs. of Belmont, 341 Mass. 188, 190, 168 N.E.2d 257, 
259 (1960), noted in 1969 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §§13.5,13.6. This case required a "writ-
ing" as evidence of an order or decision in order to bring a denial of enforcement 
within Section 13 of the former G.L. c. 40A. Id. 
9 MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess. at 55. 
10 351 Mass. 419, 221 N.E.2d 764 (1966). 
11 /d. at 421-22,221 N.E.2d at 765-66. Section 21 contains a general authorization di-
rected to cities and towns which empowers them to both make orders and by-laws and 
to affix penalties for the violation thereof. St. 1975, c. 107, increased the $50.00 fine 
discussed in the Sostilio case to a $200.00 maximum. Since the legislature has explicitly 
provided for the power to fine in G.L. c. 40A, the rationale of the Sostilio decision 
would appear to be unnecessary and no longer applicable to penalties for zoning viola-
tions. 
12 MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess. at 58. 
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those allowed by Section 7, 8, and 17 of the new Act. Generally, the 
provisions of the former Section 22 pertaining to the jurisdiction of 
the superior court have been retained, although in a somewhat mod-
ified and reorganized form.13 There is, however, one exception: that 
portion of the section authorizing the attorney general to bring an in-
formation in equity has been deleted. The retention of the jurisdiction 
provision indicates that remedies previously available under the 
former section 22 will continue to be available under the new Zoning 
Act. In particular there is no reason to doubt that a citizen may com-
pel local enforcement officials to act by petitioning for a writ of man-
damus.14 There may be less occasion for the use of this action in view 
of the new emphasis on the use of the administrative appeals process. 
The action will, however, remain available. 
The new Zoning Act also retains the statute of limitations provision 
of the prior act,15 with several important alterations. Section 22 of the 
former statute created a six-year statute of limitations for maintaining 
certain actions. If real property had been improved and used pur-
suant to a duly authorized and issued building permit, then no action 
based upon an alleged zoning violation could be brought pertaining 
either to the use or to the structure itself after six years had elapsed 
from the issuance of the permit. Under Section 7 of the new Act, the 
six-year statute of limitations runs from· the commencement of the 
alleged violation rather than from the date on which the permit was 
issued. There is the added requirement that, within the same period, 
notice of the action must be recorded in the registry of deeds for each 
county or district in which the land is located. The notice must con-
tain "names of one or more of the owners of record, the name of the 
person initiating the action, and adequate identification of the struc-
ture and the alleged violation."16 
§15.6. Substantive Changes in Variance Granting Proce-
dure. The section of the new Zoning Act governing the granting of 
variances, while it retains some of the provisions of Zoning Enabling 
Act, is generally more restrictive than the parallel section of the 
former statute. The new statute, as did its predecessor, provides that a 
variance from the applicable zoning ordinances or by-laws shall not be 
granted unless three requirements are met.1 First, the conditions on 
13 Thus, for example, the statement of the superior court's jurisdiction no longer con-
tains any reference to equity. This change reflects the tenor of the revised Mas-
sachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure which abolished the traditional procedural distinc-
tion between equitable and legal actions. MASS. R. CIV. P. 2. 
14Cf Woods v. City of Newton, 349 Mass. 373, 379, 208 N.E.2d 508, 513 (1965), 
noted in 1965 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 14.13. 
15 G.L. c. 40A, § 7 (New Act). 
16 [d. 
§15.6. 1 These requirements, previously contained in Section 15(3) of Chapter 40A, 
are found in the new Section 10. 
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which the petition is based must especially affect the land or building 
in question, but not generally affect the zoning district in which it was 
located. Second, a literal enforcement of the zoning regulation must 
involve substantial hardship, financial or otherwise, to the petitioner. 
Finally, it must be possible to grant the variance "without substantial 
detriment to the public good and without nullifying or substantially 
derogating from the intent or purpose of [the] ordinance or by-Iaw."2 
In addition to the three requirements that have been retained, how-
ever, Section 10 includes several new substantive provisions regulating 
the granting of variances.3 The circumstances which lead to the peti-
tion for a variance must now relate to the "soil conditions, shape, or 
topography of such land or structures."4 It can be expected that this 
provision will not only make it more difficult to obtain a variance, but 
that it will also cause problems of interpretation. These will include 
the definition of the term "topography" and its application to a "struc-
ture" as required by the Act. 5 
Unlike the former Chapter 40A, the new Section 10 places limita-
tions on the granting of use variances. Thus, unless a local ordinance 
or by-law expressly permits variances for use, such variances may not 
be authorized for a use or activity not otherwise permitted in the dis-
trict. 6 An exception is made, however, for use variances which were 
properly granted prior to January I, 1976, and which were limited in 
time. 7 They "may be extended on the same terms and conditions that 
were in effect [on the Zoning Act's] effective date."g 
Section 1 0 has also enlarged upon and modified the language of the 
former Section 15 which authorized the board of appeals to impose 
limitations of time and use upon variances and to impose conditions 
upon the continuation of a permitted use. The permit granting au-
thority may now impose conditions, safeguards, and limitations on 
time and use, including the continued existence of a particular struc-
ture. 9 Section 10 specifically excludes the imposition of any condi-
tions, safeguards or limitations based upon continued ownership of 
• G.L. c. 40A, § 10 (New Act). 
3Id. The former Section 15 had contained not only the standards for grant of a vari-
ance, but also the powers of the board of appeals. Unlike that section, the new Section 
lOis devoted solely to the subject of variances. 
·Id. 
S WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY defines "topography" as it ap-
pears to be used in Section 10 as " ... the configuration of a surface including its relief 
and the position of its natural and man-made features .... " It is also defined as "the 
physical or natural features of an object or entity and their structural relationships." It 
appears unclear whether or not the term may be appropriately applied to "structures." 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2411 (G. & C. Merriam Co., 1963). 
8 G.L. c. 40A, § 10 (New Act). For an explanation of the change and the reasons 
therefore, see MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess., at 65-66. 
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the land or structure for which the variance is granted. lo This codifies 
previous decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court which have held that 
conditions must relate to the land or structures and not to. particular 
persons. ll 
Finally, there is a new provision which has the effect of requiring 
that the rights authorized by a variance be exercised within one year 
after granting. If this is not done, then all procedural requirements 
must be complied with again in order to re-establish the variance.12 
§15.7. Creation and Powers of Board of Appeals: Creation of Of-
fice of Zoning Administration. Sections 12 and 14 of the new Zon-
ing Act concern the appointment and powers of the board of ap-
peals. l These sections with few changes reflect the provisions of the 
former Chapter 40A contained in Sections 14, 15 and 19.2 As under 
the former Section 14, zoning ordinances or by-laws are required to 
provide for a board of appeals. 3 That section had, in addition, pro-
vided that a previously existing board under either local building or 
planning ordinances would fulfill the requirement,4 and alternatively 
that a zoning board could act under those ordinances. These pro-
visions are absent from the new Act. 5 Instead it allows departure from 
the requirements only where "otherwise provided by charter."6 
Other significant changes in the new Act concern the permissible 
number of board members, the board's authority to employ experts 
and clerical assistants, and the board's duty to promulgate and file 
rules. The Zoning Enabling Act had required that a board of appeals 
contain at least three members. 7 Section 12 now mandates that the 
board be composed of three or five members.8 The second change, 
10 [d. 
11 See, e.g., Aronson v. Board of Appeals of Stoneham, 349 Mass. 593, 595, 211 
N.E.2d 228, 229 (1965), noted in 1966 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 15.5. 
12 C.L. c. 40A, § 10 (New Act). 
§15.7. 1 C.L. c. 40A, §§ 12, 14 (New Act). 
2 C.L. c. 40A, §§ 14, 15 and 19. 
3 C.L. c. 40A, § 12 (New Act). 
4 C.L. c. 40A, § 14. 
5 C.L. c. 40A, §§ 12, 14 (New Act). In the case of a previously existing board of ap-
peals under the building code, this change conforms zoning practice to the provisions 
of the recently promulgated State Building Code. See C.L. c. 143. See text at § 15.5 for 
a discussion of this change. Cenerally, the change is consistent with the primary pur-
pose of the Zoning Act: to create standardized procedures for zoning promulgation and 
administration. 
• C.L. c. 40A, § 12 (New Act). This is a reflection of the theory underlying the Zon-
ing Act that municipalities have inherent zoning powers subject to limitation by the 
state. See § 15.2 n.3 supra. 
7 C.L. c. 40A, § 14. 
8 C.L. c. 40A, § 12 (New Act). The legislative history indicates several reasons for this 
change, including the possibility of tie votes in even membered boards and the un-
wieldiness of large boards; MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess., 70. The report takes 
the position that larger boards distort the majority required for favorable action on zon-
ing matters. 
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explicit inclusion of the board's authority to employ assistants, was 
presumably calculated to advise communities of their option to do this 
rather than to clarify any dispute over the propriety of such action. 
Finally, the requirement that the board adopt rules " ... for the con-
duct of its business and for the purposes of this chapter ... " and file 
a copy with the city or town clerk9 is a necessary and expected corol-
lary to the legislative purpose of the Zoning Act: standardization of 
procedures for the administration of zoning regulations. 10 The admin-
istration of zoning ordinances and by-laws is often an informal pro-
cess. A board, although aware of procedural and substantive statutory 
standards, may deviate from them.H Not only might the promulgation 
of rules put property owners on notice as to board procedures, but 
also it might make the board itself more conscious of them. Both of 
these results would effectuate the legislative goal. 
The powers of the board of appeals are collected in Section 14 of 
the new Act. 12 They appeared previously in Sections 15 and 19.13 The 
board retains the power to hear appeals from the action or inaction of 
administrative officers,14 chiefly building inspectors, and to hear ap-
plications for special permits15 and petitions for variances. 16 In ac-
cordance with the creation of the position of zoning administrator, 
appeals from his or her decisions are also authorized. 17 The specific 
types of action which the board may take are enumerated. It " ... 
may, in conforming with the provisions of [Chapter 40A], make or-
ders or decisions, reverse or affirm in whole or in part, or modify any 
order or decision .... "18 While doing so it possesses all the powers of 
the individual whose decision is appealed and " ... may issue or direct 
the issuance of a permit."19 
The creation of the office of zoning administrator2o is one of the 
most important features of the new Act. Authorization of the position 
is not mandatory. Once an ordinance or by-law gives such authoriza-
tion, however, the appointment is the responsibility of the board of 
9 C.L. c. 40A, § 12 (New Act). 
10 Acts of 1975, c. 808, § 2. 
11 MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess., at 64-65. 
12 C.L. c. 40A, § 14 (New Act). 
13 C.L. c. 40A, §§ 15, 19. 
14 C.L. c. 40A, § 14 (New Act). These are now denoted "section 8 appeals" and are 
substantially the same as appeals under G.L. c. 40A, § 13, prior to the passage of the 
new Zoning Act. 
IO C.L. c. 40A, § 14 (New Act). This is, of course, subject to the requirement that the 
board be empowered to act as a special permit-granting authority by ordinance or by-
law. C.L. c. 40A, § 1 (New Act). 




20 [d. at § 13. 
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appeals unless the charter provides otherwise.21 The appointment of 
the zoning administrator is subject to confirmation by the appropriate 
legislative body, which may establish qualifications pertaining to the 
office. The administrator then serves at the pleasure of the board. 22 
Some of the board's powers may be delegated to the administrator 
subject to voting requirements.23 The fact and scope of the delegation 
must be recorded in the board's rules and regulations.24 As noted 
above, Section 14 authorizes appeals from the administrator's de-
cisions to the board. This new position has the potential for bringing 
both efficiency and expertise to zoning administration. Unlike the 
board of appeals, the administrator's position would presumably be a 
full time, exclusive occupation. As a result he could hear more zoning 
actions and undertake more sophisticated analysis of zoning laws than 
can part-time boards. The procedures specifically applicable to the 
administrator reflect the legislature's intent that this occur. Since the 
position is not mandated but only permitted it is now up to local 
communities to put this change into effect. 
§ 15.S. Purposes of Zoning: Limitations on Zoning Reg-
ulations. The purposes of zoning regulations, which were contained 
in Sections 2 and 3 of the former Chapter 40A, are now found in the 
preamble to the new Zoning Act ("the preamble"}.1 This consolidation 
of the permissible objectives of zoning in one section also represents a 
reorganization in which the purposes of zoning regulations have been 
separated from the limitations imposed on them. 
Purposes if Zoning Regulations. The first and most obvious change 
follows from the theoretical shift of which the Zoning Act is illustra-
tive. Rather than mandating the purposes of zoning, the preamble 
suggests a non-exclusive list of general objectives. This reflects, first, 
the notion that cities and towns have inherent zoning powers limited 
only by general law. 2 Secondly, it is indicative of the legislature's in-
tent that zoning be used as a flexible tool for innovative land use. 
Such a conception of zoning mandates a good deal of discretion on 
the part of municipalities. The suggested objectives include all of the 
purposes of zoning enumerated in the former Section 33 and several 
2lld. 
22ld. 
ISld. If the board has three members all must concur; if five, then all but one must 
concur.ld. 
Uld. at § 12. 
§ 15.8. 1 1975 Mass. Acts c. 808, § 2A. 
2 See discussion in note 3, §15.2 supra. 
3 "Zoning regulations and restrictions shall be designed among other purposes to 
lessen congestion in the streets; to conserve health; to secure safety from fire, panic and 
other dangers; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent over crowding of land; to 
avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of trans-
portation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements; to conserve 
29
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additional ones. The preamble has modified that part of the former 
Section 3 concerning the adequate provision of certain public re-
quirements by expressly including water supply, drainage and open 
space. To the provision addressing the conservation of land, the pre-
amble added the objectives of the conservation of natural resources 
and the prevention of blight and pollution of the environment. En-
couragement of appropriate land use should now include "considera-
tion of the recommendations of the master plan, if any, adopted by 
the planning board and the comprehensive plan, if any, of the re-
gional planning agency."4 An entirely new suggested objective is to 
encourage housing for persons of all income levels. 
The preamble then enumerates specific areas which may be re-
stricted, prohibited, permitted or regulated.s Many of these areas 
were addressed by the former Section 2.6 The preamble has modified 
or deleted some provisions, and added some new areas that are spe-
the value of land and buildings; to encourage the most appropriate use of land 
throughout the city or town; and to preserve and increase its amenities." G.L. c. 40A, 
§3 c. 808. 
There has been a slight change in two of these purposes which does not seem signifi-
cant. The provision to "prevent overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of 
population; ... " is separated by a comma rather than a semicolon in the preamble, 
1975 Mass. Acts c. 808, § 2A. These phrases could be read to mean that the prevention 
of overcrowding should be for the purpose of avoiding an undue concentration of 
population rather than as two separate purposes of zoning. 
4 For a discussion of this change, see MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess., 12-13. 
Consideration of the regional agency's comprehensive plan comports with other 
changes in the Zoning Act that facilitate regional cooperation concerning zoning reg-
ulations which affect a community larger than the city or town promulgating the reg-
ulations. See G.L. c. 40A, §§5, 8 (New Act). 
5 This section apparently attempts to clarify the legislature's intent to authorize the 
prohibition of particular areas. There had been some confusion as to whether the 
words "regulate" and "restrict" used in the former Section 2 encompassed outright pro-
hibition. 
8 Section 2 provided in relevant part: 
For the purpose of promoting the health, safety, convenience, morals or welfare of 
its inhabitants, any city, except Boston and any town, may ... regulate and restrict 
the height, number of stories, and size of buildings and structures, the size and 
width of lots, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts 
and other open spaces, the density of population and the location and use of build-
ing, structures and land for trade, industry, agriculture, residence or other pur-
poses; ... 
For any or all of such purposes a zoning ordinance or by-law may divide the 
municipality into districts of such number and shape and area as may be deemed 
best suited to carry out the purposes of this chapter, and within such districts it 
may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration or 
use of buildings, and structures, or use of land, and may prohibit noxious trades 
within the municipality or any specified part thereof . . . . A zoning ordinance or 
by-law may provide that lands deemed subject to seasonal or periodic flooding 
shall not be used for residence or other purposes in such a manner as to endanger 
the health or safety of the occupants thereof. 
G.L. c. 40A, §2. 
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cifically subject to zoning regulations. There is no longer any express 
authorization for the division of a city or town into zoning districts. 
Given the theoretical change of the new Act this may well have been 
superfluous, since such division is, at least in theory, fundamental to 
the concept of zoning. In addition, the provision authorizing the reg-
ulation of the erection, construction, reconstruction and alteration of 
buildings and structures has been deleted. This change reflects de-
cisions of the Supreme Judicial Court concerning the respective 
spheres of operation of zoning laws and building codes. The former 
are designed "to stabilize the use of property and to protect an area 
from deleterious uses.... [whereas] a building code 'relates to the 
safety and structure of buildings.' "7 There is a corresponding change 
in Section 3 of the new Act which prohibits ordinances or by-laws 
from regulating or restricting materials or methods of construction 
governed by the state building code.8 
As under Section 2 of the former act, the preamble provides that 
uses of land, including certain flood plains, may be regulated. 9 The 
provision that lands subject to flooding not be used in such a manner 
as to endanger the occupants' health or safety, however, has been 
omitted. The preamble also specifically mentions that wetlands are an 
area subject to zoning regulation. 10 In this case, also, there was a cor-
responding limitation in Section 3 that municipalities cannot exempt 
land or structures from the state's flood plain or wetlands legislation. ll 
Of the particular aspects of buildings and structures which may be 
regulated the preamble omits only the number of stories and the 
enumeration of the particular uses of structures which may be reg-
ulated.12 The bulk of a building or structure is expressly subject to 
regulation, and signs are included within the meaning of the word 
"structure."13 Further, the preamble expressly recognizes that signs 
are subject as well to the law relating to outdoor advertising. 14 
According to the preamble, noxious uses remain susceptible to zon-
ing regulation,15 as do the areas and dimensions of land to be oc-
cupied or unoccupied courts, yards and open spaces.16 The latter pro-
7 Enos v. Brockton, 354 Mass. 278, 281, 236 N .E.2d 919, 921 (1968), commented on in 
1968 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §12.4. 
8 C.L. c. 40A, §3 (New Act). 
91975 Mass. Acts. c. 808, § 2A(I). 
10 [d. 
11 C.L. c. 40A, § 3. 
12 1975 Mass. Acts c. 808, § 2A. 
13 [d., § 2A(2). 
14/d. See C.L. c. 93, §§ 29-33; C.L. c. 93D. See § 15.15 infra for a discussion of John 
Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., a case in which the Supreme Judicial 
Court considered the interrelationship between the outdoor advertising statutes and 
local zoning regulations. 
15 1975 Mass. Acts. c. 808, § 2A(4). C.L. c. 40A, § 2, had authorized the prohibition 
of "noxious trades." The preamble's reference to noxious "uses" is clearly broader. 
18 1975 Mass. Acts. c. 808, § 2A(5). For a discussion of the reasons for describing the 
relevant unit for zoning as "land" rather than "lot," and the reference to "open spaces" 
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vision appears to be a new characterization for three areas delineated 
by the former Section 2: size and width of lots; size of yards, courts 
and other open spaces; and percentage of lot that may be occupiedY 
The preamble also authorizes the regulation of density of population 
and intensity of use.18 New provisions in the preamble specifically 
allow regulation of uses of bodies of water, including water courses;19 
areas and dimensions of bodies of water;20 accessory facilities and 
uses;21 and the development of the natural, scenic and aesthetic qual-
ities of the community. 22 
Limitations if Zoning Ordinances and By-Laws. The limitations of zon-
ing ordinances and by-laws under the Zoning Enabling Act23 included 
the exception of Boston from the operation of the act; the exemption 
of religious and educational uses from zoning ordinances and by-laws 
which prohibited or limited such uses; a maximum floor area re-
quirement, 768 square feet, for a single family residence; the re-
quirement of uniformity within a district; and the requirement of uni-
formity among districts with similar characteristics. Section 5 of that 
act24 contained special provisions limiting the application of zoning 
regulations to agricultural, horticultural and floricultural uses. The 
creation of "floating zones" was prohibited by Section 6.25 Exemptions 
for public service corporations were provided for in Section 10.26 
Sections 3 and 4 of the new Zoning Act27 have omitted a few of 
these limitations, significantly modified others, and added three new 
limitations. The prohibition of floating zones in Section 328 remains 
substantially similar to the one contained in the former Section 6. The 
requirement of uniform treatment within a district for each class and 
rather than "other open spaces" as in the former Chapter 40A, see MASS. H.R. REI'. No. 
5009,1972 Sess. at 13-14, 16-17. 
17 C.L. c. 40A, § 2. 
18 1975 Mass. Acts c. 808, § 2A(6). While population density was within the scope of 
regulation of the Zoning Enabling Act, intensity of use was not, C.L. c. 40A, § 2. 
19 1975 Mass. Acts c. 808, § 2A(3). 
20 !d., § 2A(5). 
21 !d., § 2A(7). Such facilities and uses were implicitly subject to regulation under C.L. 
c. 40A, since they were dependent upon the main use. See Town of Needham v. 
Winston Nurseries, Inc., 330 Mass. 95,101,111 N.E.2d 453,457 (1953). 
221975 Mass. Acts c. 808, § 2A(8). The Supreme Judicial Court has recently rec-
ognized that aesthetic objectives are a legitimate purpose of zoning, at least in the case 
of signs and billboards. John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 1975 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 3450, 3472, 339 N.E.2d 709, 719, noted in § 15.15 infra. 
23 C.L. c. 40A, § 2. 
24Id., § 5. 
2. Id., § 6. 
26Id., § 10. 
27 C.L. c. 40A, §§ 3, 4 (New Act). 
28 Id., § 3. "The term 'floating zone' refers to a zone or district originally created by a 
legislative act, the boundaries of which are not located at the same time on the zoning 
map." MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess. at 24-25. 
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kind of structure or use permitted, now contained in Section 4,29 has 
not significantly changed in the new version. 
The most serious and conspicuous omission from the new Act is 
that the city of Boston is not specifically excepted from its operation. 
The legislative history, however, indicates that although the inclusion 
of Boston within the purview of Chapter 40A was considered, it was 
not recommended.30 In addition, the proposed technical divisions 
amendment to chapter 808 would amend the new Zoning Act to ex-
cept Boston.3t Moreover, it is unlikely that the legislature's omission 
would be construed as a repeal of the Boston Zoning Act,32 the sepa-
rate enabling legislation for Boston. Thus it seems doubtful that the 
new Zoning Act would be applied to the city of Boston. A second re-
quirement omitted from the new Zoning Act mandated that zoning 
regulations "shall be the same for zones, districts or streets having 
substantially the same character."33 This requirement may have been 
dropped because it was considered to be at odds with the legislature's 
intent that zoning be utilized as a more flexible tool for land use 
planning. 
Under Section 5 of the former Chapter 40A, cities and towns were 
prohibited from regulating the non-use of nonconforming land pre-
viously used for agricultural, horticultural or floricultural purposes, if 
the condition of non-use had existed for less than five years.34 Fur-
thermore, they could not prohibit, among other things, the expansion 
of nonconforming buildings or "land used primarily for those pur-
poses.35 The new Act omits the five-year nonconforming use protec-
tion. Although the new Section 336 affords greater protection for the 
initial establishment of these uses, it also imposes less stringent limita-
tions on the zoning powers of municipalities relating to agricultural, 
horticultural and floricultural uses.37 It provides that no zoning ordi-
nance or by-law shall prohibit, unreasonably regulate or require a spe-
cial r 'rmit for the use of land for such primary purposes, or prohibit 
or unreasonably regulate the expansion or reconstruction of existing 
structures on the land.38 These provisions are subject to the exception 
that agriculture, horticulture and floriculture may" be limited to par-
cels greater than five acres in areas not zoned for those purposes.39 
IBId., § 4. 
30 MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess. at 27. 
31 Mass. H.R. 4358, 1976 Sess., § 3. 
31 St. 1956, c. 665. 
33 G.L. c. 40A, § 2. 
34 G.L. c. 40A, § 5. 
3sld. 
38 G.L. c. 40A, § 3 (New Act). 
37/d. 
3Bld. 
39 Section 3 also provides that land divided by a public or private way or a waterway 
be considered as one parcel for determining the five-acre minimum. G.L. c. 40A, § 3 
(New Act). 
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In a departure from the maximum floor area requirement, 768 
square feet, allowed by the former Section 2,40 under the new Act 
municipalities may no longer regulate or restrict the interior area of a 
single family residential dwellingY The provisions applicable to re-
ligious and educational uses have also been changed in two important 
respects. Land or structures used for such purposes are still afforded 
protection from zoning ordinances or by-laws which would prohibit or 
limit them.42 They may be subjected, however, "to reasonable reg-
ulations concerning the bulk and height of structures and determining 
yard sizes, lot area, setbacks, open space, parking and building cover-
age requirements."43 Secondly, the educational purposes which qualify 
for Section 3's protection are more clearly defined. Section 2 of the 
former act had defined them as religious, sectarian, denominational 
or public.44 Section 3 defines the relevant educational purposes in 
terms of the ownership of the land on which they are carried on.45 
Specifically, if the land is owned or leased by the state, its agencies, 
subdivisions or bodies politic, or by a religious sect or denomination, 
or by a nonprofit educational corporation, the use falls within the 
ambit of Section 3. This change may eliminate whatever confusion was 
generated by the use of the terms religious, sectarian and de-
nominational as separate categories.46 Its major effect seems to be to 
require that an association which might have fallen into one of those 
categories, but not "religious sects or denominations," must be in-
corporated for nonprofit educational purposes. The intention of the 
40 G.L. c. 40A, § 2. 
41 The State Sanitary Code also provides for some minimum floor area requirements. 
State Sanitation Code, Art. 2, Regulations 11.1, 11.2, 11.3. 
4. G.L. c. 40A, § 3 (New Act). 
43Id. This change is in accordance with two cases decided upon the issue by the Su-
preme Judicial Court. In Sisters of the Holy Cross v. Town of Brookline, 347 Mass. 
486,494, 198 N.E.2d 624, 631 (1964), noted in 1964 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 14.5, the 
Court held that the town of Brookline's imposition of dimensional requirements applic-
able to single family dwellings on a proposed dormitory, chapel and student center of a 
sectarian college would limit the use of the order's land within the meaning of G.L. 
c.40A, § 2. The Court suggested, however, that some type of dimensional requirements 
might be imposed that might not limit land use for religious or educational purposes. 
Id. at 492, 198 N.E.2d at 629. A second case, Radcliffe College v. City of Cambridge, 
350 Mass. 613, 618, 215 N.E.2d 892, 896 (1966), noted in 1966 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 
§15.1, allowed the application of off-street parking requirements to the college's use of 
the land. The language of Section 3 of the new Zoning Act appears to be an adoption 
and clarification of these two cases. It is suggested that the dimensional requirements 
authorized therein must be particularized to the educational or religious use to remain 
within both Section 3 and Holy Cross. For the applicable effective date provisions as to 
this part of Section 3, see §15.l supra. 
44 G.L. C. 40A, § 2. 
45 G.L. c. 40A, §3 (New Act). 
48 For a discussion of the meaning of "public" educational purposes, see City of Wor-
cester v. New England Inst. and New England School of Accounting, Inc. 335 Mass. 
486, 140 N.E.2d 470 (1957). 
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legislature was probably to insure that only bona fide educational uses 
were exempted from otherwise applicable zoning requirementsY 
Although this may result, it does not necessarily follow that the class 
of beneficiaries will be decreased by making the standard of the state's 
nonprofit corporation laws48 applicable. 
There has been a significant modification in the provisions of the 
new Zoning Act allowing exemptions for structures and land used for 
public service corporations.49 The former Section 10 had stated that a 
public service corporation50 could petition to the Department of Pub-
lic Utilities in order to gain an exemption from local zoning ordi-
nances or by-laws. In order to grant the exemption the department 
had to find, after public notice and hearing, that the present or pro-
posed situation of the building, structure or land was reasonably 
necessary to the convenience or welfare of the public.51 Section 3 of 
the new Act adds to these requirements that the exemption may be 
directed to particular aspects of the zoning ordinance 01" by-law rather 
than the entire regulation.52 In addition, the required notice by the 
Department of Public Utilities must be given according to Section 11 
of the new Act,53 and the hearing must be held in the city or town in 
question. The change in notice procedures rejects a recent ruling of 
the Supreme Judicial Court under Section 10 of the former act, which 
held that notice given pursuant to department regulations was suffi-
cient.54 The new standard to be applied by the department in consid-
ering the exemption requires not only a finding that the present or 
proposed use of the land or structure is reasonably necessary for the 
public convenience or welfare, but also a determination that the 
exemption is required. 55 The new Zoning Act, unlike its predecessor, 
contains specific provisions by which a consolidated public hearing 
may be held in one municipality in situations in which the corporation 
has structures or lands located in more than one city or town.56 Notice 
.7 The legislature apparently has assumed that the application of the standard of the 
state's non-profit }ncorporation laws would result in a determination of a group's bona 
fide educational purpose. 
48 G.L. c. 180. 
49 G.L. c. 40A, §3 (New Act). 
50 For a discussion of the standards for determining whether a corporation is a "pub-
lic service corporation" see Save The Bay, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 139, 155-64, 322 N.E.2d 742, 752-55, noted in 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 
§19.12. 
51 G.L. c. 40A, §1O. 
52 G.L. c. 40A, §3 (New Act). 
53/d. §11. 
54 Save The Bay, Inc., v. Department of Pub. Utils., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 139, 152, 
322 N.E.2d 742, 751 (1975). But since the actual issue in Save the Bay was whether abut-
ters of abutters were entitled to notice and since Section 11 omits this class as parties in 
interest for notice purposes, the narrow holding of the decision with respect to notice 
has not been disturbed. 
55 G.L. C. 40A, § 3 (New Act). 
58/d. 
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to all affected communities is required, presumably in addition to 
notice pursuant to ~ection 11.57 The requirements of Section 3 for 
this special situation are otherwise the same as those of its pre-
decessor. 
The new Act, as was the former Chapter 40A, is silent as to 
whether local zoning regulations apply to governmental property use. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted this silence to mean that 
the state is generally immune from local zoning control. 58 There ap-
pears to be no reason to assume that this interpretation will change 
under the new Act. 
The new limitations contained in Section 3 prohibit zoning ordi-
nances or by-laws from regulating or restricting the use of materials 
or methods of construction of structures regulated by the state build-
ing code.59 A second limitation prohibits localities from exempting 
land or structures from flood plain or wetlands regulations enacted by 
the legislature.6o Finally, Section 4 of the Zoning Act requires that 
zoning districts shall be mapped in a manner sufficient for identifica-
tion, and that zoning maps shall be part of zoning ordinances or by-
laws.61 
§15.9. Zoning: Special Permits. Section 9 of the new Zoning Act1 
performs two distinct functions. First, it makes several substantive and 
procedural2 changes in the law relating to special permits previously 
contained in Section 4 of the Zoning Enabling Act.3 Second, it pre-
sents a significant number of innovative ways in which municipalities 
may utilize the special permit device. 4 The former Section 4 provided 
that: 
A zoning ordinance or by-law may provide that exceptions may be 
allowed to the regulations and restrictions contained therein, 
which shall be applicable to all of the districts of a particular class 
and of a character set forth in such ordinance or by-law. Such ex-
57 Id.; see id., § 11. 
58 City of Medford v. Marinucce Bros. & Co., Inc., 344 Mass. 50, 54-56, 181 N.E.2d 
584, 587-88 (1962), noted in 1962 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §§ 13.4, 13.5. See also MASS. 
H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess. at 24, 28-29 (discussing this case and alternative pro-
posals). 
5. G.L. c. 40A, § 3 (New Act). This is, in essence, a codification of previous case law. 
See, e.g., Enos v. City of Brockton, 354 Mass. 278, 281, 236 N.E.2d 919, 921 (1968). 
80 G.L. c. 40A, § 3 (New Act). 
81 Id., § 4. 
§15.9. 1 G.L. c. 40A, § 9 (New Act). 
• The procedural changes are discussed in § 15.3 supra. 
3 G.L. c. 40A, § 4. 
• Most of these uses of the special permit device had been utilized by some 
municipalities previously. The thrust of the new section is apparently to foster more 
widespread use of these techniques for innovative land use. See MASS. H.R. REP. No. 
5009, 1972 Sess. at 30. 
36
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/19
§15.9 ZONINC AND LAND USE 485 
ceptions shall be in harmony with the general purpose and intent 
of the ordinance or by-law and may be subject to general or spe-
cific rules therein contained. The board of appeals [or other au-
thority] ... may, in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate 
conditions and safeguards, grant to an applicant a special permit 
to make use of his land or to erect and maintain buildings or 
other structures thereon .... 5 
Section 9 of the new Act makes several changes in, and additions to, 
these basic provisions. It mandates, rather than permits, that zoning 
ordinances or by-laws provide for " ... uses which shall only be permit-
ted in specified districts upon the issuance of a special permit .... "6 In 
addition, the term "exception," which was used in the former act to 
describe this traditional function of the special permit, has been de-
leted. 7 It is no longer required that specially permitted uses be appli-
cable to all districts sharing the same class or character. As under the 
former law, the use of the special permit power by the designated 
permit-granting authority is discretionary unless otherwise provided 
by local ordinance or by-Iaw.s 
The standard applicable to the granting of special permits has been 
changed in part. The use must still be found to be in harmony with 
the general purpose and intent of the ordinance or by-Iaw.9 Accord-
ing to the new Section 9, however, it is also mandatory that the use be 
subject to general or specific provisions set forth in the ordinance or 
by-Iaw.10 The former Section 4 had made this provision permissive. 
This had resulted in judicial decisions striking down local zoning or-
dinances on the grounds that they did not provide " ... standards suf-
ficient to channel the discretion exercised by the local board in the is-
suance of permits .... "11 Section 9's mandatory character should ob-
viate this problem. The former Section 4 had also provided that the 
board of appeals could impose conditions and safeguards upon the is-
suance of a special permit. Section 9 expands this language to include 
not only conditions and safeguards, but also limitations which may be 
imposed on "time" as well as "use."12 
5 C.L. c. 40A, § 4 (emphasis added). 
8 C.L. c. 40A, § 9 (New Act). 
7 The legislative history indicates that the term was considered a misnomer since no 
exception was usually involved. "Rather, the special permit is granted only for uses spe-
cifically authorized by the ordinance where it is appropriate to 'condition' the use or 
control its density or location .... " MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess. at 31 (emphasis 
in original). 
8 C.L. c. 40A, § 9 (New Act). 
9 [d. 
10 [d. 
11 MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess. at 33. See Clark v. Board of Appeals, 348 
Mass. 407, 408, 204 N.E.2d 434, 435 (1965), noted in 1965 ANN. SVRV. MASS. LAW § 
14.10. 
12 C.L. c. 40A, § 9 (New Act). 
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Finally, the section also addresses the questions of the period for 
which special permits remain effective and the treatment of accessory 
uses to scientific research, development, and related production.13 As 
to the first question, Section 9 mandates that zoning ordinances or 
by-laws provide that a special permit shall lapse within a designated 
period of time from the time it was granted unless a substantial use 
has commenced or, when appropriate, construction has begun prior 
to the expiration date. 14 The time period, which may not exceed two 
years, includes the time required to pursue or await determination of 
a judicial appeal. 15 In reference to the second question, Section 9 re-
quires that ordinances or by-laws provide special permits for a class of 
uses accessory to scientific activities subject to several qualifications. To 
fall within the statutory provision the proposed use must be accessory 
to activities permitted as a matter of right.16 These activities, in turn, 
must be necessary in connection with scientific research, development, 
or related production. The use need not, however, be located on the 
same parcel as the activities permitted as a matter of right. The acces-
sory use may then be specially permitted following a finding by the 
granting authority that it does not substantially derogate from the 
public goodY 
In furtherance of its second function, suggesting flexible uses for 
the special permit device, Section 9 lists four distinct categories for 
which the device is appropriate: the development bonus, the permit-
ting of multi-residential uses in nonresidentially zoned areas, the clus-
ter development, and the planned unit development.18 If a commu-
nity provides for these types of special permits in its ordinances or 
by-laws, it must comply with further provisions of Section 9 which 
govern their implementation. The first category, the development 
bonus, essentially provides for an increase in permissible density or in-
tensity of use in return for specified amenities from a developer. 19 
The types of amenities, the provision of which condition the grant, in-
clude " ... open space, housing for persons of low or moderate in-
come, traffic or pedestrian improvements, or other amenities .... "20 It 
is mandatory that ordinances or by-laws that adopt this device des-
ignate the improvements, amenities, or locations of proposed uses that 
condition the granting of the special permit. "[T]he maximum in-
creases in density of population or intensity of use which may be au-
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The second suggested use for the special permit device, allowing 
multi-family residential use in a nonresidentially zoned area, is gov-
erned by a three-pronged standard.22 First, the mixing of these uses is 
subject to the general requirement that the public good be served. 
Secondly, prior to issuing a special permit the permit-granting author-
ity must find that the nonresidential area would not be adversely af-
fected by the residential use. Finally, the authority must also find that 
the permitted uses in the nonresidential district are not noxious to the 
proposed residential use. 
The third permissible category, the cluster development, is defined 
by Section 9 as " ... a residential development in which the buildings 
and accessory uses are clustered together into one or more groups 
separated from adjacent property and other groups within the de-
velopment by intervening open land .... "23 If adopted, this particular 
type of use is subject to several mandatory provisions that are con-
tained in Section 9 and Section 2 of the new Act. First, Section 9 per-
mits cluster developments only on a plot of land that is divided into 
building lots and open land. More specifically, the plot must be of a 
minimum size, which the ordinance or by-law may specify, and di-
mensional control, density and use restrictions of the lots must be at 
variance with those otherwise permitted by local regulation.24 Sec-
ondly, the total land area of the open space and the building lots must 
be at least equal to the area required for the total number of units 
proposed in the development.25 Sections 9 and 2 contain somewhat 
redundant provisions requiring conveyance of the open land in a clus-
ter development. Section 9 requires that "[s]uch open land shall either 
be conveyed to the city or town and accepted by it for part [sic]26 or 
open space use, or be conveyed to a non-profit organization the prin-
cipal purpose of which is the conservation of open space, or to be 
conveyed to a corporation or trust owned or to be owned by the own-
ers of lots or residential units within the plot .... "27 Section 2 is sub-




25 ld. This particular requirement would be struck by the technical revisions amend-
ment to Chapter, 808 Mass. H.R. 4358, 1976 Sess. § 9. As now in force the provision 
may have two undesirable effects. The first effect might be to foreclose the use of the 
"development bonus" in the cluster development. The second corollary effect might be 
to remove the incentive for developers to pursue cluster developments, an arguably 
more attractive alternative to the standard rectangular tract method of development. 
This is particularly so not only in light of the provision's conflict with the "development 
bonus" concept, but also in view of the further requirement of Section 9 relating to the 
mandatory conveyance of open land. See text at notes 26-27 infra. 
26 G.L. c. 40A, § 9 (New Act). Mass. H.R. 4358, 1976 Sess., § 10, the technical re-
visions bill, would amend the word "part" to read "park." 
27 G.L. c. 40A, § 9 (New Act). 
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permit for the cluster development provide for a conveyance, and in 
reference to the last type of conveyance describes "lots or residential 
units within the land" rather than within the "plot."28 The legislative 
purpose for this repetition is unknown. It would be corrected, how-
ever, by the proposed technical revisions amendment which would 
strike Section 2 in its entirety.29 
Section 9 further provides that if a corporation or trust owned by 
residential lot or unit owners is the alternative chosen, then "own-
ership [of the corporation or trust] shall pass with conveyances of the 
lots or residential units .... "30 Finally, in order to guarantee the pres-
ervation of the open land in situations in which it is not conveyed to 
the city or town, Section 9 mandates that "a restriction enforceable by 
the city or town shall be recorded .... "31 The restriction must provide 
that the "land shall be kept in an open or natural state and not be 
built [sic] for residential use or developed for accessory uses such as 
parking or roadway."32 . 
The fourth category of special permits, the planned unit develop-
ment, although also a flexible zoning tool, is qualitatively different 
from the cluster development. Unlike the clustering method, it may 
combine on one plot a mixture of uses---residential, open space, .com-
mercial, industrial or others-and a variety of building types. 33 This 
type of development is also subject to further requirements under 
Section 9. The plot of land for a proposed development must be of a 
minimum size, "the lesser of sixty thousand square feet or five times 
the minimum lot size of, the zoning district .... "34 A larger size may 
be required by the local ordinance or by-Iaw.3s The statutory standard 
by which the authorization of a planned unit development must be 
measured requires a determination that a mixture of uses and a vari-
ety of building types are "sufficiently advantageous" to render a de-
parture from the usual requirements appropriate, to the extent that 
such a departure has been authorized by ordinance or by-Iaw.36 Thus, 
Section 9 does not mandate in the first instance the degree to which 
municipalities may waive normal requirements in order to accommo-
date planned unit developments. It does implicitly require that some 
standards for such accommodations be included in ordinances or by-
laws. Particular applications of these standards are then to be tested 
by the standards of "sufficient advantage" and "appropriateness" con-
tained in Section 9. 
28Id. § 2. 
29 Mass. H.R. 4358, 1976 Sess. § 3. 








Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/19
§15.10 ZONING AND LAND USE 489 
The primary goal of Section 9, the promotion of the special permit 
as a tool for flexible and innovative zoning, will only be achieved if 
municipalities allow it to be. The section's effectiveness, therefore, 
cannot be measured at the present time. 
§15.10. Nonconforming Uses: Permits Issued Prior to Notice: 
Status of Undeveloped Lots. Under the former Chapter 40A, there 
were three basic situations in which zoning ordinances or by-laws did 
not become effective as to particular buildings, structures, lots and 
uses. Section 51 rendered ordinances, by-laws, and amendments in-
applicable to existing nonconforming structures, or uses of structures 
and land. Sections 5A and 7A2 protected undeveloped lots. Finally, 
Section 11 3 provided that under specified circumstances ordinances or 
by-laws could not affect permits issues or work begun prior to notice 
of the hearing on their adoption or amendment. The new Zoning Act, 
in Section 6, addresses all three situations.4 
The first paragraph of Section 6 combines the subjects of noncon-
forming uses and structures, and the application of ordinances and 
by-laws to permits and work in progress prior to notice of an impend-
ing change.5 The main purpose for this consolidation was apparently 
to make the operative date for both protections the same. That date 
now coincides with the first publication of notice for the public hear-
ing required by Section 5 of the new Act. 6 Since there are different 
changes in the law affecting each situation, however, they will be 
treated separately here. The former Section 57 had provided, in part, 
that newly adopted or amended zoning ordinances or by-laws were 
not applicable to buildings, structures, or land, or uses thereof in exis-
tence at the time of adoption or amendment. Such ordinances or by-
laws did apply to any change of use or alteration that amounted to re-
construction, extension, or structural change, or to alterations for the 
purposes of either a substantially different use or for use for the same 
purpose to a substantially greater extent. In addition to these limita-
tions, Section 6 of the new Zoning Act expressly provides that ordi-
nances or by-laws shall apply to substantial extensions of use in-
dependent of structural extensions or alterations.8 This change ap-
pears to be in accordance with the standards applied to nonconform-
ing uses by the Supreme Judicial Court.9 Furthermore, an exception is 
§15.10. 1 G.L. c. 40A, § 5. 
2 Id., §§ 5A, 7 A. 
"Id., § II. 
4 G.L. c. 40A, § 6 (New Act). 
"Id. 
6Id. 
7 G.L. c. 40A, § 5. 
8 G.L. c. 40A, § 6 (New Act). 
9 See Powers v. Building Inspector, 363 Mass. 648, 662-63, 296 N.E.2d 491, 500 
(1973), noted in 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 12.28. Under this new language, a ques-
tion still remains as to when or if a change in the degree of use, as opposed to the 
quantity or nature of use, will constitute an extension of use. 
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indicated for the alteration, reconstruction, extension or structural 
change of one- or two-family residences that do not increase their 
nonconforming nature. 10 Under Section 6 a pre-existing use is 
permissible, but must be preceded by a finding by the permit- or 
special-permit-granting authority that it "shall not be substantially 
more detrimental than the existing use to the neighborhood."ll As has 
been previously decided by the Supreme Judicial Court, the pro-
tections for nonconforming uses do not apply to billboards, signs and 
other advertising devices. 12 
Section 5 had also provided that cities and towns could regulate the 
nonuse of nonconforming structures so as not to prolong unduly the 
life of nonconforming uses. 13 Applications of this provision have been 
unsuccessful because the Court required a showing of intent to aban-
don the use rather than of mere nonoccupancy and lapse of time.14 
The new Act, however, has resolved this issue by permitting 
municipalities to define and regulate nonconforming uses and struc-
tures that have been abandoned or not used for two years or more. IS 
The former Section 11,16 unlike Section 5, provided that zoning or-
dinances or by-laws were not effective as to permits issued or build-
ings or structures lawfully begun before notice of the hearing before 
the planning or zoning board or, in towns, issuance of the warrant for 
the town meeting. This protection was subject to two conditions: first, 
construction under the permit was required to commence within six 
months after issuance of the permit; second, the work had to proceed 
"in good faith continuously to completion so far as is reasonably prac-
ticable under the circumstances."17 So long as the city or town pro-
ceeded without unreasonable delay to adopt or amend the ordinance 
or by-law in question, its violation subsequent to notice would not be 
justified. Section 6 modifies these provisions. First, it specifies that 
building permits and special permits18 are included within the sec-
tion's protection. Second, the conditions upon which the statutory pro-
10 C.L. c. 40A, § 6 (New Act). 
"ld. 
12 John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 361 Mass. 746, 757, 282 
N.E.2d 661, 668 (1972), noted in 1972 ANN.SuRV. MASS.LAW§ 22.10. 
13 C.L. C. 40A, § 5. 
14 See MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5009, 1972 Sess., 40 and cases cited therein. 
15 C.L. c. 40A, § 6 (New Act). 
16 C.L. c. 40A, § 11. 
17ld. 
16 C.L. c. 40A, § 6 (New Act). It is to be noted that Section 6 uses the language 
"building or special permits issued before the first publication ... " ld. (emphasis added). 
The effective date for special permits, on the other hand, is the date of certification by 
the city or town clerk. ld., § 11. See § 15.3 supra for a discussion of the effective date. 
Some problem of interpretation may arise as to whether the date of issuance is the date 
the special permit is granted-the date of the granting authority's decision-or the ef-
fective date according to Section 11 of the new Zoning Act. 
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tection continues have been altered. According to Section 6, the use or 
construction authorized by the permit must commence "within a 
period of not less than six months"19 after its issuance. The intent of 
the legislature was undoubtedly that the activity must commence 
within a period of not more than six months as formerly provided by 
Section 11.20 This alteration appears to have been unintentional. The 
language requiring continuous completion of construction has been 
slightly modified by omitting the words "in good faith" and requiring 
instead that the work proceed "expeditiously."21 It is doubtful that this 
change is significant since the Court has already held that the failure 
to proceed continuously under Section 11 was not excused simply be-
cause a lack of good faith was not found. 22 Finally, the requirement 
that the city or town proceed without unreasonable delay to enact the 
ordinance or amendment has also been omitted. It is possible that this 
provision was considered unnecessary in view of the time limits, in 
Section 5 of the new Act, within which adoption or amendment must 
take place. 
B. DECISIONS 
§15.11. Open Housing: Snob Zoning. Open housing advocates 
met with success in both state and federal courts during the 1976 Sur-
vey year. In three Massachusetts cases, the Supreme Judicial Court 
continued to delineate the scope of the Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zon-
ing Act.1 
The statute was read broadly in Board oj Appeals oj Maynard v. Hous-
ing Appeals Committee2 in which the Court rejected all eight challenges 
to a comprehensive permit ordered by the Housing Appeals Commit-
tee (HAC). First, the Court held that a decision by only three mem-
bers of the Committee was valid when two of the usual five members 
were no longer active at the time of the decision. 3 
The HAC's order was also upheld under the Massachusetts Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.4 A m~ority of the three deciding officials 
19 C.L. c. 40A, § 6 (New Act). 
20 C.L. c. 40A, § II. 
21 C.L. C. 40A, § 6 (New Act). 
22 Paopalia v. Inspector of Bldgs., 351 Mass. 176, 179-80,217 N.E.2d 911, 914 (1966). 
§15.11. 1 C.L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23. See generally 1970 ANN SURV. MASS. LAW c. 18. The 
statute's constitutionality was upheld in Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm., 
363 Mass. 339, 368, 294 N.E.2d 393, 414 (1973), noted in 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §§ 
12.10, 12.30. 
21976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 902, 345 N.E.2d 382. 
31d. at 904, 345 N.E.2d at 384. Under C.L. c. 23B, § 5A, the Housing Appeals 
Committee is to consist of five members. 
4 That act, C.L. c. 30A, § 11(7), provides in pertinent part: 
If a majority of the officials of the agency who are to render the final decision 
have neither heard nor read the evidence [there must be a] tentative or proposed 
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had either heard or read the evidence, and the board had received "a 
document tantamount to a proposed decision"s and was given an op-
portunity to object. Thus, the Court concluded that both alternative 
prongs of the Administrative Procedure Act's validity standard had 
been satisfied. II 
Next, the Court acknowledged the Housing Appeals Committee's 
authority to require compliance with the Massachusetts Environmental 
Protection Act. 7 As to the town's claim that the site was a "wetland" 
requiring approval under the Hatch Act,S the Court directed the ob-
jection to the remedial provisions of that statute.9 
Turning to the eligibility of the developer, the Court liberally con-
strued the term "limited dividend organization,"lO thus permitting the 
project to qualify as "low or moderate income housing."ll Although 
the developer had not become a "duly organized limited partner-
ship"12 until after its application had been denied by the town Board 
of Appeals, the HAC considered it an "organization" as of the time of 
its application to the board. Consequently, because it was an organiza-
tion eligible to receive a subsidy, the developer was a "limited div-
idend organization" under HAC Rules and Regulations § (£).13 The 
Court affirmed this interpretation of the term. 
In another aspect of the case, the Court allowed the Housing Ap-
peals Committee to avoid a local veto power by modifying the per-
mit. 14 Under the Anti-Snob Zoning statute, local regulations are 
deemed "consistent with local needs" if "the application ... would re-
sult in commencement of construction ... on . .. more than . .. 10 
acres ... in anyone calendar year."lS In such cases, only the local 
board can override local requirements and regulations in order to 
grant a comprehensive permit. Here, the permit was requested for a 
tract exceeding 16 acres. However, the HAC's order limited the de-
velopment to 1 0 acres, thus exempting the developers from local reg-
ulations. 16 
Finally, the Court rejected the town's contention that a sewer exten-
sion required by the Committee would not receive the approval of 
decision [and] an opportunity ... to file objections and to present argument, either 
orally or in writing as the agency may order .... 
5 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 904,345 N.E.2d at 384. 
6 [d. 
7 G.L. c. 30, §§ 61-62. 
8 G.L. c. 131, § 40. 
" 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 906-07, 345 N .E. 2d at 385. 
10 [d. at 905-06, 345 N.E.2d at 385. See G.L. c. 40B, § 20. 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 905-06, 345 N.E.2d at 385. 
12 [d., 345 N.E.2d at 385. 
13 [d. 
14 [d. at 906, 345 N.E.2d at 385. 
15 G.L. c. 40B, § 20. 
16 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 906, 345 N.E.2d at 385. 
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local voters, as was required by town law. If a successful vote was im-
possible, the Court stated, that requirement could be dispensed with 
by the HAC as a regulation not consistent with local needs. 17 
The Court's rulings on each facet of the Maynard case indicate its 
reluctance to allow the Anti-Snob Zoning Act to be easily circum-
vented. Challenges more substantial than those presented in Maynard 
were considered and rejected in Bailey v. Board of Appeals of Holden. IS 
There, the board of appeals had granted the Holden Housing Au-
thority a comprehensive permit for the construction of housing for 
the elderly.19 The petitioners owned a portion of the situs and chal-
lenged the permit on constitutional and statutory grounds. 
First, the Court held that the authority was not constitutionally re-
quired to hold a public hearing before selecting a site for the con-
struction.20 The Court stated, "[t]he determination of what property is 
to be taken and used for public housing is a legislative function, not 
requiring a prior hearing as a matter of constitutional right."21 In a 
footnote, the Court added that the board's decision had not been ar-
bitrary.22 
Next, the Court reaffirmed an earlier ruling23 that an applicant for 
a comprehensive permit under chapter 40B need not own the site at 
the time the application is made. Thus, the Bailey Court held that it 
was sufficient that the housing authority had taken serious steps to-
ward completion of the requirements for a permit.24 
Third, the Court held that a local housing authority is "not required 
to file an environmental assessment form and an environmental im-
pact report before seeking a comprehensive permit .... "25 Although 
the authority had filed an environmental assessment form, the Court 
did not examine the procedure followed because of its holding that 
the authority is exempt from the environmental regulations. 26 
Finally, the findings made by the board, although conclusory, were 
held sufficient to support its decision. The board's finding that the 
permit would be "reasonable and consistent with local needs"27 was 
supported by a further finding that the town's obligations to provide 
low and moderate income housing for the elderly had not been met 
17Id. at 907-08,345 N.E.2d at 385-86. 
18 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 945, 345 N.E.2d 367. 
19Id. at 945, 345 N.E.2d at 368. See also Reid v. Acting Comm'r of Dep't of Commu-
nity Affairs, 362 Mass. 136,284 N.E.2d 245 (1972). 
20 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 946-47,345 N.E.2d at 369. 
21Id. at 947, 345 N.E.2d at 369. 
22Id. at 947 n. 4, 345 N.E.2d at 382 n.4. 
23 Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dep't of Community Affairs, 
363 Mass. 339, 378, 294 N.E.2d 393, 420 (1973). 
24 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 948, 345 N.E.2d at 369. 
25Id. 
26Id. at 949 n.5, 345 N.E.2d at 370 n. 5. 
27 See G.L. c. 40B, § 23. 
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and that there was a demonstrated need for such housing. 28 While the 
Court accepted these findings as an adequate basis for the granting of 
the permit, it warned that "the board's opinion would have been more 
satisfactory if it had recited subsidiary facts on which those ultimate 
findings of fact were based .... "29 This admonition suggests that, 
while the Court will be vigilant to uphold the purpose of the Anti-
Snob Zoning Law, applicants must be equally careful to fulfill the 
statute's requirements. 
A limitation on the scope of Chapter 40B, sections 20-23 was rec-
ognized in Town of Chelmsford v. DiBiase.30 The Court in that case held 
that the Housing Appeals Committee's authority to override local "re-
quirements and regulations" does not include the power to override a 
town's good faith exercise of its power of eminent domain. 31 
In June and November, 1971, the Chelmsford town meeting con-
sidered taking a certain tract of land by eminent domain for conserva-
tion purposes.32 On December 6, 1971, the owners of the tract 
applied for a comprehensive permit to build low and moderate in-
come housing. Three weeks later, a special town meeting voted to take 
the proposed site. The board of appeals subsequently denied the 
pending permit application.33 However, the developers' appeal to the 
Housing Appeals Committee was successful, and the comprehensive 
permit was granted on April 10, 1974.34 Subsequently, the superior 
court, in a separate action, found that the taking was valid and voided 
the comprehensive permit.3s The developers and the HAC appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct review and affirmed, 
holding that the power of the local board and the HAC to override 
local "requirements and regulations" does not include authority to 
override a taking made in good faith and for a public purpose.36 The 
Court distinguished between a taking and "requirements and reg-
ulations." While the latter are limitations on an owner's use of his own 
property, a taking is a transfer of ownership. "If [a taking] is over-
ridden, the effect is not to remove limitations on the rights of the 
owner but to change the ownership."37 If the legislature had intended 
to allow a permit-granting authority to abridge the inherent sovereign 
taking power, the Court concluded, it would have been specific.38 
Consequently, the Court upheld the taking as well as the voiding of 
the comprehensive permit. 
28 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 949-50, 345 N.E.2d at 370. 
2°ld. at 950, 345 N.E.2d at 370. 
30 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 937, 345 N.E.2d 373. 
311d. at 938, 345 N.E.2d at 374. 
321d. at 938, 345 N.E.2d at 374. 
331d. at 939-40, 345 N.E.2d at 374. 
341d. 
351d. at 941,345 N.E.2d at 384. 
361d. at 938, 345 N.E.2d at 374. 
371d. at 943,345 N.E.2d at 375. 
381d. at 944, 345 N.E.2d at 375-76. 
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The Maynard, Holden and Chelmsford cases give some indication of 
how far the Court is willing to go to assure the efficacy of the Anti-
Snob Zoning Law. In Maynard and Holden the Court construed the 
statute broadly so as to allow its provisions and intent to be im-
plemented. Nevertheless, the Court drew the line in the Chelmsford 
case and refused to read into the statute a restriction on a fundamen-
tal attribute of sovereign power. 39 
On the federal level, the United States Supreme Court, in Hills v. 
Gautreaux, 40 sanctioned interdistrict remedies for discrimination in 
public housing even when there was no finding of an interdistrict vio-
lation. The suit was brought against the Chicago Housing Authority 
(CHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) by black tenants in and applicants for federally funded hous-
ing in Chicago.41 The plaintiffs alleged that the CHA placed tenants 
and selected sites for public housing in a racially discriminatory man-
ner.42 In affirming metropolitan area relief the Court distinguished 
Milliken v. Bradley,43 in which the Court had rejected a metropolitan 
school desegregation order. The Court stated that the Milliken order 
was impermissible not because it extended beyond the city in which 
the violation occurred, but because it restricted the operation of 
school systems "that were not implicated in any constitutional viola-
tion."44 In Hills, however, both the CHA and HUD had authority to 
operate beyond the borders of Chicago. Accordingly, the Court found 
that the relevant geographic area for purposes of the available hous-
ing options was the Chicago housing market, not the Chicago city 
limits.45 The order was intended to guide HUD's determination of 
which locally-authorized developments should receive federal assis-
tance. Thus, the Court concluded, the regulation would not impose 
federal orders upon unwilling localities, since participation in the fed-
eral funding program was voluntary.46 
The Court's emphasis on the scope of federal involvement is signifi-
cant in light of its decision last term in Warth v. Seldin,47 which se-
39 A comprehensive review of the Anti-Snob Zoning Law, G.L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23, was 
published in May, 1976 by the Citizens Housing and Planning Association of Metropoli-
tan Boston. The Report recognizes that the law does override some other valid plan-
ning considerations, such as environmental concerns and the primacy of local control. 
Nevertheless, the authors conclude that the statute "is a valuable instrument for the 
state to provide needed housing for its lower-income residents." CITIZENS HOUSING AND 
PLANNING ASS'N OF METROPOLITAN BOSTON. OVERRIDING THE SUBURBS: STATE INTERVEN-
TION FOR HOUSING THROUGH THE MASSACHUSETTS ApPEALS PROCESS 57 (1976). 
40 425 U.S. 284 (1976). 
41 [d. at 286. 
42Id. 
43 418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974). 
44 425 U.S. at 296. 
45 [d. at 299. 
46 [d. at 303. 
47422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
47
Huber: Chapter 15: Zoning and Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
496 1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.12 
verely narrowed standing requirements for parties seeking to chal-
lenge the zoning regulations of a neighboring locality. The Hills deci-
sion indicates that, despite the Supreme Court's backslide on the 
standing issue, the federal courts will, in the proper circumstances, act 
against discrimination in housing. 
§15.12. Zoning: Destruction of Structures Erected in Violation of 
Zoning By-laws and Ordinances. During the Survey year the Su-
preme Judicial Court in Building Inspector of Falmouth v. Haddad (Had-
dad //)1 reversed part of an Appeals Court decision in the case of the 
same name rendered last year (Haddad 1).2 The narrow issue before 
the Court in Haddad II was whether the Court of Appeals was in error 
in affirming a final decree ordering the removal of a substantially 
completed building which had been erected by the defendants in 
knowing violation of a zoning by-law.3 The defendants, trustees of a 
realty trust, had acquired a single parcel of land in a district zoned for 
a single family residential use.4 Located on the parcel was a large ten-
room single family residence, which was subsequently destroyed by 
fire. The trustees applied for and obtained a building permit to erect 
a similar structure and shortly thereafter submitted a subdivision plan 
for the parcel.5 As a result, the structure at issue was located on Lot 4 
of the plan, the original tract purchased having been divided into four 
lots. Instead of the permitted single family residence, however, de-
fendants began constructing on Lot 4 a twenty-unit motel. Upon 
learning of this, the building inspector revoked the permit and issued 
a stop-work order.6 Moreover, he and other town officials gave re-
peated notice to the defendants that a special permit was required for 
construction of the type of building they had been erecting. Despite 
such notice, the trustees never applied for a special permit. After is-
suance of the stop-work order the defendants were allowed to "close-
in" the building to protect it from inclement weather. The work done 
in this "closing-in" substantially completed the exterior of the building 
and included shingling exterior walls, installing decks, sliding glass 
doors and windows, and putting a roof on. Shortly thereafter the 
building inspector brought suit to enjoin the trustees from further 
construction and to require removal of the structure. The superior 
court ordered such removal and the trustees sought further review. 7 
The Court of Appeals recognized that destruction of buildings 
erected in violation of zoning laws was a drastic remedy.s It found, 
§15.12. 11976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 58, 339 N.E.2d 892. 
2 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 365, 324 N.E.2d 386, commented on in 1975 ANN. SURV. 
MAss.LAw§ 19.10 at 537. 
31976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 60, 339 N.E.2d at 894. 
·Id. 
S /d. at 61,339 N.E.2d at 894-95. 
6Id. at 63,339 N.E.2d at 895. 
7Id. at 59, 339 N.E.2d at 894. 
81975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 374,324 N.E.2d at 390-91. 
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however, two compelling reasons for affirming the superior court's 
decree. First, the trustees had in bad faith intentionally violated the 
town's zoning by-law. Second, the court concluded that the defendants 
had not met the applicable standard to avoid the remedy of removal, 
in that the structure was neither usable in conformity with the applic-
able by-law nor modifiable and usable.9 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected both grounds of the decision 
in Haddad I and held that the trustees "must be given ... an oppor-
tunity [to attempt to obtain any permit necessary to adapt the struc-
ture to a use permitted as of right or by special permit, and to per-
form work pursuant to such permit] before being compelled to de-
molish the present structure .... "10 The trustees' bad faith, although 
obvious, did not warrant destruction of the building. It was, however, 
" ... unquestioned that ... the trustees may be enjoined from using 
the building for any purpose other than a single family residence."ll 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals was in error in undertaking to make 
a finding as to the possibility of whether the structure was legally us-
able or modifiable to that end when the superior court had made no 
findings or rulings on that issue. 12 As a result the Court held further 
that the superior court should hold additional hearings as necessary 
directed towards a determination of the issue. If the court made a de-
termination favorable to the trustees, it was to retain jurisdiction of 
the case in order to insure that the defendants proceed without un-
reasonable delay, Should the trustees fail, neglect or refuse to make 
application for permits or to complete work authorized by permits 
granted, then after hearing the court could order removal of the 
building.13 
The Court's decision in Haddad II reflects the reluctance with which 
the Court approaches the destruction of structures which are in viola-
tion of zoning laws and the resultant economic waste. It is characteris-
tic of, and supported by, previous decisions on the issue. 14 However, 
the new aspect of the standard illustrated by Haddad II is that the 
good or bad faith of the violator is irrelevant, at least when significant 
economic waste may result. The only indispensable consideration is 
whether the structure is in some manner usable or adaptable for a use 
conforming to the applicable zoning regulations. One possible excep-
9Id. 
10 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 67,339 N.E.2d at 897. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 68,339 N.E.2d at 897. 
13Id. at 68-69,339 N.E.2d at 897. 
14 See Kelloway v. Board of Appeals of Melrose, 361 Mass. 249, 280 N.E.2d 160 
(1972); Town of Marblehead v. Deery, 356 Mass. 532, 254 N.E.2d 234 (1969); Town of 
Stowe v. Pugsley, 349 Mass. 329, 207 N.E.2d 908 (1965); Town of Sterling v. Poulin, 
1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 901, 316 N.E.2d 737. Haddad II also contrasts sharply 
with cases involving demolition orders where private property rights are encroached 
upon. See, e.g., Peters v. Archambault, 361 Mass. 91, 92-93, 278 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1972). 
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tion to this lenient policy may be deduced from the Court's charac-
terization of the defendant's building as "incomplete, but substan-
tial."ls It is conceivable, therefore, that the Court would give less 
weight to considerations of economic waste in situations in which a 
structure had not reached a substantial stage of completion. The facts 
in Haddad II give some indication of what constitutes a "substantial" 
structure. The defendants' building had roofs and decks on both 
stories, all exterior doors and windows had been inserted, and shin-
gles had been applied to exterior walls. l6 At one end of the spectrum, 
therefore, is exterior completion. Presumably at the other would be 
the laying of a foundation. If, in subsequent cases, bad faith violations 
similar to those in Haddad II were found, and the stage of completion 
of the structure tended towards the lower end of the spectrum, it is 
conceivable that a different result might obtain. Exactly where the 
boundaries of substantial completion will be fixed, if at all, must await 
the further attention of the Court. 
§15.13. Special Permits: Excavation and Filling of Coastal 
Marshlands. In MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxburyl (Mac Gibbon 
III), the Supreme Judicial Court annulled, for the third time in thir-
teen years, a town's denial of a special permit to fill and excavate cer-
tain coastal marshlands. The Court reviewed the facts presented to 
the superior court2 and concluded that the outright denial of the 
permit by the board of appeals was inappropriate when the environ-
mental problems involved could be solved by imposing certain condi-
tions and safeguards.3 The Court thus ordered the board to grant the 
permit.4 MacGibbon III is treated in detail later in this chapter.s 
§15.14. Zoning Appeals Procedure: Non-Jurisdictional De-
fects. In Pierce v. Board of Appeals of Carver, 1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court considered whether a plaintiffs failure to comply with the re-
quirement of the Zoning Enabling Act that he "shall cause each of the 
defendants to be served with process within fourteen days after the 
filing of the complaint ... "2 was a procedural defect requiring dis-
missal of the appeal. The plaintiff had filed an appeal from the board 
of appeals' decision to grant a special permit. 3 He had complied with 
15 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 67,339 N.E.2d at 897. 
16/d. at 64, 339 N.E.2d at 895. 
§15.13. 11976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 143,340 N.E.2d 487. 
21d. at 144-47,340 N.E.2d at-488-89. 
ald. at 155,340 N.E.2d at 492. 
4/d. 
5 See § 15.16 infra. 
§15.14. I 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 572, 343 N.E.2d 412. 
2 C.L. c. 40A, § 21. This section was amended by St. 1975 c. 808, § 3, which superse-
ded the entire Zoning Enabling Act. The requirements for maintenance of judicial ap-
peals are now contained in Section 17 of the new Zoning Act. See § 15.4 supra. 
" 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 575, 343 N.E.2d at 414. 
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the provisions of the Zoning Enabling Act which require first, that the 
complaint be filed in the superior court within twenty days after the 
date on which the Board's decision is filed with the town clerk; and 
second, that notice of the appeal be given to the town clerk within the 
same period.4 Three days after the date of filing the plaintiff sent 
summonses and copies of the complaint to the deputy sheriff in order 
that they be served on the defendant members of the Board and the 
applicant. The postal service mistakenly treated them as second-class 
mail although plaintiff had sent them first-class. 5 As a result they did 
not reach the deputy sheriff until sixteen days after the date on which 
the complaint was filed. The sheriff made service on the defendants 
upon receipt of the summonses and complaints. 6 
The applicant, J. M. & J. Corporation, moved to dismiss Pierce's 
appeal on the grounds that the superior court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction because process had not been served withi~ the statutory 
fourteen-day period. The motion was allowed by the superior court 
and judgment entered for the defendant. 7 The plaintiff unsuccessfully 
appealed to the Court of Appeals.s Upon consideration, the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that failure to comply with the fourteen-day ser-
vice requirement did not as a matter of law require dismissal of the 
plaintiffs appeal.9 Although it was within the discretion of the 
superior court to dismiss the action in the present case, the Court 
found that "no significant issue of discretion could be presented in the 
circumstances ... "10 and therefore reversed the superior court's 
judgment and ordered the complaint reinstated. 11 
The result reached in the Pierce case is consistent with the Court's 
recent trend in decisions concerning procedural defects in appeals of 
administrative actions, particularly zoning decisions. 12 In its actual 
holding, however, the Court distinguished language contained in 
Shaughnessy v. Board of Appeals of Lexington 13 to the effect that giving 
notice to defendants within the statutorily prescribed time was juris-
4 G.L. c. 40A, § 21. 
51976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 575,343 N.E.2d at 414. 
6 [d. at 575-76,343 N.E.2d at 414. 
7 [d. at 576, 343 N.E.2d at 414. 
81975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 874, 883, 329 N.E.2d 774, 778. The Appeals Court's 
rationale was based upon an analysis of the plaintiffs obligation "to deliver" copies of 
the summons and complaint to the sheriff. G.L. c. 40A, § 21 and Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(a) 
were read together to place the risk of mailing on the plaintiff and, in essence, to re-
quire that the plaintiff make actual physical delivery of the summons and complaint to 
the sheriff in order to comply with Section 21. /d. at 879-83, 329 N.E.2d at 776-78. 
91976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 576-77,343 N.E.2d at 414. 
10 [d. at 583,343 N.E.2d at 417. 
11 [d. 
12 See, e.g., Lynch v. Board of Appeals of Boston, 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 415, 
417,297 N.E.2d 63,66, noted in 1973 ANN.SuRV. MAss.LAW§ 12.22. 
13 357 Mass. 9, 255 N.E.2d 367 (1970). 
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dictional. 14 This language was distinguished in that it had been in-
voked in an attempt to distinguish the essential action of giving notice 
from the less important one of filing an affidavit of notice, which was 
the primary issue in that case.15 For that reason and in view of the 
fact that Shaughnessy allowed a curative joinder upon a finding of no 
prejudice, the Court in Pierce found the statement in Shaughnessy to be 
a source of confusion rather than guidance. 16 
The Court's approach to procedural defects exemplified by Pierce 
does not, however, condone disregard of procedural requirements. 
When considering the effect of an omission or error, it has recognized 
that "[s]ome errors or omissions are seen on their face to be so re-
pugnant to the procedural scheme, so destructive of its purposes, as to 
call for dismissal of the appeal."17 Pierce implies that with respect to 
the procedural requirements of the former Zoning Enabling Act,18 
such jurisdictional errors or omissions would include failure to com-
mence the appeal within twenty days after the board of appeals' deci-
sion has been filed, and failure to file notice of the appeal with the 
town clerk during the same twenty-day period.19 "With respect to 
other slips in the procedure . .. the judge is to consider how far they 
have interfered with the accomplishment of the purposes implicit in 
the statutory scheme and to what extent the other side can justifiably 
claim prejudice."20 In such cases it is within the trial court's discretion 
to allow the appeal to go forward. 21 Defects which fall under this type 
of analysis include failure to attach a copy of the board of appeal's 
decision to the copy of the complaint served on the defendants or 
filed with the clerk,22 and failure to name the original applicant23 or a 
board member24 as a defendant, resulting in lack of service on those 
parties. The failure to file an affidavit reciting that all parties have 
been appropriately notified also falls within this category. 25 
The decision in Pierce adds to this collection of possibly non-
jurisdictional defects the failure to serve all defendants within the 
14 [d. at 13, 255 N.E.2d at 369. 
15 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 580-81, 343 N.E.2d at 416. 
16 [d. at 580,343 N.E.2d at 416. 
17 Schulte v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3247, 
3254, 337 N.E.2d 677, 680. Schulte reviewed the entire issue of jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional defects on filing an appeal from an administrative decision. The effect of 
that decision was to harmonize recent Supreme Judicial Court decisions in this area and 
to reduce technical but not meaningful defects to non-jurisdictional ones. 
18 G.L. c. 40A, § 21. 
19 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 577,343 N.E.2d at 415. 
20 Schulte v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3247, 
3255,337 N.E.2d 677, 680. 
21/d. 
221976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 578, 343 N.E.2d at 415. 
23 [d. at 579, 343 N.E.2d at 415. 
24/d. at 580,343 N.E.2d at 415. 
25 [d. at 581,343 N.E.2d at 416. 
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fourteen-day period prescribed by the Zoning Enabling Act. 26 How-
ever, the decision should not be viewed as giving a carte blanche to 
those who fail to comply with that provision. Rather, the case is prop-
erly interpreted as holding that a failure to meet the fourteen-day re-
quirement does not as a matter of law require the trial court to dis-
miss the appeal; in other words, it is not per se a jurisdictional defect. 
Moreover, Pierce leaves within the trial court's discretion the question 
of whether plaintiffs failure to comply is prejudicial and, therefore, 
grounds for dismissal of the appeal. It is to be expected that a review-
ing court will afford great deference to the trial court's judgment on 
this question. 
Pierce has been applied by the Court of Appeals in this manner in 
Raia v. Board of Appeals of North Reading. 27 In Raia, the plaintiff ap-
pealed the board's granting of a variance from minimum lot frontage 
requirements. 28 The plaintiff complied with the time requirements for 
filing and giving notice of appeal, but failed to give notice of the ac-
tion to the original petitioner, Hashem, within the statutory 
fourteen-day period.29 Hashem did not receive notice of the action 
until seventy-eight days after its commencement.30 He raised the issue 
by plea in abatement which was overruled by the superior court 
judge.31 The Court of Appeals, relying on the recent decision in 
Pierce, held that the superior court was not deprived of jurisdiction by 
reason of the plaintiffs failure to give notice, since the record did not 
contain any evidence of prejudice to Hashem because of the late ser-
vice. The Court of Appeals, therefore, could not "say that the judge 
abused his discretion in refusing to sustain the plea in abatement."32 It 
appears from Pierce and Raia that the length of the delay is not de-
terminative. Instead, the determinative issue is whether or not there is 
sufficient evidence showing actual prejudice to the defendant. If the 
trial court finds that there is insufficient evidence of prejudice, the 
defendant faces the difficult task of persuading the reviewing court 
that the trial court abused its discretion. 
§15.15. Municipal Regulation of Billboards: Aesthetic Zoning: 
Commercial Free Speech: Consistency of Local Regulation with 
State Law. In John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board1 
(Brookline) the Supreme Judicial Court for the first time squarely held 
26 G.L. c. 40A, § 21. 
27 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 606, 347 N.E.2d 694. 
28Id. at 606,347 N.E.2d at 696. 
29Id. at 609, 347 N.E.2d at 697. The Raia court held that the fact that Pierce was de-
cided under the repealed Zoning Enabling Act was of no consequence. Id. at 609 n. 4, 
347 N.E.2d at 697 n. 4. 
30Id. at 609, 347 N.E.2d at 697. 
31/d. at 610,347 N.E.2d at 697. 
32Id. 
§15.15. 11975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3450, 339 N.E.2d 709. 
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that aesthetic considerations constitute a constitutionally adequate 
basis for local regulation of billboards. In reaching this result, the 
Brookline court has expanded the scope of the permissible objectives of 
the police power. 
The plaintiff, a corporation engaged in the business of maintaining 
and leasing commercial billboards, maintained twenty-two such 
billboards in nonresidential districts in Brookline.2 The billboards 
were maintained pursuant to annual permits issued by the defendant 
Outdoor Advertising Board (the board), the state agency responsible 
for the regulation of outdoor advertising.3 In 1972 a town "sign by-
law" as well as an amendment to the town's zoning by-law took effect.4 
These by-laws had the effect of prohibiting all off-premises advertis-
ing in Brookline.s Upon notice from the town of the by-laws' effect, 
the board held an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether further 
permits should be issued to the plaintiff.6 The plaintiff alleged that 
the by-laws were invalid on three grounds. First, the plaintiff alleged 
that the outright prohibition of off-premise signs was not within the 
town's zoning power and was inconsistent with the state constitution, 
as well as statutes and regulations pertaining to outdoor advertising. 7 
Further, the plaintiff contended that the by-laws violated due process 
in that they were not reasonably related to a legitimate objective of the 
police power.s Finally, the by-laws' prohibition of billboards through-
out the entire town was claimed to be an unconstitutional abridgement 
of the First Amendment guaranty of free speech thereby violating the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The board re-
jected all three grounds and denied further permits to the plaintiff. 1o 
"Id. at 3451,339 N.E.2d at 711. 
31d. Municipalities are also empowered to regulate outdoor advertising, including 
billboards, in a manner not inconsistent with state statutes and regulations. For a discus-
sion of this issue see text at notes 12-20 infra. 
<Id. at 3451-53, 339 N.E.2d at 711-12. The sign by-law was adopted and became ef-
fective in 1967.ld. at 3451,339 N.E.2d at 711. Although it did not by its term prohibit 
all off-premise advertising, that was its effect. Id. at 3453, 339 N.E.2d at 712. It con-
tained a five-year grace period for the removal of nonconforming signs. That grace 
period expired in 1972. Id. at 3452, 339 N.E.2d at 711. The zoning by-law, passed in 
December, 1971, and effective in January 1972, did expressly prohibit all off-premise 
signs throughout the town.ld. at 3451-53, 339 N.E.2d at 711-12. No distinction was 
made in the opinion between the town's power to zone and its power to enact general 
by-laws.ld. at 3463-64, 339 N.E.2d at 716. 
"Id. at 3453, 339 N.E.2d at 712. Off-premise or nonaccessory signs advertise goods 
or services having no relation to the premises upon which they are located. On-premise 
or accessory signs advertise the goods or services available on the premises. Their func-
tion is basically incidental to the operation of the business. 
"Id. 
71d. at 3450, 339 N.E.2d at 712. 
8/d. at 3463, 339 N.E.2d at 715-16. 
"Id. at 3478,339 N.E.2d at 721. 
10ld. at 3454, 339 N.E.2d at 712. 
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This decision, in turn, was upheld by both the superior court and the 
Supreme Judicial CourtY 
In its affirming opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court first rejected 
the plaintiffs contention that the by-laws were inconsistent with state 
law in that state law impliedly precludes a total prohibition of 
billboards by a municipalityP The Court's initial inquiry concerned 
Chapter 93 of the General LawsP That chapter authorized the board 
to regulate outdoor advertising and, in addition, empowered cities 
and towns to regulate such advertising in a manner consistent with the 
state statute and board regulations. 14 The Court in its inquiry as to 
whether the Brookline by-laws were inconsistent with Chapter 93 or 
the board rules and regulations, applied the somewhat relaxed stan-
dard which it had adopted in earlier cases.1S According to that stan-
dard, a local by-law or ordinance is upheld unless it is found to con-
flict sharply with state law or board regulations. 16 Applying the stan-
dard, the Court found no inconsistency between the by-laws and the 
state laws and board regulations, particularly since the relevant board 
regulation, Regulation 9k, allowed towns and cities considerable dis-
cretion in regulating off-premise advertising. 17 Such grant of discre-
tion, the Court reasoned, implied that municipalities may impose reg-
ulations more stringent than those imposed by the board. IS Further, 
the Court found support in General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Depart-
ment of Public Works 19 for the proposition that the regulatory authority 
of municipalities includes the power to prohibit outdoor off-premises 
advertising. Thus, the Court rejected the plaintiffs contentions of the 
invalidity of the Brookline by-laws under state law. 20 
Turning to the plaintiffs due process argument, the Court invoked 
a two-stage analysis. In the first stage, the Court inquired whether the 
by-laws bore a reasonable relation to the public health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare.21 The Court in Brookline assumed that the purpose 
11 !d. 
12!d. at 3463,339 N.E.2d at 715. 
13 G.L. c. 93, §§ 29-33. The Court initially recognized that the legislature's authority 
to enact chapter 93 was conferred by art. 50 of the Amendments to the Constitution, 
1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3455, 339 N.E.2d at 712-13. 
14 [d. G.L. c. 93, § 29. 
15 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3457-58,339 N.E.2d at 713-14. 
18 [d., citing Bloom v. City of Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 154, 293 N.E.2d 268, 279 
(1973). 
17 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3459-61,339 N.E.2d at 714-15. 
~M . 
19 289 Mass. 149, 197, 193 N.E. 799, 821, appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543 (1935). 
20 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3463,339 N.E.2d at 715. 
21 [d. at 3464, 339 N.E.2d at 716. In setting forth this due process standard, the 
Court stated that "[t]he by-law is to be presumed valid and, if its reasonableness is fairly 
debatable, the judgment of the local legislative body must be sustained." !d., citing 
Caires v. Building Comm'r of Hingham, 323 Mass. 589, 594-95, 83 N.E.2d 550, 554 
(1949). 
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of the by-laws was primarily or solely aesthetic. 22 Having thus squarely 
framed the issue in terms of the permissibility of the aesthetic objec-
tive, the Court concluded that the by-laws passed constitutional muster 
in that such objective is properly viewed as encompassed by the term 
"general welfare."23 The Court's exp~nsive reading of that term, in 
turn, was justified on the basis of the need of the judiciary to respond 
to changing societal values. 24 Specifically, the Court concluded that its 
expansion of the concept general welfare was justified by the en-
hanced recognition of environmental and aesthetic values by both the 
United States Supreme Court25 and the Massachusetts Legislature.26 
Further, the Court stated that its approach did not constitute a sharp 
break with the past. Specifically, the Court noted that it had expressed 
a similar view, by way of dicta, in a 1935 case, General Outdoor Advertis-
ing Co. v. Department of Public Works. 27 
In the second phase of its due process analysis, the Court consid-
ered and rejected the plaintiffs argument that even if aesthetics con-
stitute a permissible purpose of local regulation, the by-laws in ques-
tion did not bear a reasonable relationship to that purpose.28 In reject-
ing Donnelly's argument that the total prohibition of off-premises 
billboards from an urban community such as Brookline was an un-
reasonable exercise of the police power, the Court mustered several 
means of justifying the prohibition. First the Court declined to accept 
the view that, while billboards may be totally banned from a rural 
area, in urban areas such a prohibition is u~ustified. Urban residents, 
the Court reasoned, are just as entitled to protection of their aesthetic 
environment as are rural residents.29 Further, the Court found no 
221975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3464,339 N.E.2d at 716. The board in its decision uphold-
ing the by-laws had made the same assumption. ld. 
231d. at 3466-69, 339 N.E.2d at 717-18. 
2·ld. at 3466,339 N.E.2d at 717. 
251d. at 3467,339 N.E.2d at 717, citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954. See 
also Village of Belle Terre v. Buraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
26 1 ~75 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3468, 339 N .E.2d at 717. The Court cited the legislature's 
adoption of Article 97 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, 
an article which enunciated a right of the people to "the natural, scenic, historic, and 
esthetic qualities of their environment .... " !d. In addition, the Court found evidence 
of legislative recognition of the aesthetic factor in the Zoning Enabling Act, G.L. c. 40A, 
§ 3, which provided that zoning regulations shall be designed to "preserve and increase 
... amenities" within a city or town. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3468, 339 N.E.2d at 717. 
27 289 Mass. 149, 187, 193 N.E. 799, 816, appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543 (1935). In 
General Outdoor Advertising Co., the Court had stated: 
Even if the rules and regulations of billboards and other advertising devices did not 
rest upon the safety of public travel and the promotion of the comfort of travellers by 
exclusion of undesired intrusion, we think that the preservation of scenic beauty and 
places of historical interest would be a sufficient support for them. Considerations of 
taste and fitness may be a proper basis for action in granting and in denying permits 
for locations for advertising devices. 
!d. 
28 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3472-76,339 N.E.2d at 719-21. 
2°ld. at 3473,339 N.E.2d at 719. 
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merit in distinguishing, for the purposes of due process, between a 
prohibition of billboards in residential areas and a prohibition of 
billboards in business areas.30 Specifically, the Court concluded that in 
a densely populated area such as Brookline, the aesthetic quality of 
business districts impacts directly on the aesthetic quality of residential 
areas.3t Moreover, the Court reasoned that municipalities have a 
legitimate interest in improving the aesthetic quality of business as 
well as residential areas. In conclusion, the Court found Brookline's 
outright prohibition of off-premises advertising rationally related to 
the aesthetic objective and, accordingly, found the town's by-laws to 
comport with due process.32 
Finally, the Court turned to and rejected Donnelly's contention that 
the sign and zoning by-laws violated its right to free speech under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.33 Recognizing that commercial 
speech has been afforded some degree of protection under the First 
Amendment, the Court analyzed the free speech issue in terms of 
whether governmental interests outweighed the plaintiffs First 
Amendment rights.34 First the Court noted that Donnelly's billboards 
were commercial, as opposed to ideational, in nature. Thus, the Court 
found the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Bigelow v. 
Virginia,3s in which the prohibition of a newspaper advertisement re-
lating to the availability of abortions was struck down, not controlling 
in the instant case.36 Further, the Supreme Judicial Court reasoned 
that in Brookline, because of the "intrusive" quality of billboards, 
passers-by are effectively compelled to read them. 37 The protection of 
passers-by from such compulsion, the Court implied, is a significant 
30ld. at 3475,339 N.E.2d at 720. 
311d. 
321d. at 3477,339 N.E.2d at 721. 
331d. at 3478, 339 N.E.2d at 721. 
341d. 
35 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
36 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3478-79, 339 N.E.2d at 721. The Supreme Court recently 
decided Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748 (1976), involving the validity of a Virginia statute that had the effect of 
totally prohibiting the advertisement of prescription drug prices in the state, id. at 749-
50. This opinion has to some extent clarified the Court's previous decisions in this area. 
Specifically, the Bigelow decision, 421 U.S. 809, had left open the standard for de-
termining the degree of first amendment protection to be afforded purely commercial 
speech. In Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, the standard for evaluating the "commercial speech" 
interest and balancing this with the state's interest in protecting its citizens focused upon 
the absolute prohibition placed upon the advertiser and, more importantly, upon the 
absolute deprivation of information to the consumer.ld. at 761-65. The validity of time, 
manner, and place restrictions on commercial advertising was reaffirmed.ld. at 770-73. 
Brookline's prohibition of billboards, therefore, appears to fall within the category of 
permissible restrictions. The factor of absolute deprivation of information is also lacking 
from Brookline. It would seem that the analysis of the Supreme Judicial Court in Brook-
line is bolstered, to a degree, by Virginia Board of Pharmacy. 
371d. at 3479-81, 339 N.E.2d at 721-22. 
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governmental interest. Then the Court concluded that a municipality 
may legitimately favor the rights of persons not to be compelled to 
read the plaintiffs commercial messages, over the right of the plaintiff 
to convey such messages.38 
The primary significance of the Brookline case is to be found in the 
Court's outright recognition that aesthetic factors alone may constitute 
a permissible objective of zoning. Historically, the Massachusetts 
judiciary, along with a majority of state courts, has been reluctant to 
accept aesthetics as a permissible objective of the police power.39 At 
38 [d. at 3481, 339 N.E.2d at 722. A potential equal protection issue raised by the dis-
tinction between off-premise and on-premise advertising in a by-law based solely on 
aesthetics was not discussed by the Court. The crux of this issue is whether a classifica-
tion totally prohibiting off-premise advertising is discriminatory, particularly when on-
premise advertising is not subject to some restriction. The rationale of the distinction 
has focused upon two separate points: (1) The right to maintain a business or on-
premise sign is a corollary of the right to maintain the business; and (2) that billboards 
are of a unique nature and foster particularly undesirable effects. Although the Su-
preme Judicial Court has noted the second point, the rationale is most clearly articu-
lated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in United Advertising Corp. v. Raritan, II N.]. 
144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952), noted in Holme, Billboards and On-Premise Signs: Regulation and 
Elimination Under the Fifth Amendment, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT 
DOMAIN 247 (1974). 
The distinction has been upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court in the General Outdoor 
Advertising case, 289 Mass. 149, 168, 193 N .E. 799, 808, appeals dismissed, 296 U.S. 543 
(1935). In fact, the distinction has been upheld in most jurisdictions both before and 
after judicial acceptance of purely aesthetic regulations. See 4 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN 
LAND PLANNING LAW c. 122 (1974). General, however was rendered in the period in 
which billboard regulation was supported only by traditional police power objectives. 
Since, in the wake of Brookline, such prohibition is supported by a judicially recognized 
aesthetic objective, the equal protection question has acquired a different focus. Spe-
cifically, an on-premise sign may be as unattractive and aesthetically offensive as an 
off-premise sign. As a result, it would appear that the total prohibition or strict regula-
tion of off-premise advertising unaccompanied by similar although less stringent regula-
tion of on-premise advertising violates the equal protection guaranty of the fourteenth 
amendment. This view has found support in the dissenting opinion of Judge Frederick 
Hall, of the New Jersey Supreme Court, in United Advertising Co. v. Borough of 
Metuchen, 42 N.]. 1, 12-13, 198 A.2d 447, 453-454 (1964) (Hall,]., dissenting). On the 
same basis a Florida court has invalidated size regulation of off-premise advertising 
based on solely aesthetic considerations when on-premise signs could be of unlimited 
size, Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 6II, 615 (Fla. 1960). 
However, a contrary view may be inferred from the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). There, the 
Court held that it was not a violation of equal protection for a municipality to eradicate 
perceived evils in a piecemeal fashion. This approach was adopted by the California 
Court of Appeals for the Second District in a case involving the prohibition of advertis-
ing, Coast - United Advertising, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 51 Cal. App. 3d 766, 770, 
124 Cal. Rptr. 487, 490 (1975). In that case, in response to the plaintiffs equal protec-
tion claim the court held that when a city was "trying to improve the aesthetic appeal of 
its public streets, it need not abolish all unaesthetic elements immediately." Railway Ex-
press was cited in support of this proposition. 
39 [d. at 3465, 339, N.E.2d at 716; 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.21-
.22 (1968); 4 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW c. 119 (1974). 
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present aesthetics is generally held to be a proper auxiliary considera-
tion in support of a zoning regulation. 40 However, except in a minor-
ity of states, it is not sufficient in itself to support an exercise of the 
police power.41 Massachusetts adhered to this view prior to the Brook-
line case.42 Judicial reluctance to recognize aesthetics as a permissible 
police objective has been related to several factors: the requirements 
of the common law of nuisance,43 (an historical antecedent to zoning), 
the use of the word 'aesthetic' itself,44 and the difficulty of defining 
'aesthetic'.45 This last factor has probably been the foremost problem 
in the history of aesthetic zoning. 46 There are two approaches to de-
fining aestheticsY The first draws upon the professional viewpoint of 
the trained artist, architect or planner, and the second, upon the con-
ventional viewpoint of the community's members. These viewpoints 
will not necessarily coincide. For the purpose of aesthetic controls over 
off-premise advertising it appears that the latter approach prevails.48 
40 See, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3465,339 N.E.2d at 716. 
41 See, I R. ANDERSON. AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.22 (1968); 4 N. WILLIAMS. 
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW c. 119 (1974); Masotti and Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and 
the Police Power, 46 J. URBAN L. 773 (1969). 
42 See, e.g., General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 
149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935); Opinion of the Justices of the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 
N .E.2d 557 (1955). 
43 I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.14 (1968). The relevance of the 
common law of nuisance stems from the fact that the plaintiff was required to prove 
substantial interference with the use of his property. Noxious odors and loud noises 
were fairly susceptible of proof. However, it was more difficult to prove a substantial 
invasion by reason of an unsightly or ugly use. This characteristic appears to have car-
ried over into zoning law. [d. 
44 [d. It has been suggested that the choice of the word aesthetic was unfortunate as it 
brought to mind the effeminate, the esoteric, and the fringes of personal preference. 
The judiciary was, therefore, skeptical of its place in a court of law. [d. 
45 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3465, 339 N.E.2d at 716. The difficulty of definition is 
illustrated by the Court's discussion in Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 
Mass. 348, 351, 74 N.E. 601, 602 (1905). However, in a later case the court said that 
aesthetics "has commonly been applied to regulations as to the character, form, and ap-
pearance .... " General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 
Mass. 149, 185, 193 N.E. 799, 815, appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543 (1935). 
46 In addition, this problem was closely related to the judicial perception that no judi-
cial standards could be devised to resolve questions of aesthetics. I R. ANDERSON, 
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.14 at 504; I A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND 
PLANNING § 14.01 (4th ed. 1975); Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Re-
appraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Dukerminierl; 
Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 
149 (1954). 
47 At least one author has suggested that it is unnecessary to define aesthetics per se, 
but that it is only relevant to determine what is aesthetically desirable in any particular 
community or environment. Dukeminier, supra note 46, at 226-27. However, this does 
not preclude discussion of the standard available to determine what is aesthetically de-
sirable in different contexts. 
48 See, e.g, John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 1975 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 3450, 339 N.E.2d 709; Town of Lexington v. Govenar, 295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19 
(1936); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 
193 N.E. 799 (1935). 
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The billboard cases have not discussed the relevance of this distinc-
tion. However, this particular area may be one of the few in which the 
professional and conventional viewpoints converge, thereby obviating 
the need for discussion. 
As noted previously, the courts' perception of aesthetics as a purely 
subjective factor had relegated it to a subordinate position in zoning 
law in a majority of the states.49 Even this is a marked improvement 
over the initial reception given to aesthetics. Originally, aesthetic con-
siderations were thought of as merely a question of good taste. 50 Sub-
sequently, a majority of state courts accepted aesthetics as a valid sec-
ondary consideration. However, in order to find an ordinance or 
by-law valid it was necessary that it be related to one of the traditional 
police power objectives.51 This period in the history of aesthetic zon-
ing has been referred to as the "era of legal fiction."52 Billboards, sub-
jects of the earliest aesthetic cases, were found to provide shelter for 
criminal and immoral acts, to present fire hazards, and to affect traf-
fic safety. 53 
The Supreme Judicial Court, however, has never resorted to such 
outlandish legal fictions in supporting advertising or other aestheti-
cally motivated regulation. Rather, prior to Brookline, the Court gave 
weight to the aesthetic factor to the extent that it related to more 
established societal-usually economic-values. Thus, for instance, in 
General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works 54 the Court 
upheld a Concord by-law that prohibited off-premises advertising, 
stressing the importanc~ of the preservation of places of historic in-
terest and of scenic beauty.55 However, although this reasoning is in-
terrelated with aesthetics, it draws economic factors into the analysis, 
thus diluting the importance of purely aesthetic considerations.56 Simi-
larly, in Opinion of the Justices to the Senate,57 concerning architectural 
controls in Nantucket, the Court emphasized the preservation of his-
toric areas. In that decision the economic interest in maintaining the 
tourist attraction to the island was clearly articulated.58 Town of 
49 See note 39 supra. 
50 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 351, 74 N.E. 
601,602 (1905). 
51 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 
184-185, 193 N.E. 799, 815, appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543 (1935); Opinion of the Jus-
tices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 778, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561 (1955); 4 N. WILLIAMS, 
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW c. 119 (1974). 
52 4 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW c. 119 (1974). 
53Id. 
54 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935). 
55Id. at 213, 184-89, 193 N.E. at 833,814-17. 
56 It could be argued that the aesthetic argument is not distinct from the economic 
argument. Holme, Billboards and On-Premise Signs: Regulation and Elimination Under The 
Fifth Amendment, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 257 (1974). 
57 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955). 
58Id. at 780, 128 N.E.2d at 562. 
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Lexington v. Govenar59 emphasized another facet of the economic fac-
tor, the maintenance of district property values. In that case advertis-
ing signs, with limited exceptions, were prohibited in residential 
areas. 60 The defendant, an attorney, was found to have violated the 
ordinance by maintaining a professional sign at his residence.61 The 
relevance of aesthetic considerations was acknowledged; however, the 
protection of the value of residences was specifically noted.62 
The Brookline case, however, did not render itself particularly ap-
propriate to the foregoing economic analyses. The prohibition against 
off-premise advertising as applied to the plaintiff concerned billboards 
in nonresidential areas, i.e., industrial and commercial districts. 
Although the property-value argument could be raised, it would have 
less impact when considered in these districts rather than residential 
districts. 63 Additionally, the record in Brookline was devoid of any rea-
son other than an aesthetic one for the passage of the by-Iaw.64 These 
two factors made it necessary for the Court squarely to face the ques-
tion of the validity of purely aesthetic zoning controls. When it did face 
that question, the Court's decision to uphold aesthetic zoning found 
its rationale in the flexible nature of the term "general welfare," a 
term whose meaning, the Court suggested, shifts with the times. This 
rationale appears to rest ultimately on the Court's subjective percep-
tion of the spirit of the times. However, it is at least arguable that ear-
lier opinions purporting to reject aesthetic zoning, while they were 
justified in terms of various legal fictions,65 were in fact based largely 
on courts' subjective perception of the significance of the aesthetic fac-
tor. Thus, rather than as a step in the direction of greater judicial sub-
jectivity, Brookline can be viewed primarily as a step in the direction of 
increased judicial candor on the issue of aesthetic zoning. 
More generally, billboard case law is a significant indicator of judi-
cial attitudes concerning regulations designed to affect community 
appearance.66 Although the Brookline opinion is somewhat ambigu-
.9295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19 (1936). 
6°Id. at 32, 3 N.E.2d at 20. 
61Id. 
62Id. at 36-37,3 N.E.2d at 22. 
63 The Court did note that in a densely populated area, residential and business dis-
tricts might be situated in close proximity to one another. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3475, 
339 N.E. 2d at 720. Therefore, in order to improve the living environment, both areas 
would require regulation. Although the effect upon property values was not explicitly 
considered, the argument is apparent. In addition, the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Finch in In Re Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82, 89, 8 N.E.2d 286, 
289 (1937), was quoted with approval. The dissent argued that a city might, by improv-
ing its appearance, attract more commercial enterprises and permanent residents. Id. 
These effects could have economic ramifications. 
64 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3466, 339 N.E.2d at 716. 
65 See text at notes 51-53 supra. 
661 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.15, at 509 (1968); 4 N. WILLIAMS, 
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW c. 118, at 573 (1974). 
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OUS67 it could be fairly read to recognize aesthetics as a permissible ob-
jective of all zoning controls.6s The impact of the decision, however, 
remains uncertain. There are characteristics of billboards that render 
them particularly appropriate objects of aesthetic regulation. Land use 
controls, similar to their predecessor, the common law of nuisance, 
are in large part the product of a balancing process. A particular land 
use is evaluated in terms of the degree to which it infringes upon 
neighboring uses and the degree to which it serves or benefits the 
community. If the detrimental effects do not outweigh the beneficial 
effects, the use may be sanctioned by the community or the courts.69 
Billboards infringe upon neighboring uses without providing any ser-
vice to the community. In General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department 
of Public Works 70 the Supreme Judicial Court described their unique 
nature. Their value is totally derived from their location on or near 
major public ways constructed at public expense. Their profitability is 
derived from capitalizing upon this public expenditure. In addition, 
they are objects that command the attention of passersby who are un-
able to tune them out.7l As noted above, the undesirable nature of 
billboards appears to be one subject upon which all elements within 
the community can agree. On this basis, it could be argued that 
aesthetic regulation should be confined to land uses exhibiting the fol-
lowing characteristics. First, there must be a consensus of the commu-
nity as to their aesthetically unpleasing nature. Second, the use must 
offer little or no public benefit to offset its detrimental impact on sur-
rounding uses. 
Nevertheless, the Brookline case provides communities with the pre-
cedent for implementing other types of zoning controls directed to 
solely aesthetic objectives. In view of suburban resistance to multi-unit 
dwellings and mobile homes, they are likely prospects for future reg-
ulation. 72 In some states, single family residences have been the sub-
ject of architectural controls designed to preserve the character of the 
67 The precise holding of the case was "that aesthetics alone may justify the exercise 
of the police power; that within the broad concept of 'general welfare', cities and towns 
may enact reasonable billboard regulations designed to preserve and improve their 
physical environment." 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3466,339 N.E.2d at 717. The Court also 
characterized the recognition of aesthetics as "in no way mark[ingJ a radical departure 
from [its] prior cases dealing with outdoor advertising regulation." [d. at 3469, 339 
N.E.2d at 718. This leaves open the avenue for a narrow reading of the opinion in the 
future. 
68 The Court's reasoning focused upon the demands of modern society for a gener-
ally pleasing environment. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3467-68, 339 N.E.2d at 717. The re-
cent legislative concern expressed in Art. 97 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution and noted in support of the decision is directed to the aesthetic qualities of 
the environment generally, not specifically to billboards. 
69 See generally 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNIN(' LAW c. 17 (1974). 
70 289 Mass. 149,193 N.E. 799, appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543 (1935). 
71 [d. at 167-68, 193 N.E. at 808. 
72 See 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §19.1 (exclusionary zoning). 
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community.73 Despite the possible vulnerability of these areas to reg-
ulation solely for aesthetics, there are both legislative and judicial 
safeguards that could prevent indiscriminate application of the 
aesthetic principle. In the case of prohibitions aimed at multi-unit 
dwellings, the legislature has indicated its intent in the Anti-Snob Zon-
ing Law. 74 And, unlike billboards, apartment buildings benefit the 
general community. These two factors should mitigate against any 
abuses of aesthetic controls. Mobile homes are considered to be one of 
the few remaining forms of low cost single-family detached housing. 75 
In the past, they have been severely restricted by Massachusetts 
municipalities for health, economic, and aesthetic reasons.76 Consider-
ing the Court's willingness to uphold restrictions on mobile homes, its 
newly acquired acceptance of aesthetics will probably lend greater 
support to regulation in this area. Finally, single-family architectural 
controls are rooted in those aspects of aesthetics that are basically eco-
nomic, the preservation of property values. This type of control has 
been achieved in the past through private restrictive covenants. 77 
Although there is a governmental interest in achieving these objec-
tives, significant First Amendment questions may arise from the reg-
ulation of architectural style.78 However, it can be expected that mis-
use of the aesthetic principle in any of these areas could be effectively 
controlled by a reading of Brookline strictly confined to its facts. Close 
judicial scrutiny of aesthetic regulations directed to apartment build-
ings and architectural design appears to be warranted. 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§15.16. Zoning and Land Use-Environmental Law-Zoning to 
Prohibit the Filling of Coastal Wetlands: The Taking Issue: Mac-
73 I A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 14.04 (4th ed. 1975). See also 
Crumplar, Architectural Controls; Aesthetic Regulation of the Urban Environment, 6 URBAN 
LAWYER 622 (1974). In Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773,128 N.E.2d 
557 (1955), the architectural controls discussed were designed to preserve historical 
areas. They did not apply to housing design in any area regardless of its historical sig-
nificance. The controls referred to herein would have that effect. 
74 G.L. C. 40B, § 20-23, commented on, 1969 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 14.1. 
75 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW c. 57 (1974). 
78 See Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 595, 180 N .E.2d 333, 336 
(1962); Cliff v. Board of Health of Amesbury, 343 Mass. 58, 175 N.E.2d 489 (1961); 
Town of Granby v. Landry, 341 Mass. 443, 170 N.E.2d 364 (1960); Town of 
Marblehead v. Gilbert, 334 Mass. 602, 137 N.E.2d 921 (1956); Gillam v. Board of 
Health of Saugus, 327 Mass. 621,100 N.E.2d 687 (1951). 
77 But cf. Donoghue v. Prynnwood Corp., 356 Mass. 703, 255 N .E.2d 326 (1970), in 
which a private covenent requiring a developer's approval of house design was not en-
forced. This result was reached because there was no uniformity of house styles in the 
area and the proposed home would not detrimentally affect property values. For a dis-
cussion of the case see 1970 ANN. S URV. MASS. LAW § 17.10. 
78 For an interesting discussion of the constitutional issue, see Rubin, Architecture, 
Aesthetic Zoning, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 179 (1975). 
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Gibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury. 1 With the intent of pre-
serving the natural resources of the town, the town of Duxbury in 
1960 changed its zoning by-law to restrict the filling of the town's re-
maining wetlands.2 Plaintiffs, owners of seven acres of coastal marsh-
land, applied to the town board of appeals in 1962 for a special per-
mit to fill their land in order to make it suitable for residential de-
velopment.a This application began a fourteen year battle between an 
environmental protection-oriented board of appeals and a private 
landowner seeking the profits of development which would ultimately 
be considered by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on four 
occasions.4 
The first time it considered the application, the board of appeals 
denied the permit to fill the land because it found that the land was 
unsuitable for the installation of an adequate sewage system.5 After 
the superior court decreed that the decision of the board of appeals 
did not exceed the board's authority, the plaintiffs appealed to the 
Supreme Judicial Court. 6 The Supreme Judicial Court, in MacGibbon 
I, annulled the board's decision by holding that the board's decision 
was not responsive to the plaintiffs' petition.7 Insofar as the permit 
was sought for the purpose of filling and excavating the land, the 
Court ruled that it ought not be denied on the ground that the land 
was unsuitable for the installation of sewerage.8 The Court decided 
that sewage considerations were only relevant to the issuance of a 
§15.16 1 - Mass. - (1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 143), 340 N.E.2d 487 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as MacGibbon III]. 
Id. 
2Id. at 144,340 N.E.2d at 488. The amendment to the zoning by-law stated, 
"[the by-law] is also for the purpose of protecting and preserving from despolia-
tion the natural features and resources of the town, such as salt marshes, wedands, 
brooks and ponds. No obstruction of streams or tidal rivers and no excavation or 
filling of any marsh, wedand or bog shall be done without proper authorization by 
a special permit issued by the Board of Appeals." 
a Id. Special permits were allowed under section 8(d) of the by-law which provided 
that, "[t]he Board of Appeals may, in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate con-
ditions and safeguards, make special exceptions to the terms of the by-law in harmony 
with their general purpose and intent, and in accordance with the specified rules con-
tained in this by-law." In 1971 the town amended the by-laws and § 8(d) became § 9(d). 
The parties stipulated that the by-law prior to the 1971 amendments was controlling in 
the case at bar. Id. at 144 n.I, 340 N.E.2d at 488 n.\. 
• MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690, 200 N.E.2d 254 (1964) 
[hereinafter cited as MacGibbon I]; MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 
Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MacGibbon l/]; MacGibbon v. 
Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 143, 340 N.E.2d 487 [hereinafter 
cited as MacGibbon III]; MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 1976 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 768, 344 N.E.2d 185 [hereinafter cited as MacGibbon IV]. 
5 MacGibbon I, 347 Mass. 690, 691, 200 N.E.2d 254, 255 (1964). 
6Id. at 690,200 N.E.2d at 254. 
7Id. at 692, 200 N.E.2d at 256. 
8Id. 
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building permit, which the petitioners were not seeking.9 The Su-
preme Judicial Court directed the board to hold further proceedings 
to consider facts relevant to the denial of plaintiffs' petition to fill 
their land. In addition, the Court instructed the board to make a de-
finite statement of the rational causes and motives, based upon 
adequate findings of fact, for the board's decision. 1o 
At rehearing, the board again denied the plaintiffs' petition to fill 
their land. This time the board ruled that the special permit provision 
of the zoning by-law was never intended to allow the granting of 
permits to fill coastal wetlands but only applied to the filling of small 
interior wetlands which would not significantly violate the wetlands 
preservation purpose of the by-Iaw. ll The superior court affirmed the 
board's decision. 12 The Supreme Judicial Court, in MacGibbon II, 
again reversed the superior court and annulled the decision of the 
board.13 The Court found that the board erred in interpreting the 
by-law as limiting special permits to inland areas and that the board 
failed to comply with the Supreme Court's directive in MacGibbon I to 
state the rational motives, founded upon adequate findings of fact, for 
the board's decision. 14 
The Court in MacGibbon II not only held that the special permit 
provision of the by-law applied to coastal wetlands, but that the board 
could not refuse to issue a special permit to fill wetlands based solely 
on the town's desire to maintain the land in its natural state. In this 
context, the Court stated that "[i]t appears that the board, acting 
under the guise of zoning, intends to grant no special permits for any 
physical changes or improvements on any coastal wetlands in the 
town, and thereby to protect and preserve them in their natural 
state."15 The Court held that such a preservation of privately owned 
land in its natural state for the benefit of the public by preventing the 
owner from using it for any practical purpose was not within the 
scope of authority delegated to municipalities under the Zoning En-
abling Act. 16 In dicta, the Court indicated that the deprivation of all 
practical use of the land in order to maintain the land in its unspoiled 
condition would not only .exceed the bounds of the Zoning Enabling 
9 [d. at 691, 200 N.E.2d at 255. It is submitted that MacGibbon [ was incorrectly de-
cided. A permit to fill should at least be made contingent upon the issuance of a build-
ing permit. See Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Secretary, 508 F.2d 
927, 934-36 (2d Cir. 1974); Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. A.E.C., 
481 F.2d 1079, 1088-93 (D.C. Cir. 1973); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834-35 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
10 [d. at 692,200 N.E.2d at 256. 
11 MacGibbon II, 356 Mass. 635, 639-40, 255 N .E.2d 347, 351 (1970). 
12 /d. at 636, 255 N.E.2d at 349. 
13/d. at 642, 255 N.E.2d at 352. 
14 [d. at 639-40,255 N.E.2d at 350-51. 
15 [d. at 640, 255 N.E.2d at 351. 
16 [d. at 640-41, 255 N.E.2d at 351; The Zoning Enabling Act, G.L. c. 40A. 
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Act, but also would constitute a taking of property without compensa-
tion in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Con-
stitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Common-
wealth. I 7 The Court directed the board to hold further proceedings, 
in light of MacGibbon II, to determine if a special permit should be 
granted to the petitioners. ls 
The board held a third hearing and again denied the plaintiffs' ap-
plication for a special permit to fill their land, basing its decision on 
environmental protection grounds and the prevention of flooding and 
erosion.1 9 The superior court affirmed the board's decision, holding 
that both the environmental protection of coastal wetlands and pre-
vention of flooding and erosion were valid grounds under the Zoning 
Enabling Act upon which the town could zone to prohibit the filling 
of the land.20 The superior court also held that practical uses re-
mained in the land, so that the denial of the permit was not tan-
tamount to an unconstitutional taking without compensation.21 
On direct review, the Supreme Judicial Court in MacGibbon III re-
versed the superior court and directed the board to grant the permit 
to fill the land.22 The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the 
superior court that the prevention of flooding and erosion was a:n ap-
propriate issue for the board to consider in deciding whether or not 
to grant the permit to fill the land. The Court, however, applied a 
least restrictive means test and ruled that the board could not deny 
the permit on the basis of flooding and erosion since these problems 
could be reduced to an acceptable level by requiring safeguarn.s which 
the board had the power to order.23 
The only remaining ground for the denial of the special permit was 
the protection of the environment. The superior court found that a 
restriction for environmental protection purposes was not the same as 
a denial of a permit "solely to preserve the area in its natural state for 
the enjoyment of the public," which MacGibbon II had held was not a 
valid purpose for zoning under the Zoning Enabling Act. 24 The Su-
17Id. at 641, 255 N.E.2d at 351-52. Appropriation of private property for a public 
use is expressly forbidden by the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment and 
implied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Olson v. United States, 
292 U.S. 246, 254 (1934). For the purpose of this note the prohibition on the taking of 
private property will be discussed as a fourteenth amendment protection. The Mas-
sachusetts State Constitution also forbids the taking of property without compensation. 
Mass. Const. pt. 1 art. 10. 
18 [d. at 642, 255 N.E.2d at 352. 
19 MacGibbon I/l (1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 143, 149-54),340 N.E.2d 487,490-92 (1976). 
2°Id. at 149-52, 340 N.E.2d at 490-91. 
21Id. at 149, 340 N.E.2d at 490. 
22Id. at 143, 340 N.E.2d at 489. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered direct review 
on its own initiative pursuant to G. L. c. 211A, § 10(A). 
23Id. at 151-54,340 N.E.2d at 491-92. 
24Id. at 149, 340 N.E.2d at 490. In MacGibbon II the purpose claimed was to preserve 
the area in its natural state. The purpose was expanded in MacGibbon III to the protec-
tion of marine fisheries and the preservation of coastal wetlands. The former purpose is 
66
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/19
§15.16 ZONING AND LAND USE 515 
pre me Judicial Court agreed that the protection of coastal wetlands 
for environmental reasons was not covered by the MacGibbon II deci-
sion and that it constituted a proper public purpose for zoning under 
the Zoning Enabling ACt.25 However, the Court held that zoning for 
the purpose of protecting the environment would only be valid if the 
effect of the restriction was not so harsh as to deny the landowner all 
practical use of the land.26 
Upon consideration of the effect of the zoning restriction on the 
MacGibbons' land, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the trial 
court's finding that practical uses remained in the land.27 The uses the 
trial court had found, such as agriculture, recreation, birdwatching, 
kite flying, protection of a view, and conservation, were ruled not to 
be practical.28 In light of its finding that no practical uses remained in 
the land, the Supreme Judicial Court HELD: The preservation of wet-
lands in their natural state for environmental purposes is not a "le-
gally tenable ground" for the use of zoning regulations to prevent the 
filling of wetlands where the landowner is denied all practical use of 
the land.29 If the landowner had not been deprived of all practical use 
of the land, then the zoning regulation could have been used for en-
not a valid justification for zoning whereas the latter is a proper public purpose for zon-
ing. Id. at 149-50,340 N.E.2d at 490. 
25 !d. at 149, 150,340 N.E.2d at 490. 
26 !d. at 151, 340 N.E.2d at 491. 
27Id. at 150-51, 340 N.E.2d at 491. 
2·Id. at 151, 340 N.E.2d at 491. The Court did not explain why the uses found by 
the superior court were not practical. Presumably the court reached this result because 
none of the stated uses provided the land with any significant marketable economic 
value. The prohibition on the filling of wetlands does usually deprive the land of any 
marketable value. However, the facts found by the superior court indicate that the ef-
fect was not so severe in the MacGibbon case. MacGibbon bought the land in 1961 for 
$1,000. MacGibbon III, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh at 144, 340 N.E.2d at 489. The superior 
court found the land was now worth $5,300 unfilled and if developed would have a 
value of $44,000. Id. at 149, 340 N.E.2d at 490. The speculative future value of the 
land should not be considered in determining the extent of plaintiffs loss. Steel Hill 
Dev., Inc. v. Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 963 (1st Cir. 1972). Since the market value of 
the land as restricted was more than five times what MacGibbon paid for it, he suffered 
no out of pocket loss. By using the market value of the land to determine the uses left, 
the court should have ruled there were adequate uses remaining to avoid a taking. 
The MacGibbon case actually could have been decided on a much simpler basis. The 
plaintiffs bought the land after the zoning law went into effect. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
144, 340 N.E.2d at 488-89. The plaintiffs still had the right to challenge the validity of 
the zoning ordinance. See Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 
121 N.E.2d 517, 520 (1954). However, once the zoning law was declared to be a valid 
exercise of the police power, MacGibbon's notice as to the possible uses of the land 
when purchased should have been determinative of the taking issue. Since the plaintiffs 
did not buy the right to property which could be filled, the town was not taking a right 
the plaintiffs ever had. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on The 
Ethical Foundations of "just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1238 (1967) 
29Id. 
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vironmental purposes to stop the filling of the wetlands.30 However, 
the finding that no practical uses remained in the land resulted in the 
zoning restriction being held invalid. 
The full significance of the Court's decision in MacGibbon III was 
unclear because the Court did not expressly state whether its holding 
was based on a finding that the zoning regulation constituted an un-
constitutional taking or whether it merely reflected a decision by the 
Court that the restriction exceeded the authority granted to the town 
under the Zoning Enabling Act.31 As a result of the Court's failure to 
specify the grounds for its decision, the holding in MacGibbon III is 
open to two reasonable interpretations. First it may be interpreted 
that the denial of all practical use of the land so interfered with plain-
tiffs' property rights as to constitute an unconstitutional taking of the 
plaintiffs' land by the state.32 Second, the holding may be interpreted 
as merely defining the scope of the Zoning Enabling Act and not re-
aching the constitutional issue. Under this latter interpretation, Mac-
Gibbon III stands for the more limited proposition that although zon-
ing to protect wetlands is permissible under the Zoning Enabling Act, 
when the zoning regulation results in a deprivation of all practical use 
of the land the authority granted by the statute is exceeded.33 
In order to resolve the issue of the grounds for the Court's hoiding 
in MacGibbon III, the town petitioned the Court for a rehearing. 34 In 
30 See Golden v Selectmen of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 523, 265 N.E.2d 573, !J75-76 
(1970). 
31 The relevant provisions of the Zoning Enabling Statute are G.L. c. 40A, § § 2, 3. 
32 U.S. CONST. amend V and XIV; see also MASS. CONST. Pt. I art. 10. 
33 Insofar as Massachusetts had previously decided that the denial of all practical use 
of the land resulted in an unconstitutional taking of the property, see Commissioner of 
Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 107, 109, 206 N.E.2d 666, 669, 
670 (1965), MacGibbon III was generally interpreted as finding an unconstitutional tak-
ing. See Brief for Massachusetts Attorney General as Amicus Curiae at 5, Brief for Mas-
sachusetts Association of Conservation Commissions as Amicus Curiae at 2, MacGibbon 
IV, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 768, 344 N.E.2d 185. This interpretation placed in jeopardy 
other state statutes providing for similar restrictions on wetland filling, since these re-
strictions would similarly interfere with all practical use of the land and therefore result 
in takings. The statutes potentially affected would be G.L. c. 130, § 105 and G.L. c. 131, 
§ 40A, which provide for the protection of coastal and inland wetlands, respectively, 
and give the Commissioner of Environmental Management the power to prevent the 
filling of marshlands. Also affected might be G.L. c. 131, § 40, which allows local com-
munities to restrict the filling of wetlands, and the Zoning Act, G.L. c. 40A, §§ 1-17, 
which explicitly gives municipalities the power to enact zoning restrictions to conserve 
natural resources and prevent pollution. 
34 MacGibbon IV, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 768, 344 N.E.2d 185. Amicus Curiae briefs 
were submitted by the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, the Massachusetts Asso-
ciation of Conservation Commission, the Conservation Law Foundation of New Eng-
land, Inc. with the Massachusetts Audubon Society, the Environment Committee of the 
Boston Bar Association, and Stuart DeBard. These groups were concerned that MacGib-
bon III, particularly if it were interpreted as reaching the constitutional issue, would 
prevent the state from restricting the filling of valuable wetlands under the authority of 
the various environmental protection statutes identified in note 33 supra. 
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denying the petition for rehearing in MacGibbon IV,35 the Court stated 
that it had not decided any constitutional issues in MacGibbon III,36 but 
rather had merely defined the extent of the power granted to the 
town under the Zoning Enabling Act.37 In this context, the Court 
stated: "[MacGibbon III] held that the uses of the plaintiffs' land, as 
testified to by the board's expert, are not 'practical' in the sense used 
in MacGibbon II in defining the power of a town under the Zoning 
Enabling Act."38 Thus the Court indicated that its consideration of 
whether any practical use remained in the land was only for the pur-
pose of determining whether the restriction went beyond the power 
granted to the town under the Zoning Enabling Act, and not for the 
purpose of deciding a constitutional taking issue.39 It should be noted, 
however, that the Zoning Enabling Act, upon which the MacGibbon III 
decision was based, was replaced in 1975 by a new zoning act. 40 Since 
35Id. 
36 See id. at 771, 344 N.E.2d at 187. MacGibbon III held the zoning restriction was in-
valid because it denied the plaintiffs all practical use of their land. The significance of 
this holding was unclear because MacGibbon II had applied a practical use standard to 
determine both whether the statutory authority was exceeded and whether the restric-
tion on the land constituted an unconstitutional taking. 
First, the Supreme Judicial Court in MacGibbon II used the fact that no uses remained 
in the land to determine that the restriction exceeded the town's authority under the 
statute. According to the Court: 
The preservation of privately owned land in its natural, unspoiled state for the en-
joyment and benefit of the public by preventing the owner from using it for any 
practical purpose is not within the scope and limits of any power or authority del-
egated to municipalities under the Zoning Enabling Act. 
356 Mass. at 640-41, 255 N.E.2d at 351. This did not necessarily mean that the Court 
found an unconstitutional taking, since the restriction could exceed the power granted 
under the Zoning Enabling Act and still be within the degree of restriction allowable by 
the Constitution. Confusion developed when the Court stated in the next paragraph 
that there would be an unconstitutional taking if the restriction "deprives the plaintiffs' 
land of all practical value .... " Id. at 641, 255 N.E.2d at 352. This constitutional stan-
dard was the same as the standard used to define the extent of the power granted by 
the Zoning Enabling Statute. 
After MacGibbon II, on remand the zoning ordinance was found not to be grounded 
in the purpose of preserving the "land in its natural, unspoiled state for the enjoyment 
and benefit of the public," but in protecting marine fisheries and the environmental 
protection of coastal wetlands. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 149, 340 N.E.2d 490. When the 
Supreme Judicial Court found this latter purpose to be a legitimate purpose for zoning 
under the statute, the only question remaining appeared to be whether the restriction 
amounted to a taking. Therefore, the finding in MacGibbon III of no practical uses re-
maining in the land was interpreted as deciding the constitutional taking issue. Such an 
interpretation could not be reconciled with the rehearing denial opinion which held 
that no constitutional issues were decided in MacGibbon Ill. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 769, 
344 N.E.2d at 186. 
37 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 769, 344 N.E.2d at 186. 
38Id. 
39 See note 36 supra. 
40 The MacGibbon III decision was based on the Zoning Enabling Act before it was re-
pealed by the new zoning act of 1975, G.L. c. 40A, §§ 1-17. MacGibbon IV, 1976 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 768, 769, 344 N.E.2d 185, 185. 
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Mac Gibbon III held only that the authority granted by the old act was 
exceeded, the possibility remains that a prohibition on the filling of 
wetlands to protect the environment may be constitutional and the 
town may have the authority to implement such a restriction under 
the new zoning actY 
Allowing the restriction under the new zoning act is possible be-
cause the new statute expands the purposes for which a municipality 
may zone specifically to include "the conservation of natural resources 
and the prevention of blight and pollution of the environment."42 
One of the methods set forth for accomplishing the act's objectives is 
"restricting, prohibiting, permitting, or regulating: 1. uses of land, in-
cluding wetlands .... "43 Since protection of the environment and 
regulation of wetlands are now express purposes of the zoning act, 
the Court could decide that the new zoning statute gives towns the 
power to restrict the filling of wetlands for the purposes of protecting 
the environment, even where the uses of the land are as restricted as 
they were in MacGibbon. 
The rehearing denial opinion, MacGibbon IV, indicates that the Su-
preme Judicial Court wanted to keep open the possibility that a pro-
hibition on the filling of wetlands without compensation could be con-
stitutional. In addition to emphasizing that the MacGibbon III decision 
was based solely on the old Zoning Enabling Act and not the new Zon-
ing Act of 1975,44 the Court stated that MacGibbon III did not decide 
anything with respect to other state statutes governing the protection 
of wetlands.45 Therefore, a prohibition on the filling of wetlands may 
be constitutional when implemented under proper statutory authority, 
such as the new Zoning Act or the statutes which give the Commis-
sioner of Environmental Management the power to prevent the filling 
of marshland.46 
Since MacGibbon III did not exclude the possibility that other stat-
utes, aside from the old Zoning Enabling Act, may provide valid au-
thority for a MacGibbon III -type restriction, the courts will still have to 
decide whether sufficient uses remain in such restricted land to avoid 
an unconstitutional taking. Therefore, even if the MacGibbon III opin-
ion is limited to defining the power granted to the towns by the old 
Zoning Enabling Act, the significance of Mac Gibbon III cannot be dis-
missed. Although such a limitation would mean that the MacGibbon III 
holding would not be directly applicable to restrictions placed on wet-
lands under other statutes or even the new zoning act, still MacGibbon 
III exhibits the concern of the Court for protecting an individual's 
41 See G.L. c. 40A, §§ 1-17. 
42 The Zoning Act, St. 1975, c. 808, § 2A. 
43/d. 
44 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 768-69, 344 N.E.2d at 186. 
45 [d. at 770-71, 344 N.E.2d at 187. 
46 See note 33 supra. 
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property rights. Additionally, it should be noted that the taking issue 
is not dismissed in MacGibbon III, but merely avoided by basing the 
decision on the now defunct Zoning Enabling Act. Eventually the 
courts will have to confront the unconstitutional taking issue. MacGib-
bon III provides an indication of the standard the Massachusetts Court 
will apply when deciding if a regulation constitutes an unconstitutional 
taking, and also foreshadows a shift in the court's approach to the 
problem. 
This note will first examine the various tests courts have adopted 
for determining when a zoning regulation results in an un-
constitutional taking. In this context, the conflict between police 
power regulation and the fifth and fourteenth amendments' protec-
tion of individual property rights will be considered. The note will 
then analyze various approaches to the taking issue to determine 
which approach Massachusetts should adopt in light of the conflicting 
interests of wetlands protection and private property rights. It will be 
submitted that a balancing test is best suited to the proper resolution 
of the taking issue, and that this is the test which the Commonwealth 
approaches in MacGibbon. Finally, the shortcomings of the balancing 
test will be considered and recommendations as to the future direction 
of the Massachusetts Court will be made. 
I. U NCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING: POLICE POWER AND FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
The roots of the taking issue lie in the United States Constitution, 
as well as in many state constitutions, which proscribe the taking of 
property by the government without compensation.47 If the govern-
ment uses private property for a public purpose the owner must re-
ceive just compensation.48 However, judicial interpretation has shown 
that the proscription is not an absolute one. For example in Mugler v. 
Kansas,49 the United States Supreme Court held that a state need not 
provide compensation when regulating the uses of land under an 
exercise of its police power to promote general public welfare and to 
protect health, morals and safety.50 The exercise of a state's police 
power, however, can in some instances conflict with the fourteenth 
amendment's prohibition against the taking of property without com-
47 U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV; Mass. CONST. Pt. 1 art. 10. For the provisions of 
other states, see generally J. SACKMAN AND P. ROHAN. 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 
6.1 [3] at 6-19 (Revised 3d. ed. 1976). [Hereinafter cited as NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN]. 
48 See Pumpelly v. Green Bay, 80 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1871). 
49 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
50 [d. at 669; the proper grounds for an exercise of a state's police power were set 
forth in Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 (1915) and Noble State Bank v. Haskele, 219 
U.S. 104, 111 (1911). 
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pensation.51 Therefore, in order to preserve the protections of the 
fourteenth amendment, the police power must be limited.52 The dif-
ficulty arises in determining where the line is to be drawn between a 
valid exercise of the police power not requiring compensation and a 
taking which, if uncompensated, would violate the constitution. 53 
Wetland regulations exemplify this conflict between a valid exercise 
of the 'police power and an unconstitutional taking. Protection of wet-
lands by use of the police power is appropriate54 because wetlands are 
a necessary natural resource that must be protected for the public 
welfare.55 The problem is that the restrictions on the land necessary to 
protect wetlands frequently deny the landowner all practical use of his 
land and, therefore, may amount to a taking of property requiring 
compensation. The courts must therefore decide the permissible de-
gree of restriction on the use of the land before a taking results.56 
II. STANDARDS EMPWYED TO RESOLVE THE TAKING ISSUE 
The courts have not provided any clear guidance with respect to 
drawing the proper line of demarcation between a valid exercise of 
the police power and a taking of property. However, several tests have 
been formulated. 
A. THE DIMINUTION IN VALUE TEST 
The most prevalent test is the "diminution of value" test set forth by 
51 See note 17 supra. 
nSee Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,412-13 (1922). 
53 See Kratovil and Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 
596, 608-611 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Kratovil and Harrison]. 
54 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 47, § 33.5 at 33-38.11; MacGibbon III, 
1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 149-50,340 N.E.2d at 490; Commissioner of Natural Resources 
v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 107, 111,206 N.E.2d 666, 669, 671 (1965); State v. 
Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 713, 716 (Me. 1970). 
$5 The authorities are in agreement that wetlands are necessary to prevent water pol-
lution, protect marine fisheries, provide a buffer zone to diminish soil erosion and vari-
ous other public benefits. Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in 
Light of Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. I, 18-30 (1972) [hereinafter 
cited as Binder]; Note, Coastal Wetlands in New England, 52 B.U. L. REV. 724, 725-730 
(1972); Note, State and Local Wetlands Regulation: The Problem of Taking Without Just Com-
pensation, 58 VA. L. REV. 876, 877-79 (1972); Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legislation in 
the States, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 351, 352 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Heath]. 
58 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 47, § 33.5(6) at 33-38.10(53); Binder, supra 
note 55, at 1-9; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149, 149-52 
(1971); see generally BOSSELMAN, CALLIES AND BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); Van 
Alstyne, Taking or Damaging ITy Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1970); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations if "just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1171 (1967) 
[hereinafter cited as Michelman]; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37, 
46 (1964). 
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the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 57 
In Pennsylvania Coal, a state law prohibited certain coal mining that 
had caused the subsidence of homes. 58 The coal company owned the 
rights of subjacent support of the surface owners, and the mining re-
striction made substantial amounts of valuable coal unrecoverable. Jus-
tice Holmes, in holding that the prohibition exceeded the police 
power, stated, 
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values in-
cident to property could not be diminished without paying for 
every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some 
values are ,enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to 
the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have 
its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One 
fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of 
the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if 
not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and 
compensation to sustain the act. 59 
The "diminution in value" test as set forth by the Supreme Court re-
quires that some beneficial use remain in the land or the restriction 
will be a taking. 60 By focusing on the extent of the economic harm in-
flicted on the individual affected by a restrictive regulation, the "dim-
inution in value" test determines the validity of the regulation by ref-
erence to the extent of the private loss. In applying the diminution in 
value test courts have based their decision solely on the degree of in-
terference with the landowner's property rights without any consid-
eration of the importance of the public purpose supporting the reg-
ulation.61 
57 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Several states, including Massachusetts, have adopted the "dim-
inution in value" test to determine if a restriction on the filling of wetlands results in a 
taking. See, e.g., Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 1M, 
109, 206 N.E.2d 666, 670 (1965); Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 151 
Conn. 3M, 309, 197 A.2d 770,772 (1964); State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 715 (Me. 
1970); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.]. 539, 
555-56, 193 A.2d 232,241-42 (1963); if. Millet; v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 196,82 
A.2d 34, 37 (1951). For a discussion of t1te Massachusetts cases see notes 149-160 infra 
and accompanying text. 
58 260 U.S. at 412-13. 
59ld. at 413. 
6. See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). 
61 Connecticut is an example of one state that has adopted the diminution in value 
test. In Bartlett v. Zoning Commission, 161 Conn. 24, 29, 31, 282 A.2d 907, 909, 910 
(1971), the Connecticut Supreme Court decided that marshland which by regulation 
could not be filled had. no practical use and, therefore, the imposition of such a regula-
tion amounted to an unconstitutional taking. /d. In that case, the market value of plain-
tiffs land if filled was $32,000, whereas the value if the land was not filled was $1,000. 
ld. at 29,282 A.2d at 910. In light of such a diminution of value, the Court found that 
plaintiff had been denied all practical use of his land and t1terefore, the state had to 
pay compensation for the land. ld. at 29, 31, 282 A.2d at 910-911. Thus the Connec-
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B. THE BALANCING TEST 
Courts began to recognize inadequacies in the diminution in value 
test when they attempted to apply it to situations where the individual 
landowner's actions had adverse effects on the public generally.62 The 
diminution in value test, by focusing narrowly on the effect of the 
regulation on the landowner, failed to consider the importance of the 
public policy control objectives of the regulation.63 Some restrictions 
on the use of the land, such as flood control regulations, must be 
allowed despite severe interference with the landowner's property 
rights since there is no other means to protect the public from harm 
that may result from certain activities of the individual landowner. 64 
Therefore, some courts began to move away from the diminution in 
value test and consider the purpose as well as the effect of the regula-
tion. 
In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,65 the United States Supreme 
Court, in recognition of the need to consider the public purpose of 
the regulation, abandoned a strict diminution in value standard, but 
failed to replace it with any other definable standard.66 The town in 
Goldblatt had passed a zoning ordinance that resulted in the closing of 
plaintiffs gravel excavation business.67 The ordinance had been 
passed because plaintiffs excavation had cteated a lake that was a 
threat to a newly-developed residential area.68 Plaintiff argued that 
the ordinance deprived him of all economic use of the land.69 The 
Court upheld the ordinance, but did not decide exactly how far the 
ordinance could go in restricting the use of the land, since it found 
that the plaintiff had not met his burden of proving that no economic 
use remained in the land. 70 While the Goldblatt Court expressed a con-
tinued belief in the importance of the degree of diminution of value 
in the land, it stated that such diminution was not conclusive.71 The 
tieut Supreme Court, in properly applying the diminution in value test, ignored the en-
vironmental protection purpose of the regulation and the adverse effects a finding of a 
taking might have on the public. 
6. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastion, 239 
U.S. 394,410-11 (1915). 
63 See notes 56-62 supra and accompanying text. 
"See, e.g., Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 235, 284 N.E.2d 891, 900 
(1972),cert denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973). 
65 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
66 The Goldblatt Court stated that "[tlhere is no set formula to determine where reg-
ulation ends and taking begins." Id. at 594. 
67 The Court found that the regulation completely destroyed the mining utility of 
plaintiffs land. Id. at 592. 
681d. at 595-96. 
691d. 
7°ld. at 594. 
711d. The Court did not set forth the reasoning behind its conclusion but merely 
stated that, "Although a comparison of values before and after is relevant, see Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, it is by no means conclusive." In support of this deci-
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Court did not explain why diminution in value alone would no longer 
be conclusive, but presumably the Court arrived at this conclusion be-
cause it realized that in the Goldblatt situation the regulation would 
have to be upheld regardless of its effect on the landowner because of 
the need to protect the homeowners from the dangers of the excava-
tion. 
Goldblatt was significant because it recognized that the courts had to 
consider more than just the effect on the individual landowner. How-
ever, the usefulness of the case is limited because it failed to specify 
what factors should be considered in addition to the effect on the 
landowner. Therefore, reference must be made to other decisions to 
determine what other factors may be instrumental in a determination 
of whether an unconstitutional taking has occurred. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Turnpike Realty Co. v. 
Dedham,72 recognized that the purpose of the regulation should be 
considered in addition to the effect on the landowner. 73 The town in 
Turnpike prohibited the filling of wetlands in order to preserve a flood 
plain.74 The landowners claimed that no practical use was left for the 
land and therefore, under the "diminution in value" test, there was a 
taking. 75 The Court applied a "balancing test" weighing the harm 
prevented by the regulation against the extent of the invasion of the 
owner's property rights. 76 In setting forth its balancing approach the 
Court stated: "Although it is clear that the petitioner is substantially 
restricted in its use of the land, such restrictions must be balanced 
against the potential harm to the community from overdevelopment 
of a flood plain area."77 The uses remaining in the land were consid-
ered adequate in light of the public harm prevention purposes of the 
restriction. 
Under this balancing approach, the Court could allow the severe re-
striction on the use of the land because of the importance of the 
state's objective in passing the regulation. If the "diminution in value" 
test had been followed, the Court would only have considered the ef-
sion the Court cited Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), where a diminution 
in value from $800,000 to $60,000 was upheld. In Hadocheck the city zoned in a manner 
which prohibited the continued functioning of the plaintiffs brickyard. A residential 
area had grown up around the brickyard. [d. at 406. The concern in both Hadocheck 
and Goldblatt was for the health and safety of the new residential neighbors. The im-
portance of this objective justified any ill effect on the landowner of the regulated prop-
erty. In sum, both cases went beyond mere consideration of the effect on the land-
owner and also considered the importance of the public purpose to determine if the reg-
ulation amounted to a taking of property. 369 U.S. at 594. 
72 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), mt. denied, 409 U.S. ll08 (1973). 
73/d. at 235, 284 N.E.2d at 900. 
14 [d. at 223-225, 284 N.E.2d at 893-94. 
75 [d. at 235, 284 N .E.2d at 900. 
76/d. at 235, 284 N.E.2d at 900. 
77 [d. 
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feet on the land. Since the land was severely restricted in its uses, a 
taking would have resulted despite the flood prevention objectives of 
the state. The balancing test continued to give consideration to the ef-
fect of the regulation on the individual landowner; however, under 
the balancing approach a severe diminution in value would be allowed 
if the importance of the state's purpose outweighed the need to pro-
tect the individual's property rights. 
C. THE HARM PREVENTION TEST 
Some courts have moved beyond the balancing approach to a test 
that considers only the purpose of the regulation and ignores the ef-
fect on the private landowner. Shortly after the Goldblatt decision, the 
California Supreme Court adopted a "harm prevention" test. In Con-
solidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles,78 the Court ruled that there 
was no taking even though no economic uses remained in the land. 79 
Such a severe interference with the landowner's private property 
rights would clearly result in a taking if the diminution in value test 
was applied and would require a strong public necessity to overcome a 
finding of a taking under the balancing approach. The Consolidated 
decision, however, ignored the effect on the landowner and ruled that 
the regulation was valid because it was based on a reasonable public 
purpose.80 
The town in Consolidated implemented a zoning ordinance that pro-
hibited the use of plaintiffs land for a rock and gravel operation.81 
The trial court found that the land was very valuable if used for rock 
and gravel excavation, but had no value for any other purpose.82 The 
harm caused by the excavation was the creation of dust and a lower-
ing of property values.83 Although the court stated that it believed 
safeguards could be required that would eliminate most of the harm-
ful effects, significant amounts of dust would still be created.84 In 
light of the area's reputation as a haven for respiratory ailment suf-
ferers, the court found the ordinance to be reasonable. 85 After the 
court determined that the regulation was a reasonable exercise of the 
police power to prevent a public harm caused by the spillover effects 
of the private use, it did not examine the effect the regulation had on 
the landowner's property rights to determine if there was a taking. 
78 57 Cal.2d 515, 530-32, 370 P.2d 342, 351-52, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 647-48, appeal dis-
missed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). For more extensive discussion of case, see Note, 50 CALIF. L. 
REV. 896 (1962). 
79 57 Cal.2d at 530-32,370 P.2d at 351-52,20 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48. 
8°Id. at 647-48. 
81Id. at 518, 370 P.2d at 344, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 640. 
82Id. at 519,370 P.2d at 344,20 Cal. Rptr. at 640. 
83/d. at 520, 370 P.2d at 345, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 641. 
84Id. at 519,370 P.2d at 344,20 Cal. Rptr. at 640. 
8. Id. at 519-20, 370 P.2d at 344-45, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 640-41. 
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Rather, the court held on the basis solely of the harm prevention as-
pects of the regulation that there was no taking of the land.86 Califor-
nia, therefore, rejected the "diminution in value test" in favor of a 
"harm prevention test" where any reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
exercise of the police power to regulate a private use of the land that 
creates a public harm will not be a taking regardless of the effect on 
the value of the land. 87 
The extreme position of Consolidated, that no reasonable exercise of 
the police power could result in a taking, effectively gave the state the 
power to deny the landowner all use of his land without paying com-
pensation so long as the restriction served a reasonable public pur-
pose. In response to the need to give some protection to the private 
landowner, California restored some limitations on the police power 
when it applied its "harm prevention test" directly to a wetlands reg-
ulation in Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation 
and Development Commission. 88 As part of a comprehensive plan to pro-
tect the ecological balance of the San Francisco Bay, the Commission 
prohibited the filling of plaintiffs' land.89 The plaintiffs claimed that 
their land, for which they had paid $40,000 in 1964, had no practical 
value in its unfilled condition and that, therefore, the regulation 
amounted to a taking without compensation.90 After finding the reg-
ulation to be a valid exercise of the police power, the Court retreated 
slightly from the extreme position it had taken in Consolidated that no 
valid exercise of the police power could constitute a taking.91 The 
Candlestick court in deference to the holding of the United States Su-
preme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, admitted that, "an 
undue restriction on the use of private property is as much a taking 
for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it."92 
8Sld. at 530-32, 370 P.2d at 351-52, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48; Such a holding was in 
direct conflict with the Pennsylvania Coal Co. ruling, which the California Court dis-
missed as being decided before comprehensive zoning became prevalent.ld. at 528, 370 
P.2d at 350,20 Cal. Rptr. at 646. See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text. 
871d. at 528,530,370 P.2d at 350,351,20 Cal. Rptr. at 646,647. On appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court, Consolidated was dismissed for lack of a substantial federal 
question in a per curiam decision technically on the merits. 371 U.S. 36 (1962). (For the 
significance of a dismissal for want of a substantial federal question see Hicks v. 
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1975).) In dismissing the appeal, it is unlikely that the 
Supreme Court was adopting the California position that any reasonable exercise of the 
police power would not be a taking, because less than a year earlier the Supreme Court 
in Goldblatt had reasserted that a valid police power regulation could, in some instances, 
result in a taking. Nevertheless, Consolidated indicates that where a state imposes a re-
striction to prevent a public harm the Supreme Court will rarely find the restriction to 
be an unconstitutional taking. (See NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 47, at 33-
38.16-33-38.17.) although there remains some nebulous point where the regulation be-
comes a taking. (Goldblatt v. Hemstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962». 
88 II Cal. App. 3d 557, 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 906 (1970). 
89/d. at 562, 571,89 Cal. Rptr. at 899, 905-06. 
90/d. at 562, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 899. 
911d. at 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 906. 
921d. 
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To decide whether the prohibition against the filling of wetlands 
constituted such an "undue restriction," however, the court continued 
to consider the purpose of the regulation and not the effect on the 
individual landowner. In this context, the court stated that: 
In view of the necessity for controlling the filling of the bay, as 
expressed by the Legislature in the provisions discussed above, it 
is clear that the restriction imposed does not go beyond proper 
regulation such that the restriction would be referable to the 
power of eminent domain rather than the police power.93 
Applying this reasoning, the California court in Candlestick concluded 
that the necessity of the public purpose of the regulation justified any 
adverse effects on the individual landowner. The court in Candlestick 
therefore maintained the harm prevention test of Consolidated, but 
added the requirement that the harm prevented by the regulation 
reach some level of necessity in order to justify a severe restriction on 
the use of the land.94 In Candlestick, the precarious condition of the 
bay and the need for a regional approach were enough to satisfy the 
cQurt that the restriction was necessary.95 The Court did not consider, 
however, what other means the state might have to protect the bay 
nor why requiring compensation would prevent the protection of the 
bay. 
D. THE WISCONSIN ApPROACH 
The three standards which have been set forth above, the "diminu-
tion in value test", the "balancing test", and the "harm prevention 
93Id . 
• 4 When New Hampshire adopted the "harm prevention test," the requirement that 
the public purpose reach some level of importance to justify the restriction on the use 
of the land was maintained. Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 128-29, 336 A.2d 239, 
241-43 (1975). In Sibson, plaintiffs claimed that a denial of a permit to fill their land 
amounted to a taking without compensation. Id. at 128, 336 A.2d at 241. The court 
ruled that the prohibition for environmental protection purposes against the filling of 
wetlands was a valid exercise of the police power in that it proscribed future uses of the 
land that would be harmful to the public. Id. at 130, 336 A.2d at 240, 243. The court 
said that such a restriction would be sustained "unless the public interest is so clearly of 
minor importance as to make the restriction of individual rights unreasonable." Id. at 
129, 336 A.2d at 242. Sibson, like Candlestick, thus required that the purpose of the re-
striction reach some threshold level of importance. The court found that the protection 
of wetlands not only justified proscribing future uses which required changing the na-
ture of the land, but would even sustain interferences with current uses. The court in 
dicta stated, "The importance of wetlands to the public health and welfare would clearly 
sustain the denial of the permit to fill plaintiffs' marshland even were their rights the 
substantial property rights inherent in a current use of an activity on their land." /d., 
336 A.2d at 242-43. In Sibson, the restriction did not interfere with a current use but 
this indicates how far the "Harm Prevention Test" will allow the state to infringe upon 
private property rights in order to protect the public from injurious private uses of the 
land. 
95 Candlestick, 11 Cal. App. 3d at 571-72, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (1970). 
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test", all assume that some private property right has been violated by 
the prohibition of the filling of wetlands. The issue, then, is whether 
the infringement on property rights amounts to a taking. Wisconsin 
takes a different approach which denies that the landowner ever 
owned the right to fill the land. Therefore, a regulation that prohibits 
the filling of wetlands does not take any property rights from the 
landowner.96 This approach is based upon Wisconsin's unique defini-
tion of the collection of rights, powers, privileges and immunities that 
form "property."97 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in just v. Marinette County,98 found 
that this cluster of property rights did not include a landowner's right 
to change the natural character of his land. The Court stated: "An 
owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the 
essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for 
which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights 
of others."99 The court considered the filling of wetlands to constitute 
such a change in the natural character of the land. Therefore any re-
striction on the filling of wetlands would not interfere with the land-
owner's cluster of private property rights. 
Since the landowner was not deprived of any property rights by the 
wetlands regulations, the court concluded that despite any diminution 
in the value of the land caused by the regulation, no taking would re-
sult. The court dismissed the importance of the diminution in value 
when it stated: "While loss of value is to be considered in determining 
whether a restriction is a constructive taking, value based upon chang-
ing the character of the land at the expense of harm to public rights is 
not an essential factor or controlling."loo 
98 The Wisconsin approach is based on a fundamentally different premise than the 
Massachusetts approach which assumes that some property right has been violated. It is 
unlikely that Massachusetts will adopt Wisconsin's definition of property rights which 
excludes the right to substantially change the natural character of the land. Neverthe-
less the novel Wisconsin approach is a significant indicant of where courts might be 
moving to protect the environment by decreasing the degree of control an individual 
has over his or her property. Greater public intrusion upon private property rights has 
been the trend of the twentieth century and it is not unrealistic to believe that the Wis-
consin approach, which is a logical extension of this trend, will be the path the courts 
choose to follow as the need for public control over land use increases. 
97 Earliest interpretations of the "taking of property" clause of the United States Con-
stitution considered property to be a tangible object of ownership which could only be 
taken by a physical taking over of the land. Kratovil and Harrison, supra note 53 at 599. 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, courts redefined property not to mean the 
land itself but a collection of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities. [d. at 600. See 
Eaton v. B.C. & M.R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 511 (1872). Determining whether a taking had 
occurred then became problematic and dependent mainly on the extent of the denial of 
this cluster of property rights. 
98 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). For further discussion of this case see Note, 4 
SETON HALL L. REV. 662 (1973). 
99Just at 17,201 N.W.2d at 768. 
100 [d. at 23, 201 N.W.2d at 771. 
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The Wisconsin court thus will not consider the possibility of filling 
as part of the value of the land because the rights of ownership do 
not include the right to change the natural character of the land in a 
manner that injures the public. Therefore any diminution in value 
caused by a prohibition on the filling of wetlands will be irrelevant to 
a determination of the taking issue. 
The Wisconsin approach does not merely resolve the taking prob-
lem, but eliminates it entirely by a definitional process. Insofar as the 
Wisconsin court determined that property ownership rights do not in-
clude the right to destroy substantially the natural character of the 
land, the state's prohibition against the filling of wetlands cannot be 
deemed a usurpation· of any property rights and therefore such a 
prohibition will not constitute a taking. lol 
The rules of decision employed by various courts to resolve the tak-
ing issue divide into four approaches - the "diminution in value 
test," the "balancing test," the "harm prevention test," and the Wis-
consin definitional approach. lo2 The Supreme Court has not clearly 
decided which standard is the most appropriate for determining when 
a regulation constitutes a taking. loa As a result state courts have varied 
widely in their approaches. lo4 Massachusetts, like the other states, has 
101 See id. at 23-24, 201 N.W.2d at 771. 
102 One other approach to the wetlands problem should be discussed for a complete 
understanding of the regulatory weapons available to protect wetlands. In Zabel v. TaM, 
430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971), the Secretary of the 
Army prohibited the filling of plaintiffs' wetlands property to protect fish and wildlife. 
The Secretary imposed me restriction on the authority of section 10 of me Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899, c. 425 30 Stat. 1121, 1151, which was originally designed to pro-
tect navigable water under authority of the commerce clause. [d. at 202-03. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled mat a national policy favoring en-
vironmental. protection had. given the Secretary me power to prohibit the filling of 
non-navigable wetlands solely on environmental grounds. [d. at 207-14. The court dis-
missed the taking issue as irrelevant since wetlands are SUbject to a paramount ser-
vitude in the federal government under power incident to me Commerce Clause. [d. at 
215. 
A discussion of the appropriateness of using me Commerce Clause for environmental 
protection is beyond the scope of mis article. However, it is important to note that the 
federal government as a result of Zabel v. TaM has the means to accomplish wetlands 
preservation wimout paying compensation to the landowner. Although me Commerce 
Clause ground of the decision in Zabel v. TaM is not applicable to state regulation of 
wetlands, the case demonstrates the degree of importance federal courts have attached 
to wetlands protection. Also the extent to which the Secretary of the Army pursues mis 
policy will influence me need for state regulation, but it is unlikely mat mis avenue 
alone will adequately protect wetlands. Therefore, states must still confront the problem 
of determining how far the police power can restrict me use of the land to protect the 
environment without becoming an unconstitutional taking. 
For further discussion of Zabel v. Tabb, see Recent Developments, 1970 DUKE L. REV. 
1239. 
103 See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court 
Expropriation Law, 1962 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 63, 63. 
10< Compare Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124,336 A.2d 239 (1975) with Bartlett v. Zoning 
Commission, 161 Conn. 24,282 A.2d 907 (1971). 
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been searching for an explicit standard to apply to the taking issue. 
Massachusetts originally adopted the diminution in value test,105 but 
has found this test to be inappropriate under certain circumstances 
where the public need for regulation is great and the payment of 
compensation is not practical.106 Massachusetts is currently in the pro-
cess of formulating a new test to replace the diminution in value 
standard.107 In formulating its new standard, Massachusetts should be 
aware of certain inadequacies which exist in each of the proposed 
tests. 
The second half of this note will analyze the various tests in order 
to expose the problems associated with each. First, the diminution in 
value test will be found inadequate because it fails to consider the 
public purpose supporting the regulation. The harm prevention test 
will then be criticized for failing to apply a least restrictive means 
analysis to ensure that property rights are not violated unnecessarily. 
Next, the Wisconsin approach will be rejected because it fails to give 
adequate consideration to the effect on the private landowner. Then 
the balancing test will be critically analyzed. Finally, it will be sub-
mitted that the balancing test is the best approach to resolve the un-
constitutional taking issue. In the last section of this note, Mas-
sachusetts' development toward a balancing approach will be set forth 
and recommendations will be made as to further refinements in this 
area. 
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TESTS 
A. THE DIMINUTION IN VALUE TEST-F AlLURE TO CONSIDER THE PUBLIC NEED 
The diminution in value test is inadequate for the purpose of de-
termining if a taking has occurred because it only considers the effect 
of the regulation on the landowner. It considers neither the reg-
ulation's purpose nor whether an alternative means exists. A prohibi-
tion on the filling of wetlands almost always denies the landowner all 
practical use of his land. Thus, if only the effect on the individual 
landowner is considered, wetlands regulations will usually constitute a 
taking requiring compensation. The payment of compensation there-
fore, will be the only way to protect wetlands. This would result in 
many wetlands being unprotected due to a state's inability to afford to 
pay compensation. If these unprotected wetlands are filled, irrepara-
ble harm will be caused to the environment. Such a result cannot be 
tolerated. States must have the means to protect the environment for 
future generations. Therefore, the courts should consider not only the 
105 See Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 
N.E.2d 666 (1965); MacGibbon II, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970). 
108 See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891, 900 (1972). 
107 See id.; MacGibbon Ill, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 143,340 N.E.2d 487 (1976). 
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effect on the individual owner, but also the importance of the state's 
objective. . 
By contrast, courts that apply the "diminution in value" test are as-
suming that the state can afford to pay for the wetlands. lOS Such an 
assumption is often incorrect,109 but leads the court mistakenly to be-
lieve that the individual's rights are being protected without sacrificing 
the environmental objectives. For example, it is doubtful that Maine 
can afford to pay compensation for the wetlands that must be pro-
tectedYo Yet the Maine Supreme Court, applying a diminution in 
value test, ruled in State v. Johnson lll that prohibitions against the fill-
ing of wetlands for conservation purposes result in a takingY2 The 
court based its opinion that the costs of the taking should be publicly 
borne on two grounds: (1) no commercial value remained in the land, 
and (2) the benefits of preservation of wetlands are state-wide,11a The 
Maine Court failed to consider, however, the importance of the pur-
pose of protecting wetlands, or the feasibility of a condemnation pro-
gram accomplishing this objective. 
After Johnson, the only means available to Maine for protecting wet-
lands is acquisition. Maine does have an acquisition program,114 but 
the public funds are inadequate to protect wetlands. 1 IS As one com-
mentator has suggested, the Maine court should change its position 
because the condemnation doctrine fails to protect wetlands satisfac-
torily, and therefore an intolerable destruction of necessary wetlands 
resultsYs The fact that a finding of a taking would in practice de-
prive the state of its only feasible means of adequately protecting wet-
lands should have been considered by the Maine court. 
B. THE HARM PREVENTION TEST-UNNECESSARY INTRUSIONS UPON PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The "harm prevention test" resolves the inadequacy of the diminu-
tion in value test by considering the public purpose justification for 
the regulation instead of considering simply the effect on the land-
ownerY7 However, while the "harm prevention test" avoids the pitfall 
108 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Zoning Commission, 161 Conn. 24, 30, 282 A.2d 907, 910 
(1971). 
109 See Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional 
Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 47 & n.343 (1972); Wilkes, Constitutional Di-
lemmas Posed by State Policies Against Marine Pollution - The Maine Example, 23 MAINE L. 
REV. 143, 149-50, 172, 173 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Wilkes]; see generally BOSSELMAN 
AND CALLIES. THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971). 
110 Wilkes, supra note 109, at 148-50,172,173. 
111265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1971). 
In /d. at 716. 
113/d. 
114 Heath, supra note 55, at 367. 
115 Wilkes, supra note 109, at 148-50, 172, 173. 
118/d. at 172. 
117 See notes 78-95 supra and accompanying text. 
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of the "diminution in value test", it also is too narrow in its scope be-
cause it fails to give adequate consideration to the need to protect the 
rights of the individual landowner. The only protection afforded the 
individual under the "harm prevention test" is the requirement that 
the purpose of the regulation be necessary for the public welfare. 
This protection is inadequate because it fails to include an investiga-
tion into whether the means chosen to protect the public is the least 
restrictive means available. 
A finding that wetlands protection is necessary to protect the public 
from the environmental consequences of filling the land should not 
alone justify restricting the use of the land to the extent of making it 
worthless. The effect of such a regulation would be to shift the entire 
cost of the conservation of wetlands, which conservation would inure 
to the benefit of the general public, to those persons who own the 
property,11s The owners of once valuable coastal wetlands would be 
left with useless marshland. Such an inequitable distribution of the 
costs of protecting the environment and so severe an intrusion on pri-
vate property rights should only be tolerated as a last resort when the 
state has no other means of protecting the public interest. Wetlands 
can only be preserved by prohibiting their filling, but the need for the 
prohibition does not resolve the issue of compensation. The "harm 
prevention test" does not even consider the crux of the problem 
which is whether a state can adequately protect wetlands, while simul-
taneously protecting private property rights. By considering only the 
purpose of the regulation and the benefit to the public, the "harm 
prevention test," thereby, fails to give a proper emphasis to the need 
to protect an individual landowner's property rights. 
C. THE WISCONSIN ApPROACH - INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION OF THE EFFECT ON THE 
LANDOWNER 
The Wisconsin approach, like the "harm prevention test," ignores 
the substantial loss inflicted upon the landowner by the elimination of 
his commonly recognized right to fill his land. Wisconsin tried to 
avoid the problem of distributing the costs of wetlands protection by 
ruling that the landowner is not really losing anything,119 Such an ap-
proach is mistaken because the economic value of land has tradition-
ally included the value of the right to fill the land. If filling is forbid-
den, the landowner loses property to the extent of the difference be-
tween the value of the land with the possibility of filling and the value 
in its natural state, a loss which is usually substantial in wetland 
cases. 120 A prohibition on the filling of wetlands may, and usually 
118See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149, 177-86 
(1971). 
119 See also Sibson v. State. 115 N.H. 124, 128-29, 336 A.2d 239, 242-43 (1975). 
120 See, e.g., MacGibbon III, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 149, 340 N .E.2d at 490, where the 
land had a fair market value of $5,300 in its unfilled state but if it could be filled it 
would have a value of $44,000. 
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does, leave the land without any practical use. The Wisconsin ap-
proach ignores this real change in the value of the land. The problem 
of deciding who is going to bear the costs of the decreased land value 
does not disappear by redefining property rights. Although theoreti-
cally the elimination of the right to change the natural character of 
the land will avoid a taking, the real world economic effects should 
not be ignored. 
In addition, if the Wisconsin approach is taken to its exteme even 
the cutting down of a tree could be prohibited since this would 
change the natural character of the land. Even the Wisconsin court 
would not want to vest this much power in the state at the expense of 
private property rights. As various land developments are challenged 
on the ground that the natural characteristics of the land are being 
changed, the Wisconsin court will have to more specifically define the 
point at which changes in the land exceed those authorized by pro-
perty ownership. Deciding where this line should be drawn depends 
upon the same factors as the taking issue, i.e., the extent of the di-
minution in value of the land, the harm to the public from changing 
the land, and consideration of less restrictive means to prevent the 
harm caused by the change in the use of the land. Consequently, the 
Wisconsin approach does not define the problem away, but merely re-
frames it. 
D. THE NEED FOR A BALANCING ApPROACH 
The "diminution in value test," the "harm prevention test," and the 
Wisconsin approach each fail to mediate adequately the conflict be-
tween public necessity and the protection of private property rights. 
The "diminution in value test" fails to consider the importance of the 
public objective and therefore its application may foreclose the only 
means available to accomplish a necessary public purpose. 121 Con-
versely, the "harm prevention test" ignores the importance of protect-
ing the landowner from interferences with his property rights. Under 
the "harm prevention test," a landowner may be deprived of all eco-
nomic use of his land even if the state could have accomplished its ob-
jective by an alternative means which would not have usurped private 
property rights. 122 Like the "harm prevention test," the Wisconsin ap-
proach fails to give adequate consideration to the effect on the land-
owner. The Wisconsin Court allows the state to prohibit any changes 
in the characteristics of the land regardless of the necessity for such a 
restriction. As a result the landowner may be deprived of the use of 
his land even though the state's goal could have been accomplished by 
a less restrictive means.123 
121 See notes 108-116 supra and accompanying text. 
122 See notes 117-118 supra and accompanying text. 
123 See notes 119-120 supra and accompanying text. 
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The balancing test best resolves these problems by weighing the 
public need, the landowner's interests, and the availability of other 
means to accomplish the state's objective. The advantages of the 
balancing approach are threefold: it (1) allows the court to permit re-
strictions on land use when necessary for the public welfare regardless 
of the effect on the landowner, (2) provides the landowner with an 
independent check on the legislative decision that the regulation is 
necessary, and (3) permits flexibility in result as required by changing 
social circumstances. 
The first advantage is demonstrated by the Turnpike situation. 124 In 
Turnpike the State prohibited the filling of the wetlands in order to 
protect the public from flooding which may have resulted from the 
filling of the land. Despite a severe diminution in the value of the 
land the balancing approach allowed the Court to uphold the zoning 
regulation due to the importance of the public need. 125 The balancing 
approach prevented the Court from focusing narrowly on the effect 
on the individual's land and on that basis striking down the restriction 
as an unconstitutional taking. Nevertheless, the balancing standard re-
cognizes that an individual whose land is so severely restricted in use, 
as it was in Turnpike, should be entitled to challenge through the 
courts both the necessity of the controls and the reasonableness of the 
means chosen.126 
The second advantage of the balancing approach is that it provides 
for an independent determination of the necessity of the regulation. 
This independent check on the legislature's decision is necessary to 
protect the landowner from a legislature which may be focusing on 
the public need without proper regard for the private harm. 127 Legis-
latures in the attempt to resolve difficult problems in a manner most 
beneficial to the general public, occasionally lose sight of the need to 
protect fundamental individual rights. 128 To protect the individual 
from such abuses by the legislature the balancing approach forces the 
court to make an independent determination of the importance of the 
public purpose and the necessity of the means chosen. This de-
termination is then weighed against the severity of the private harm. 
By this process, the balancing test assures that only regulations which 
are absolutely necessary will be allowed when the regulation results in 
substantial restrictions on the use of the land. 
The third benefit of the balancing approach is that it provides the 
court with the flexibility necessary to deal with constantly changing 
factual circumstances and the infinite variety of combinations of pub-
124 Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 235, 284 N.E.2d 891, 900 (1972). 
For a discussion of Turnpike see notes 72-77 supra and accompanying text. 
125 Id. at 235, 284 N.E.2d at 893-94. 
126 See Binder, supra note 55 at 12. 
127 See Kratovil and Harrison, supra note 53 at 629. 
128 See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 24-25 (1962). 
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lic benefit and private detriment which may arise under the taking is-
sue. 
As the social environment changes, the degree of necessity of a pub-
lic intrusion upon property rights may change.129 The flexibility of 
the balancing approach prevents the court from being trapped into a 
specific definition of a taking which in a rapidly changing world may 
not continue to resolve adequately the conflict between the public 
need and the private property right. 130 For example, fifty years ago 
almost any court would have considered prohibition on the filling of 
wetlands to be a taking. However, as the environmental benefits of 
wetlands became more important to society, courts began to allow 
such a restriction on wetlands without finding a taking.131 The balanc-
ing approach allows for such a change in result without changing the 
framework of the standard applied to arrive at the result. 
The advantages of the balancing approach result from its ability to 
combipe the concern of the diminution in value test for the in-
dividual's property rights with the assumption underlying the harm 
prevention test that the individual's rights must be subordinate to the 
public interest. By weighing the necessity for the regulation against 
the extent of the infringement on private property rights, the balanc-
ing approach permits the court to vary the degree of diminution in 
value of the land allowed. In this manner the "balancing test" avoids 
the inflexibility of the other tests, and the courts can protect the in-
dividual's property rights as much as possible without interfering with 
any vital public objectives. 
Nevertheless, the balancing approach does have several drawbacks. 
The balancing approach is attacked first for being overly subjective, 
thereby failing to provide a concrete basis for predictability of result, 
and second for involving the courts in determinations more appropri-
ately left to the legislature. 132 
The problem of subjectivity arises because the balancing approach 
places on the courts the burden of determining the importance of the 
policy underlying the regulation. The result under the balancing test 
depends to a great extent on the court's evaluation of the necessity of 
the regulation. Since the importance of the public purpose of the 
129 See Kratovil and Harrison, supra note 53 at 6lO; Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 
YALE L. J. 36, 61 (1964). 
130 See Kratovil and Harrison, supra note 53 at 6lO. 
131 See NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 47, at § 1.42 [18] [3], at 1-300.1; see, 
e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Candlestick Prop-
erties Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Comm., 11 Cal. App. 
3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975); 
Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, cert denied, 409 
U.S. 1040 (1972). 
132 See Harris, Environmental Regulations, Zoning, and Withheld Municipal Services: Taking 
of Prrtperty by MultiGovernment Action, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 635, 659 (1973) [hereinafter 
cited as Harris]; Binder, supra note 55 at 11-12. 
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regulation is a subjective decision, courts' assessments of the Im-
portance of public purpose will vary in each case. l33 
The difference in result between the superior court and the Su-
preme Judicial Court in MacGibbon III illustrates the way in which the 
subjectivity inherent in the balancing approach can lead to varying re-
sults. The superior court considered the preservation of wetlands to 
be so important as to justify the zoning restriction. l34 The Supreme 
Judicial Court, however, characterized wetland protection as a mere 
"public benefit" and therefore would not tolerate the degree of in-
terference with property rights that the superior court allowed. l3s 
Both of these results are consistent with the proper application of the 
balancing test, yet the decisions vary because of the particular court's 
perception of the importance of the public purpose. Because the line 
drawn between a valid exercise of the police power and an un-
constitutional taking will depend under the balancing test on this sub-
jective determination of the importance of the public purpose, the line 
will not be clear; it may vary from court to court and may change with 
the times and circumstances. l36 
Aside from being criticized as being overly subjective, the balancing 
test can be attacked for involving the courts in legislative decisions. l37 
After making its determination with respect to the degree of im-
portance of the purpose of a restriction, a court employing a balanc-
ing test would weigh the purpose and the reasonableness of the means 
designed to accomplish that purpose against the effect on the in-
dividual's rights. The balancing approach assumes courts can weigh 
these dissimilar factors of public interest and private detriment, and 
decide whether or not the public purpose justifies the invasion of 
property rights. l3s It also assumes that courts can determine which 
method is the best way to accomplish the purpose.l39 
Critics of the balancing approach argue that the legislature is better 
equipped to make aU of these decisions. The legislature has the re-
sources to make proper studies to determine the nature and extent of 
the problem which the regulation is supposed to alleviate. In addition, 
the legislature is structured in a manner conducive to evaluating the 
various proposals to cope with a problem and brokering the various 
interests to arrive at the most socially desirable solution. l40 
The courts cannot deal as effectively with the general social prob-
lem because they are structured to deal only with the narrower proh-
133 See Harris, 'supra note I ~2 at 659. 
134 MacGibbon III, 1976 Mass. Adv, Sh, at 146, 149, 340 N .E.2d at 489, 490. 
135Id. at 150-51,340 N.E.2d at 491. 
136 See Harris, supra note 132 at 659. 
137 See Mickelman, supra note 57 at 1195. 
138 See Harris, supra note 132 at 659. 
139 See Binder, supra note 55 at 11-12. 
140 See Sax, supra note 56 at 176. 
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lems of the specific two adversaries before them.141 Courts do not 
have the time, resources, or political format to decide properly the 
degree of' public need for the regulation or the feasibility of other 
means to accomplish the desired objective. 
The wetlands situation demonstrates the appropriateness for legisla-
tive determination of some of the decisions the balancing test forces 
the court to make. For example, the court will not be able to commis-
sion studies to determine the ecological impact of filling wetlands, or 
the amount of wetlands that need to be preserved, or the number of 
people affected by such a regulation, or the costs of purchasing wet-
lands. Nevertheless, the balancing approach involves the court in a 
consideration of all these factors in deciding whether a restriction on 
the filling of wetlands should be considered a taking. 
Despite the inherent dangers of judicial legislating and the problem 
of subjectivity, it is submitted that the benefits of the balancing ap-
proach outweigh these disadvantages. Although the subjective de-
termination of the public need for the regulation can lead to varying 
results, it is a necessary determination to insure that an individual's 
property rights will not be violated unless absolutely necessary. The 
core of the taking problem is a conflict between individual property 
rights and society's needs. 142 This conflict should not be made a battle 
of absolutes. Rather the conflict should be mediated to protect prop-
erty rights but in the light of what is best for society generally.143 
Such a mediatory function requires that the court become involved 
with making decisions as to the importance of the public objective, the 
availability of alternative means to accomplish that objective, and the 
degree of interference with property rights. 144 Some of these de-
terminations necessarily involve a subjective element; however, all of 
these factors must be considered if the court is going to give 
maximum protection to property rights and yet not place the state in 
a position where it will have no means to accomplish an essential pub-
lic objective. 
Admittedly the balancing approach involves the court in legislative-
type decisions. The court, however, in applying the balancing test, 
should not substitute its judgment as to the proper resolution of the 
social problem for that of the legislature. 145 Rather, the court should 
merely offer an added safeguard to insure that all due consideration 
has been given to the rights of the individuals affected.146 The 
legislative-type decisions which the balancing test requires constitute a 
141 See generally BATOR. MASHKIN. SHAPIRO. AND WECHSLER. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 66-7 (2d ed. 1973). 
142 See Kratovil and Harrison, supra note 53 at 627-28. 
143 See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 61-63 (1964). 
144 See NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN. supra note 47 § 33.5, at 33-38.17-33-38.18. 
145 [d. at § 33.5, at 33-38.15-33-38.17. 
146 See Kratovil and Harrison, supra note 53 at 629. 
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legitimate judicial function in this context of acting as the protector of 
private property rights. 147 
In addition, the intrusion upon what are normally considered legis-
lative functions is necessary for the court to understand the full 
ramifications of its decision. For example, the determination of the 
reasonableness of the means may involve consideration of the state's 
ability to pay for other means of accomplishing the objective. Clearly 
budgetary considerations are exclusively within the legislative sphere. 
Nevertheless, the court may have to take note of fiscal restraints in 
order to determine the reasonableness of the means chosen. In the 
area of flood plain or wetland preservation zoning, the determination 
of the state's ability to pay compensation will be crucial. One alterna-
tive means of protecting wetlands is for the state to take the land by 
eminent domain and pay compensation for the land. The reasonable-
ness of this method of preserving wetlands depends upon the state's 
fiscal ability to pay compensation for the land. A requirement by a 
court that compensation must be paid, when the state cannot afford to 
pay such compensation, will have the same effect as prohibiting the 
regulation of the wetland filling. If the protection of wetlands is 
necessary to prevent a public harm, then the requirement that com-
pensation be paid when the state cannot afford to pay compensation 
for all the necessary wetlands may result in irreparable harm to the 
environment. The balancing approach, by forcing the court to con-
sider the availability of other means of accomplishing the public pur-
pose, would expose to the court these ramifications of requiring com-
pensation to be paid for the wetlands. In light of the failure of emi-
nent domain adequately to protect wetlands, the court might choose 
to allow the zoning restriction on the filling of wetlands even though 
it denies the landowner of certain property rights. 
This capacity to permit a state to place restrictions on property 
when necessary for the public welfare, while providing maximum pro-
tection for property rights is the touchstone of the balancing ap-
proach. Courts should not abandon their duty to protect individuals 
from confiscatory legislative action. However, the judiciary must also 
be mindful of those situations in which severe interferences with prop-
erty rights without compensation must be tolerated for the public's 
welfare. 148 In deciding when these situations exist it is not in-
appropriate, rather it is essential, that the court make certain 
legislative-type decisions to properly balance the public need and the 
private right. This balancing framework allows only necessary in-
trusions on property rights and the individual is given the added pro-
tection that the court must agree with the legislature that the imposi-
tion upon property rights is essential and compensation cannot be re-
147 [d. 
148 See Binder, supra note 55 at 45. 
89
Huber: Chapter 15: Zoning and Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
538 1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.16 
quired. The individual is thus protected from unwarranted intrusions 
upon his property rights, yet, society is not shackled by property 
rights when the legislature and the court agree that the public need 
requires that the property rights be infringed without the payment of 
compensation. 
In light of the conclusion that the balancing test is the best ap-
proach to the taking issue, recent developments in the Massachusetts 
taking standard shall be considered to determine whether the Su-
preme Judicial Court is moving in the proper direction. 
IV. MASSACHUSETTS' EVOLUTION TOWARD THE BALANCING ApPROACH 
In Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & CO.,149 Mas-
sachusetts first confronted the wetlands taking problem and set forth 
a diminution in value standard to resolve the issue.1so In Volpe, the 
Commissioner of Natural Resources sought to enjoin the defendant 
from filling any of his marshland. lSI The purpose of the restriction 
was to protect marine fisheries and maintain the ecological balance of 
the area. 1S2 The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the Common-
wealth's police power could be used to protect wetlands, but if the 
regulation deprived the landowner of all practical use of the land, an 
invalid taking would be found. 153 The Court required that practical 
uses remain for the land when it said: "A crucial issue is whether, 
notwithstanding the meritorious character of the regulation, there has 
been such a deprivation of the practical uses of a landowner's prop-
erty as to be the equivalent of a taking without compensation."lS4 
Thus, in Volpe, Massachusetts adopted the "diminution in value test" 
and therefore looked to the effect on the landowner to determine if a 
taking had occurred. ISS 
In MacGibbon II,1s6 the Supreme Judicial Court again held that a 
finding of a taking would depend on the uses left in the land.1s7 
When considering the plaintiffs' claim that the zoning by-law 
amounted to an uncompensated taking, the Court stated: "[The tak-
149 349 Mass. 104,206 N.E.2d 666 (1965). 
150ld. at 109, 206 N.E.2d at 670. 
ISlld. at 105, 206 N.E.2d at 667-68. 
152Id. at 106, 206 N.E.2d at 668. 
1531d. at 107, 206 N.E.2d at 669. 
IS4Id. 
155 The Court remanded the case to superior court for a determination by that court 
of whether or not there were any practical uses left in the land. The Commonwealth 
then dropped the case because they were confronted with an unsympathetic judge in 
the lower court. Consequendy, the diminution in value standard set out in Volpe was 
never actually applied. See Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legislation in the States, 5 LAND & 
WATERL. REV. 351, 361 (1970). 
156 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970). 
157Id. at 641, 255 N.E.2d at 352. 
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ing issue] involves the question whether the power to regulate under 
the zoning by-law is exercised in such a manner and to such an extent 
that it deprives the plaintiffs' land of all practical value to them or to 
anyone acquiring it .... "158 The Court did not actually apply the test 
and decide the taking issue, since the court did not have to reach the 
constitutional issue because it held that the town had exceeded the 
power granted to it by the Zoning Enabling Statute.159 However, after 
noting the legal alternatives available to the town to preserve the land, 
the Court, in dicta, indicated that if it had to reach the constitutional 
issue it would find that the zoning restriction deprived plaintiffs' land 
of all practical value and therefore constituted an unconstitutional tak-
ing without compensation.160 
In Volpe and MacGibbon II, the Supreme Judicial Court defined an 
unconstitutional taking as a deprivation of all practical uses of the 
land. This standard was changed in MacGibbon III, where the Court 
examined the effect on the uses of the land in conjunction with the 
purpose of the restriction; that is, the protection of the environ-
ment.161 The zoning restriction in MacGibbon III was not held invalid 
solely because of its effect on the landowner's use of the land. Rather, 
the Court indicated that the effect on property was too substantial 
when zoning for environment purposes.162 
Once before, in Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, the Supreme Judicial 
Court had found it necessary to consider the degree of diminution in 
value allowed in light of the public purpose supporting the regula-
tion. 163 In Turnpike the regulation had the same effect as in MacGibbon 
III in that it prohibited the filling of wetlands. Notwithstanding the 
identical effect upon the landowners in Turnpike and MacGibbon III 
the cases reached opposite results, with Turnpike allowing the regula-
tion and Mac Gibbon III holding it invalid.164 The results in these two 
cases would be inconsistent if Massachusetts were still applying a dim-
inution in value test. However, the opposite results can be explained 
under the balancing standard by reference to the two distinct public 
IS8ld. 
159 ld. at 640-41. 
180 See id. For interpretations of Mac Gibbon II, see Binder, supra note 55 at 40: 
The implication [of Mac Gibbon II] is clear that the Massachusetts court does not ap-
prove of wetlands preservation tI1rough zoning or prohibitions on development. 
Consequently, it appears to be the rule in Massachusetts that if the state wishes to 
preserve wetlands in their natural state it will have to do so by acquisition, and not 
by regulation. 
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 715-16 (Me.1970); NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra 
note 47, at § 33.5[c] at 33-38.20 n.75. 
161 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 149-51,340 N.E.2d at 490-91. 
182ld. 
163 Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972). For a dis-
cussion of Tumpilu! see notes 72-77 supra and accompanying text. 
164 See Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV .. 650, 
663-69 (1958). 
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purposes involved. In MacGibbon III the purpose of the restriction was 
to preserve environmentally necessary wetlands. The Court charac-
terized this purpose as a "public benefit" rather than the prevention 
of a private use that creates a public harm. 165 However, in Turnpike 
the purpose of the restriction was not only to provide for the en-
vironmental protection of wetlands but also to prevent flooding. The 
distinction between the two cases is that the Court considered the 
purpose of flood control in Turnpike to be more important than the 
environmental protection purpose in Mac Gibbon III. The more impor-
tant purpose in Turnpike justified a greater invasion upon property 
rights. Therefore the restriction could be upheld even though the ef-
fect of the regulation was the same as in Mac Gibbon III. The fact that 
the purpose of the regulation was dispositive of the taking issue in 
MacGibbon III and Turnpike indicates an abandonment of the diminu-
tion in value test in favor of a balancing test which makes the diminu-
tion in value permissible without a taking contingent upon the im-
portance of the purpose of the regulation. 166 
In conjunction with the balancing approach, Massachusetts is also 
moving toward a least restrictive means test. The least restrictive 
means test is a judicial standard that is often used when applying the 
balancing approach to a particular set of facts, in order to protect 
against unnecessary interferences with property rights.167 According 
to the "least restrictive means" analysis, if there is a reasonable 
alternative method available for the state to accomplish its purpose, 
the state must choose the method that will result in the least in-
fringement of private property rights. 16S Therefore, a state will be 
unable to restrict the use of property without paying compensation 
unless no other reasonable means is available to achieve the necessary 
public objective of the regulation. 
The effectiveness of the least restrictive means test in eliminating 
certain claimed state objectives for a regulation was exhibited in Mac-
Gibbon III. In that case, the town claimed that one of its purposes in 
185 MacGibbon III, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 151, 340 N .E.2d at 491. Most courts allow 
greater restrictions on the land when the purpose is to prevent a public harm, rather 
than provide a public benefit. The preservation of coastal wetlands has been considered 
either a public use of the land to provide the benefits of an ecologically balanced 
coastline to the public or the prevention of a private use, the filling of the land, which 
creates a public harm by its bad environmental spillover effects. Compare State v. 
Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970) with Candlestick Properties Inc. v. San Fran-
cisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 571, 89 
Cal. Rptr. 897, 905 (1970). 
188 The balancing test, which weighs the purpose and effect of public benefits against 
the private burden, has also been suggested by several commentators. See, e.g., Binder, 
supra note 55 at 9-18; Kratovil and Harrison, supra note 53 at 626-29; Dunham, A Legal 
and Economic Basisfor City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650,663-69 (1958). 
187 See Binder, supra note 55, at 11. 
188 See id. at 11, 12. 
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denying the permit to fill the land was to prevent flooding and ero-
sion.169 Mac Gibbon III held that the town could not prevent the filling 
of the land on the grounds of flooding and erosion because less re-
strictive means to prevent these problems were available. 170 The Court 
found that flooding and erosion could be prevented by appropriate 
conditions and safeguards which the town's board of appeals had the 
power to require. l7l The Court then concluded that: "The danger of 
flooding and erosion was therefore not a legally tenable ground for 
outright denial of the permit. The problem should have been resolved 
by conditions and safeguards, and it is to be so resolved."172 
The application of this least restrictive means test provides the court 
with a judicially manageable standard for making decisions as to the 
appropriateness of restrictions on the land which would normally be 
considered legislative-type decisions. Moreover, the least restrictive 
means analysis furnishes an objective framework within which the 
court can construct what might otherwise appear to be a subjective 
decision thereby making the decision more understandable, accept-
able, and more likely to be perceived as being fair. Therefore, when 
the least restrictive means analysis can be utilized it functions as a 
built-in check on the disadvantages of the balancing approach. How-
ever, the value of the least restrictive means standard as applied to the 
wetlands preservation problem is limited because there is only one 
physical method for preserving wetlands, and that is to prohibit the 
filling of the land. Nevertheless, the application of the least restrictive 
requirement in MacGibbon III to the issue of flood control and erosion 
provides further indication that Massachusetts is adopting the balanc-
ing approach to resolve the taking issue. 
This shift to a balancing approach is a welcome improvement over 
the Supreme Judicial Court's earlier adherence to the diminution in 
value standard. Under the diminution in value standard, restrictions 
on the filling of wetlands would constitute unconstitutional takings be-
cause of the resulting severe interference with the landowner's use of 
the land. The new balancing approach will allow the Court to permit 
such a restriction if it is necessary for the public welfare. However, the 
Supreme Judicial Court does not appear prepared yet to accept wet-
lands protection as a public purpose which justifies severe restrictions 
on the use of the land. 
Nevertheless, the movement toward a balancing test is significant 
because it involves the court in a consideration of the public purpose 
as well as the private effect. Therefore, supporters of a wetlands zon-
ing restriction will be able to move the courts beyond a mere discus-
169 See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 151-54, 340 N.E.2d at 491-92. 
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sion of the practical use left in the land to a consideration of the im-
portance of the public objective. The fact that the Supreme Judicial 
Court's particular view on the importance of wetlands protection may 
be mistaken is not as significant as this shift to the balancing 
framework to resolve the problem. By use of the balancing approach 
the courts will be able to recognize situations where property rights 
must bow to public concerns and thereby avoid placing the state in a 
position where it has no means to accomplish a vital public objective. 
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